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C.U. Ileri

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Conference paper (2025) - F. Ezard, C. U. Ileri, J. Decouchant
Following the design of more efficient blockchain consensus algorithms, the execution layer has emerged as the new performance bottleneck of blockchains, especially under high contention. Current parallel execution frameworks either rely on optimistic concurrency control (OCC) or on pessimistic concurrency control (PCC), both of which see their performance decrease when workloads are highly contended, albeit for different reasons. In this work, we present NEMO, a new blockchain execution engine that combines OCC with the object data model to address this challenge. NEMO introduces three core innovations: (i) a greedy commit rule for transactions that do not use shared objects; (ii) refined handling of dependencies to reduce re-executions; and (iii) the use of incomplete but statically derivable read/write hints to guide execution. Through simulated execution experiments, we demonstrate that NEMO significantly reduces redundant computation and achieves higher throughput than representative approaches. For example, with 16 workers nemo's throughput is up to 42% higher than the one of BlockSTM, the state-of-the-art OCC approach, and 61% higher than the pessimistic concurrency control baseline used. ...
Web3 is emerging as the new Internet-interaction model that facilitates direct collaboration between strangers without a need for prior trust between network participants and without central authorities. However, one of its shortcomings is the lack of a defense mechanism against the ability of a single user to generate a surplus of identities, known as the Sybil attack. Web3 has a Sybil attack problem because it uses peer sampling to establish connections between users. We evaluate the promising but under-explored direction of Sybil avoidance using network latency measurements, according to which two identities with equal latencies are suspected to be operated from the same node, and thus are likely Sybils. Network latency measurements have two desirable properties: they are only malleable by attackers by adding latency, and they do not require any trust between network participants. Our basic SybilSys mechanism avoids Sybil attackers using only network latency measurements if attackers do not actively exploit their malleability. We present an enhanced version of SybilSys that protects against targeted attacks using a variant of the flow correlation attack, which we name TrafficJamTrigger. We show how the message flows of Round-Trip Time measurements can be used to expose attack patterns and we propose and evaluate six classifiers to recognize these patterns. Our experiments show, through both emulation and real-world deployment, that enhanced SybilSys can serve a fundamental role for Web3, effectively establishing connections to real users even in the face of networks consisting of 99% Sybils. ...
Conference paper (2022) - Quinten Stokkink, Can Umut Ileri, Johan Pouwelse
Web3 networks are emerging to replace centrally-governed networking infrastructure. The integrity of the shared public infrastructure of Web3 networks is guaranteed through data sharing between nodes. However, due to the unstructured and highly partitioned nature of Web3 networks, data sharing between nodes in different partitions is a challenging task. In this paper we present the TSRP mechanism, which approaches the data sharing problem through nodes auditing each other to enforce carrying of data between partitions. Reputation is used as an analogue for the likelihood of nodes interacting with nodes from other partitions in the future. The number of copies of data shared with other nodes is inversely related to the nodes’ reputation. We use a real-world trace of Twitter to show how our implementation can converge to an equal number of copies as structured approaches ...

A Universal Mechanism for Asset Exchange between Permissioned Blockchains

Journal article (2021) - Martijn de Vos, Can Umut Ileri, Johan Pouwelse
Permissioned blockchains are increasingly being used as a solution to record transactions between companies. Several use cases that leverage permissioned blockchains focus on the representation and management of real-world assets. Since the number of incompatible blockchains is quickly growing, there is an increasing need for a universal mechanism to exchange, or trade, digital assets between these isolated platforms. There currently is no universal mechanism for inter-blockchain asset exchange without a requirement for trusted authorities that coordinate the trade. We address this shortcoming and present XChange, a universal mechanism for asset exchange between permissioned blockchains. To achieve universality and to avoid trusted authorities that coordinate a trade, XChange does not provide atomic guarantees but leverages risk mitigation strategies to reduce value at stake. Our mechanism records the specifications and progression of each trade within records on a distributed log. XChange reduces the economic gains of adversaries by bounding the total amount of fraud they can commit at any time. After having committed fraud, an adversary is forced to finish its ongoing trades before it can engage in new trades. We first present a four-phased protocol that coordinates an asset exchange between two traders. We then outline how trade records can be stored on TrustChain, which is a lightweight distributed ledger specifically built for the tamper-proof storage of data elements. We implement XChange and conduct experiments. Our experiments demonstrate that XChange is capable of reducing the economic gains of adversaries by more than 99.9% when replaying a real-world trading dataset. A deployment on low-resource devices reveals that the latency added to a trade by XChange is only 493 milliseconds. Finally, our scalability evaluation shows that XChange achieves over 1’000 trades per second and that its throughput, in terms of trades per second, scales linearly with the system load. ...
Conference paper (2021) - A.W. Stannat, C.U. Ileri, D.C. Gijswijt, J.A. Pouwelse
In a multi-agent system where agents provide quantifiable work for each other on a voluntary basis, reputation mechanisms are incorporated to induce cooperation. Hereby agents assign their peers numerical scores based on their reported transaction histories. In such systems, adversaries can launch an attack by creating fake identities called Sybils, who report counterfeit transactions among one another, with the aim of increasing their own scores in the eyes of others. This paper provides new results about the Sybil-proofness of reputation mechanisms. We revisit the impossibility result of Seuken and Parkes (2011), who show that strongly-beneficial Sybil attacks cannot be prevented on reputation mechanisms satisfying three particular requirements. We prove that, under a more rigorous set of definitions of Sybil attack benefit, this result no longer holds. We characterise properties under which reputation mechanisms are susceptible to strongly-beneficial Sybil attacks. Building on our results, we propose a minimal set of requirements for reputation mechanisms to achieve resistance to such attacks, which are stronger than the results by Cheng and Friedman (2005), who show Sybil-proofness of certain asymmetric reputation mechanisms. ...