Print Email Facebook Twitter Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate Part of: ERES 2017: 24th Annual Conference of the European Real Estate Society· list the conference papers Title Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate Author Dröes, Martijn Ziermans, Boris O. Koppels, Philip W. Date 2017-07-01 Abstract Using a unique transactions dataset, this paper examines the determinants of lease incentives in the Amsterdam office market. The study focusses on the type of landlord involved (institutional/privately owned) and whether the tenant or landlord used an advisor to help them with the transaction. The results show that an institutional landlord, ceteris paribus, offers 11 percentage points more incentives than a private owner. In addition, a landlord who uses the services of an advisor pays 16 percentage points less incentives. An advisor at the side of the tenant increases incentives by 7 percentage points. If both parties use an advisor lease incentives are not statistically different from using no advisors at all. The results in this paper highlight the crucial role of market information, information asymmetry, and bargaining in the market for commercial real estate. Subject commercial real estateoffice marketlease incentivesadvisorinformation asymmetry To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:db22b8a0-d69b-49f0-8666-a12f446dc815 Part of collection Conference proceedings Document type conference paper Rights (c) 2017 The Author(s) Files PDF 19 Information Asymmetry, ... ole of.pdf 1.48 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:db22b8a0-d69b-49f0-8666-a12f446dc815/datastream/OBJ/view