Privacy is a human right, yet, people’s behavior on the web is constantly tracked. Tor, an anonymity network, is an effective defence against tracking. However, Tor’s multiplexing of logically independent data streams into a single TCP connection causes issues. Tor with QUIC has been implemented as an alternative with better performance but it has not been studied whether and by how much QUIC increases the vulnerability to timing-based attacks.
The most threatening attacks are website fingerprinting attacks, which can track a Tor user by only controlling the guard node, first of the relays that forward traffic in Tor. In this work, Tor with QUIC is evaluated against website fingerprinting attacks with various levels of defences active. Without defences, Tor is vulnerable to website fingerprinting for both TCP and QUIC but the attacks are more effective on QUIC. On the positive side, defences against website fingerprinting remain effective for QUIC in that they decrease the effectiveness of the attack by a
similar fraction as for TCP.

The Border Gateway Protocol is critical for the correct working of the Internet. When it fails the impact is usually high and therefore failures should be minimized. Unfortunately the configuration of BGP is prone to errors. Besides that, BGP is targeted by attacks of cyber criminals. A simulator capable of running BGP can reduce the number of honest mistakes and successful attacks. In a simulated environment different configurations and optional attacks can be tried out safely. The simulator can also assist with the investigation of real world events by replicating the conditions and triggers that led up to it and providing a detailed view on every aspect. The correct workings of the simulator was verified with real world events testing the simulator from both a macro and micro perspective. The CPU and memory usage during simulation are discussed. Additionally, a quick recap on the working of BGP is provided.