Print Email Facebook Twitter Coordination games in cancer Title Coordination games in cancer Author Bayer, Péter (Toulouse School of Economics; Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse) Gatenby, Robert A. (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute) McDonald, Patricia H. (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute) Duckett, Derek R. (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute) Staňková, K. (TU Delft Transport and Logistics; TU Delft Mathematical Physics) Brown, Joel S. (Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute; University of Illinois at Chicago) Date 2022 Abstract We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy. To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:c0955b1f-e9a6-4b75-960f-d794da377941 DOI https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0261578 ISSN 1932-6203 Source PLoS ONE, 17 (1 January) Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type journal article Rights © 2022 Péter Bayer, Robert A. Gatenby, Patricia H. McDonald, Derek R. Duckett, K. Staňková, Joel S. Brown Files PDF journal.pone.0261578.pdf 1.29 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:c0955b1f-e9a6-4b75-960f-d794da377941/datastream/OBJ/view