FK
F. Koornneef
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9 records found
1
In virtually all safety-critical industries the operators of systems have to demonstrate a systematic and thorough consideration of safety. This is increasingly being done by demonstrating that certain goals have been achieved, rather than by simply following prescriptive standards. Such goalbased safety cases could be a valuable tool for reasoning about safety in healthcare organisations, such as hospitals. System-wide safety cases are very complex, and a reasonable approach is to break down the safety argument into sub-system safety cases. In this paper we outline the development of a goalbased top-level argument for demonstrating the safety of a particular class of medical devices (medical beds). We review relevant standards both from healthcare and from other industries, and illustrate how these can inform the development of an appropriate safety argument. Finally, we discuss opportunities and challenges for the development and use of goal-based safety cases in healthcare.
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In virtually all safety-critical industries the operators of systems have to demonstrate a systematic and thorough consideration of safety. This is increasingly being done by demonstrating that certain goals have been achieved, rather than by simply following prescriptive standards. Such goalbased safety cases could be a valuable tool for reasoning about safety in healthcare organisations, such as hospitals. System-wide safety cases are very complex, and a reasonable approach is to break down the safety argument into sub-system safety cases. In this paper we outline the development of a goalbased top-level argument for demonstrating the safety of a particular class of medical devices (medical beds). We review relevant standards both from healthcare and from other industries, and illustrate how these can inform the development of an appropriate safety argument. Finally, we discuss opportunities and challenges for the development and use of goal-based safety cases in healthcare.
This paper introduces basic notions about Organisational Learning and its relevance for HILAS, in order to discuss some challenges regarding sharing and shareability of lessons learned from critical experiences that might be shared among a rich variety of project partners and might be fed into early stages of aircraft design. In a way, what we need to solve and set up by the end of the project with respect to transformation of lessons from today into requirements for tomorrow's aircrafts, we need to live through already during the HILAS project. The paper addresses critical issues that we partly can start to resolve through the discussions in the workshop.
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This paper introduces basic notions about Organisational Learning and its relevance for HILAS, in order to discuss some challenges regarding sharing and shareability of lessons learned from critical experiences that might be shared among a rich variety of project partners and might be fed into early stages of aircraft design. In a way, what we need to solve and set up by the end of the project with respect to transformation of lessons from today into requirements for tomorrow's aircrafts, we need to live through already during the HILAS project. The paper addresses critical issues that we partly can start to resolve through the discussions in the workshop.
This paper discusses the incorporation into MORT of the Haddon energy-flow notion. It focuses on the relationships between MORT barrier analysis, Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis (ETBA), Control Change Cause Analysis (3CA) and the cybernetic conventions developed by Ashby. The implications for the next generation of MORT and the application of barrier analysis in domains outside of safety are discussed.
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This paper discusses the incorporation into MORT of the Haddon energy-flow notion. It focuses on the relationships between MORT barrier analysis, Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis (ETBA), Control Change Cause Analysis (3CA) and the cybernetic conventions developed by Ashby. The implications for the next generation of MORT and the application of barrier analysis in domains outside of safety are discussed.