Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) allows secure searches over a dynamic encrypted database but suffers from inherent information leakage. Existing passive attacks against DSSE rely on persistent leakage monitoring to infer leakage patterns, whereas this work targets intermittent observation - a more practical threat model. We propose Peekaboo - a new universal attack framework - and the core design relies on inferring the search pattern and further combining it with auxiliary knowledge and other leakage. We instantiate Peekaboo over the SOTA attacks, Sap (USENIX' 21) and Jigsaw (USENIX' 24), to derive their “+” variants (Sap+ and Jigsaw+). Extensive experiments demonstrate that our design achieves >0.9 adjusted rand index for search pattern recovery and ~90% query accuracy vs. FMA's ~30% (CCS' 23). Peekaboo's accuracy scales with observation rounds and the number of observed queries but also it resists SOTA countermeasures, with >40% accuracy against file size padding and >80% against obfuscation.

Telecommunication services are essential in ensuring the operation of numerous critical infrastructures. While mobile network security increased with the advancement of generations, emerging concepts such as the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) are transforming the traditional operation of Radio Access Networks (RANs). Novel concepts and technologies are finding their way into RANs with a focus on softwareization and virtualization. This increases the overall attack surface and introduces new attack vectors not necessarily found in traditional RANs. This paper shows that Denial of Service (DoS) attacks leveraging subscription mechanisms can compromise O-RAN implementations. We present a novel DoS attack targeting the Near Real-Time (Near-RT) RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC). By deploying a malicious xApp, we demonstrate how an adversary can flood the Near-RT RIC with excessive subscription requests, leading to service disruption. This attack exploits the lack of rate-limiting mechanisms within the Service Model (SM), a critical component of the Near-RT RIC responsible for handling E2 subscription requests. We systematically evaluate various attack scenarios and investigate the underlying vulnerabilities exposed. Furthermore, we propose and assess countermeasures to safeguard publicly accessible O-RAN systems from such threats.

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks in computer vision tasks. Current adversarial detections are ineffective against white-box attacks and inefficient when deep CNNs generate high-dimensional hidden features. This study proposes MeetSafe, an effective and scalable adversarial example (AE) detection against white-box attacks. MeetSafe identifies AEs using critical hidden features rather than the entire feature space. We observe a non-uniform distribution of Z-scores between clean samples and adversarial examples (AEs) among hidden features and propose two utility functions to select those most relevant to AEs. We process critical hidden features using feature engineering methods: local outlier factor (LOF), feature squeezing, and whitening, which estimate feature density relative to its k-neighbors, reduce redundancy, and normalize features. To deal with the curse of dimensionality and smooth statistical fluctuations in high-dimensional features, we propose local reachability density (LRD). Our LRD iteratively selects a bag of engineered features with random cardinality and quantifies their average density by its k-nearest neighbors. Finally, MeetSafe constructs a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) with the processed features and detects AEs if it is seen as a local outlier, shown by a low density from GMM. Experimental results show that MeetSafe achieves 74%, 96%, and 79% of detection accuracy against adaptive, classic, and white-box attacks, respectively, and at least 2.3× faster than comparison methods.

The emergence of softwarized network devices, like programmable switches and smart NICs, has brought about new and advanced network functionalities. Intelligent decision-making becomes possible at line rate by offloading network functionality from the network control-plane to the programmable data-plane. In this paper, we offload fine-grained Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack detection to the data-plane. The state-of-the-art in this regard, mainly aims to embed Machine Learning (ML) models into the data-plane without compromising on inference accuracy. Besides accuracy, we must consider multiple other factors, like traffic feature availability and false positive rates. To that end, we propose O’MINE: ONE MODEL IS NOT ENOUGH, a novel collaborative detection mechanism comprising lightweight ML models. This maximises the detection accuracy while keeping the false positive rate (FPR) low. We use three state-of-the-art datasets to evaluate the O’MINE algorithm and its ML models. Our results show that O’MINE can detect DDoS attacks with high accuracy (≈98% and ≈96% with full and scarce training data, respectively) and low FPR (≈0.22% and ≈0.72% with full and scarce training data, respectively), outperforming the state-of-the-art. Lastly, O’MINE only consumes a few device resources (≈6% of LUT and ≈4% of FF) on the Xlinx Alevo U250 FPGA we have used for inference at line rate.