Print Email Facebook Twitter ROSE Title ROSE: Robust Searchable Encryption with Forward and Backward Security Author Xu, Peng (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) Susilo, Willy (University of Wollongong) Wang, Wei (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) Chen, Tianyang (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) Wu, Qianhong (Beihang University) Liang, K. (TU Delft Cyber Security) Jin, Hai (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) Date 2022 Abstract Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) has been widely recognized as a promising technique to delegate update and search queries over an outsourced database to an untrusted server while guaranteeing the privacy of data. Many efforts on DSSE have been devoted to obtaining a good tradeoff between security and performance. However, it appears that all existing DSSE works miss studying on what will happen if the DSSE client issues irrational update queries carelessly, such as duplicate update queries and delete queries to remove non-existent entries (that have been considered by many popular database system in the setting of plaintext). In this scenario, we find that (1) most prior works lose their claimed correctness or security, and (2) no single approach can achieve correctness, forward and backward security, and practical performance at the same time. To address this problem, we study for the first time the notion of robustness of DSSE. Generally, we say that a DSSE scheme is robust if it can keep the same correctness and security even in the case of misoperations. Then, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive named key-updatable pseudo-random function and apply this primitive to constructing ROSE, a robust DSSE scheme with forward and backward security. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of ROSE and give the experimental comparisons. Subject Searchable Symmetric EncryptionForward and Backward SecurityRobustnessKey-Updatable PseudoRandom Function To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:fd506670-bdfa-4e21-b81f-573966c7c456 DOI https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2022.3155977 Embargo date 2023-07-01 ISSN 1556-6013 Source IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 17, 1115-1130 Bibliographical note Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public. Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type journal article Rights © 2022 Peng Xu, Willy Susilo, Wei Wang, Tianyang Chen, Qianhong Wu, K. Liang, Hai Jin Files PDF ROSE_Robust_Searchable_En ... curity.pdf 1.75 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:fd506670-bdfa-4e21-b81f-573966c7c456/datastream/OBJ/view