We consider testing the ability of quantum network nodes to execute multi-round quantum protocols. Specifically, we examine protocols in which the nodes are capable of performing quantum gates, storing qubits and exchanging said qubits over the network a certain number of times. We propose a simple ping-pong test, which provides a certificate for the capability of the nodes to run certain multi-round protocols. We first show that in the noise-free regime the only way the nodes can pass the test is if they do indeed possess the desired capabilities. We then proceed to consider the case where operations are noisy, and provide an initial analysis showing how our test can be used to estimate parameters that allow us to draw conclusions about the actual performance of such protocols on the tested nodes. Finally, we investigate the tightness of this analysis using example cases in a numerical simulation.@en

Current techniques in quantum process tomography typically return a single point estimate of an unknown process based on a finite albeit large amount of measurement data. Due to statistical fluctuations, however, other processes close to the point estimate can also produce the observed data with near certainty. Unless appropriate error bars can be constructed, the point estimate does not carry any sound operational interpretation. Here, we provide a solution to this problem by constructing a confidence region estimator for quantum processes. Our method enables reliable estimation of essentially any figure of merit for quantum processes on few qubits, including the diamond distance to a specific noise model, the entanglement fidelity, and the worst-case entanglement fidelity, by identifying error regions which contain the true state with high probability. We also provide a software package, QPtomographer, implementing our estimator for the diamond norm and the worst-case entanglement fidelity. We illustrate its usage and performance with several simulated examples. Our tools can be used to reliably certify the performance of, e.g., error correction codes, implementations of unitary gates, or more generally any noise process affecting a quantum system.@en

Randomness is an indispensable resource in modern science and information technology. Fortunately, an experimentally simple procedure exists to generate randomness with well-characterized devices: measuring a quantum system in a basis complementary to its preparation. Towards realizing this goal one may consider using atoms or superconducting qubits, promising candidates for quantum information processing. However, their unavoidable interaction with the electromagnetic field affects their dynamics. At large time scales, this can result in decoherence. Smaller time scales in principle avoid this problem, but may not be well analyzed under the usual rotating wave and single mode approximation (RWA and SMA) which break the relativistic nature of quantum field theory. Here, we use a fully relativistic analysis to quantify the information that an adversary with access to the field could get on the result of an atomic measurement. Surprisingly, we find that the adversary's guessing probability is not minimized for atoms initially prepared in the ground state (an intuition derived from the RWA and SMA model).@en

The goal of entanglement distillation is to turn a large number of weakly entangled states into a smaller number of highly entangled ones. Practical entanglement distillation schemes offer a trade-off between the fidelity to the target state and the probability of successful distillation. Exploiting such trade-offs is of interest in the design of quantum repeater protocols. Here, we present a number of methods to assess and optimize entanglement distillation schemes. We start by giving a numerical method to compute upper bounds on the maximum achievable fidelity for a desired probability of success. We show that this method performs well for many known examples by comparing it to well-known distillation protocols. This allows us to show optimality for many well-known distillation protocols for specific states of interest. As an example, we analytically prove optimality of the distillation protocol utilized within the Extreme Photon Loss entanglement generation scheme, even in the asymptotic limit. We proceed to present a numerical method that can improve an existing distillation scheme for a given input state, and we present an example for which this method finds an optimal distillation protocol. An implementation of our numerical methods is available as a Julia package.@en

Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond quantum key distribution. One domain is two-party cryptography, whose goal is to allow two parties who may not trust each other to solve joint tasks. Another interesting application is position-based cryptography whose goal is to use the geographical location of an entity as its only identifying credential. Unfortunately, security of these protocols is not possible against an all powerful adversary. However, if we impose some realistic physical constraints on the adversary, there exist protocols for which security can be proven, but these so far relied on the knowledge of the quantum operations performed during the protocols. In this work we improve the device-independent security proofs of Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)NJOPFM1367-263010.1088/1367-2630/18/5/055004] for two-party cryptography (with memoryless devices) and we add a security proof for device-independent position verification (also memoryless devices) under different physical constraints on the adversary. We assess the quality of the devices by observing a Bell violation, and, as for Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)NJOPFM1367-263010.1088/1367-2630/18/5/055004], security can be attained for any violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne inequality.@en

Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond quantum key distribution. One domain is two-party cryptography, whose goal is to allow two parties who may not trust each other to solve joint tasks. Another interesting application is position-based cryptography whose goal is to use the geographical location of an entity as its only identifying credential. Unfortunately, security of these protocols is not possible against an all powerful adversary. However, if we impose some realistic physical constraints on the adversary, there exist protocols for which security can be proven, but these so far relied on the knowledge of the quantum operations performed during the protocols. In this work we improve the device-independent security proofs of Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)NJOPFM1367-263010.1088/1367-2630/18/5/055004] for two-party cryptography (with memoryless devices) and we add a security proof for device-independent position verification (also memoryless devices) under different physical constraints on the adversary. We assess the quality of the devices by observing a Bell violation, and, as for Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)NJOPFM1367-263010.1088/1367-2630/18/5/055004], security can be attained for any violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne inequality.@en