A.R. Hale
Please Note
22 records found
1
HRO and RE
A pragmatic perspective
This special issue invites to a debate to elaborate on differences and similarities between the perspectives of High Reliability Organisation (HRO) and Resilience Engineering (RE). Such a debate may be conducted along both essentialistic and pragmatic lines, and we suggest that the latter approach is potentially more interesting and fruitful than the first. We use the technique of feeding off controversies and expand on what might at first look merely like a polemic disagreement, a question of wording, namely the definition of safety as a dynamic non-event. This elaboration is used as a projector onto a canvas where a number of distinguishing themes between HRO and RE are outlined more clearly; symmetry, normativity, addressee and origin are keywords that show how HRO and RE are different, and why they cannot simply be combined into one grand theory of everything. Other concrete results from these investigations include a review of applications of HRO and RE in health research, an elaboration of the distinction between Safety I and Safety II, and a nuancing of how we may understand and study successful operations. We suggest a research agenda that combines the scopes and methods of HRO and RE, possibly in combination with other theoretical approaches. We also call for a more lively discussion on central themes of HRO and RE, not for fighting over definitions and proving who is right, but with the aim of producing knowledge that makes a difference regardless of theoretical stance.
The safety professional in the UK
Development of a key player in occupational health and safety
The appointment of people working full time as advisers or enforcers for the prevention of work accidents and occupational diseases can be traced back in the UK (United Kingdom)to the factory inspectors in the early 19th Century. From the early 20th Century companies started to employ their own occupational safety and health (OSH)staff to undertake preventive tasks and to monitor compliance with legislation and company rules and procedures. Both the inspectorate and the companies faced comparable policy decisions about the role, selection, education and training of these OSH staff, who, by the 1940s, were taking the first steps to becoming a profession in the field of working conditions. This paper presents a historical summary of the developments in the UK which determined the role and requirements for appointment, education, training and work of both these groups of budding professionals (inspectors and company OSH staff). It traces the steps which have characterised this process of professionalisation, summarising them using as framework the criteria for becoming a recognised profession as set out in the introduction to this special issue (Hale et al., this issue).
There have long been discussions on the professionality of occupational health and safety (OHS) and concerns about standards of practice, with the recognition of OHS as a profession further inhibited by lack of clarity on role and variations in terminology and principles underpinning practice. In 2013, the International Network of Safety and Health Practitioner Organisations (INSHPO) recognized the need for a global approach to reconceptualise OHS professionals as influential leaders who can work to integrate OHS within business processes. The Occupational Health and Safety Professional Capability Framework: A Global Framework for Practice was subsequently developed by this international body representing OHS professional associations across 10 countries with the outcome endorsed by 53 organisations at a ceremonial signing of the Singapore Accord. This paper reviews the development of the framework and the emergence of two clear roles; the OHS Professional and OHS Practitioner. It explores the process for clarifying the roles and required knowledge and skills together with the challenges experienced along the way. The paper recognises that the framework should not be a static document and so concludes by considering the work still to be done.
Concurrent audio-visual feedback for supporting drivers at intersections
A study using two linked driving simulators
Multidisciplinaire richtlijn
Bevorderen van veilig gedrag in productieomgevingen
beyond the given information and make causal inferences. The analyst is able to do this for causal factors closely related in time and space to the event itself by applying individual knowledge and expertise. But typically the result of the analysis is ad hoc reaction to each individual event. Systematic analysis is needed to find areas of improvement for factors that are further removed from the event (latent factors).
New tools are needed to help the analyst in this respect. There is a need for models that represent possible causal event sequence scenarios that include technical, human, and organisational factors. Building such models is a huge task, and requires the combination of detailed knowledge of all aspects of the system, processing huge amounts of data, a substantial mathematical background and the ability to capture
this all in a user friendly software tool to be used by the safety analysts. Experience in Causal Modelling of Air Transportation System (CATS) in the Netherlands and similar projects in FAA and Eurocontrol in aviation shows that this is indeed a formidable task, but it has to be done to further improve safety. ...
beyond the given information and make causal inferences. The analyst is able to do this for causal factors closely related in time and space to the event itself by applying individual knowledge and expertise. But typically the result of the analysis is ad hoc reaction to each individual event. Systematic analysis is needed to find areas of improvement for factors that are further removed from the event (latent factors).
New tools are needed to help the analyst in this respect. There is a need for models that represent possible causal event sequence scenarios that include technical, human, and organisational factors. Building such models is a huge task, and requires the combination of detailed knowledge of all aspects of the system, processing huge amounts of data, a substantial mathematical background and the ability to capture
this all in a user friendly software tool to be used by the safety analysts. Experience in Causal Modelling of Air Transportation System (CATS) in the Netherlands and similar projects in FAA and Eurocontrol in aviation shows that this is indeed a formidable task, but it has to be done to further improve safety.