The central figure of merit for quantum memories and quantum communication devices is their capacity to store and transmit quantum information. Here, we present a protocol that estimates a lower bound on a channel's quantum capacity, even when there are arbitrarily correlated errors. One application of these protocols is to test the performance of quantum repeaters for transmitting quantum information. Our protocol is easy to implement and comes in two versions. The first estimates the one-shot quantum capacity by preparing and measuring in two different bases, where all involved qubits are used as test qubits. The second verifies on-the-fly that a channel's one-shot quantum capacity exceeds a minimal tolerated value while storing or communicating data. We discuss the performance using simple examples, such as the dephasing channel for which our method is asymptotically optimal. Finally, we apply our method to a superconducting qubit in experiment.

The security of quantum key distribution protocols is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a precise analysis of the security properties requires tools from both classical cryptography and information theory. Here, we employ recent results in non-asymptotic classical information theory to show that one-way information reconciliation imposes fundamental limitations on the amount of secret key that can be extracted in the finite key regime. In particular, we find that an often used approximation for the information leakage during information reconciliation is not generally valid. We propose an improved approximation that takes into account finite key effects and numerically test it against codes for two probability distributions, that we call binary–binary and binary–Gaussian, that typically appear in quantum key distribution protocols.

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle forms a fundamental element of quantum mechanics. Uncertainty relations in terms of entropies were initially proposed to deal with conceptual shortcomings in the original formulation of the uncertainty principle and, hence, play an important role in quantum foundations. More recently, entropic uncertainty relations have emerged as the central ingredient in the security analysis of almost all quantum cryptographic protocols, such as quantum key distribution and two-party quantum cryptography. This review surveys entropic uncertainty relations that capture Heisenberg's idea that the results of incompatible measurements are impossible to predict, covering both finite- and infinite-dimensional measurements. These ideas are then extended to incorporate quantum correlations between the observed object and its environment, allowing for a variety of recent, more general formulations of the uncertainty principle. Finally, various applications are discussed, ranging from entanglement witnessing to wave-particle duality to quantum cryptography.

Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Alice wishes to commit a secret bit to Bob. Perfectly secure bit commitment between two mistrustful parties is impossible through an asynchronous exchange of quantum information. Perfect security is, however, possible when Alice and Bob each split into several agents exchanging classical information at times and locations suitably chosen to satisfy specific relativistic constraints. In this Letter we first revisit a previously proposed scheme [C. Crépeau et al., Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 7073, 407 (2011)] that realizes bit commitment using only classical communication. We prove that the protocol is secure against quantum adversaries for a duration limited by the light-speed communication time between the locations of the agents. We then propose a novel multiround scheme based on finite-field arithmetic that extends the commitment time beyond this limit, and we prove its security against classical attacks. Finally, we present an implementation of these protocols using dedicated hardware and we demonstrate a 2 ms-long bit commitment over a distance of 131 km. By positioning the agents on antipodal points on the surface of Earth, the commitment time could possibly be extended to 212 ms.

The security of quantum key distribution protocols is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a precise analysis of the security properties requires tools from both classical cryptography and information theory. Here, we employ recent results in non-asymptotic classical information theory to show that information reconciliation imposes fundamental limitations on the amount of secret key that can be extracted in the finite key regime. In particular, we find that an often used approximation for the information leakage during one-way information reconciliation is flawed and we propose an improved estimate.