TC
T.N. Coggins
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1
In the introduction of this thesis, I contend that robot ethics, as a research field, generally treats privacy as the appropriate distribution of information, and therefore overlooks privacy concerns raised by robots beyond this conceptualization’s purview. I illustrate this contention by evaluating a hypothetical case involving a household companionship robot via contemporary robot ethics literature focusing on privacy. I argue that this corpus cannot identify a variety of privacy concerns raised by such robots because it relies on a narrow interpretation of privacy that can only recognize privacy harms of an informational nature. I posit that privacy represents considerably more than implied by the interpretations offered by robot ethicists. Most crucially, it signifies our need to withdraw sporadically from social engagements. Considering that robots - like the one described in the case mentioned - simulate what it is like to interact with other humans, I argue that such machines will produce privacy concerns when they successfully create the impression that another person is present during moments when their users wish to be left alone. I highlight that some researchers from robot ethics have discussed issues of this kind but rarely frame them as privacy concerns, thus leaving a significant literature gap I attempt to fill via my research. I conclude the introduction by presenting a close reading of relevant privacy scholarship to evidence the claims made above and lay the theoretical foundation for the dissertation....
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In the introduction of this thesis, I contend that robot ethics, as a research field, generally treats privacy as the appropriate distribution of information, and therefore overlooks privacy concerns raised by robots beyond this conceptualization’s purview. I illustrate this contention by evaluating a hypothetical case involving a household companionship robot via contemporary robot ethics literature focusing on privacy. I argue that this corpus cannot identify a variety of privacy concerns raised by such robots because it relies on a narrow interpretation of privacy that can only recognize privacy harms of an informational nature. I posit that privacy represents considerably more than implied by the interpretations offered by robot ethicists. Most crucially, it signifies our need to withdraw sporadically from social engagements. Considering that robots - like the one described in the case mentioned - simulate what it is like to interact with other humans, I argue that such machines will produce privacy concerns when they successfully create the impression that another person is present during moments when their users wish to be left alone. I highlight that some researchers from robot ethics have discussed issues of this kind but rarely frame them as privacy concerns, thus leaving a significant literature gap I attempt to fill via my research. I conclude the introduction by presenting a close reading of relevant privacy scholarship to evidence the claims made above and lay the theoretical foundation for the dissertation....
Many researchers from robotics, machine ethics, and adjacent fields seem to assume that norms represent good behavior that social robots should learn to benefit their users and society. We would like to complicate this view and present seven key troubles with norm-compliant robots: (1) norm biases, (2) paternalism (3) tyrannies of the majority, (4) pluralistic ignorance, (5) paths of least resistance, (6) outdated norms, and (7) technologically-induced norm change. Because discussions of why norm-compliant robots can be problematic are noticeably absent from the robot and machine ethics literature, this paper fills an important research gap. We argue that it is critical for researchers to take these issues into account if they wish to make norm-compliant robots.
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Many researchers from robotics, machine ethics, and adjacent fields seem to assume that norms represent good behavior that social robots should learn to benefit their users and society. We would like to complicate this view and present seven key troubles with norm-compliant robots: (1) norm biases, (2) paternalism (3) tyrannies of the majority, (4) pluralistic ignorance, (5) paths of least resistance, (6) outdated norms, and (7) technologically-induced norm change. Because discussions of why norm-compliant robots can be problematic are noticeably absent from the robot and machine ethics literature, this paper fills an important research gap. We argue that it is critical for researchers to take these issues into account if they wish to make norm-compliant robots.
Called Back Onstage
Dramaturgic Analysis, Domestic Social Robots, and Privacy
I argue that social robots installed inside homes produce a novel privacy problem when they invite their users to engage with them. To build my case, I introduce relevant concepts from Erving Goffman’s theory of Dramaturgic Analysis to interpret human-robot interactions. Following Goffman, I posit that we pre-reflectively adjust our behavior to communal expectations and perform as characters when interacting with other people in public. We tend to step into character when we encounter familiar social situations, which, I argue, includes those created by robots that mimic human social behavior. Our homes, ideally, enable us to set aside the characters we play in public to pursue private tasks associated with our well-being, autonomy, and intimate relationships. As such, when domestic social robots elicit social responses from users, they may rob users of time they could otherwise dedicate to valuable private activities—an issue I categorize as a privacy problem.
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I argue that social robots installed inside homes produce a novel privacy problem when they invite their users to engage with them. To build my case, I introduce relevant concepts from Erving Goffman’s theory of Dramaturgic Analysis to interpret human-robot interactions. Following Goffman, I posit that we pre-reflectively adjust our behavior to communal expectations and perform as characters when interacting with other people in public. We tend to step into character when we encounter familiar social situations, which, I argue, includes those created by robots that mimic human social behavior. Our homes, ideally, enable us to set aside the characters we play in public to pursue private tasks associated with our well-being, autonomy, and intimate relationships. As such, when domestic social robots elicit social responses from users, they may rob users of time they could otherwise dedicate to valuable private activities—an issue I categorize as a privacy problem.
More work for Roomba?
Domestic robots, housework and the production of privacy
Housework is hard work. Keeping our homes clean, tidy and comfortable takes effort and every moment we spend on housework (that we would prefer to avoid) means we have less time to devote to our private lives. Over the past two decades, numerous companies have created robots designed to relieve their owners of housework. Having robots take care of housework for us, it seems, would enable us to focus our energy at home on private pursuits we find valuable, such as spending quality time with our loved ones, recreation, and relaxation. Although this line of reasoning helps explain why domestic robots are in high demand, this article will contest its validity throughout. By drawing from historical accounts of older, ostensibly labour-saving domestic technologies, it will argue that we should expect domestic robots to alter the nature of housework rather than reduce the need for it. Overall, it will argue that domestic robots change what needs to be done for their owners to enjoy their private lives.
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Housework is hard work. Keeping our homes clean, tidy and comfortable takes effort and every moment we spend on housework (that we would prefer to avoid) means we have less time to devote to our private lives. Over the past two decades, numerous companies have created robots designed to relieve their owners of housework. Having robots take care of housework for us, it seems, would enable us to focus our energy at home on private pursuits we find valuable, such as spending quality time with our loved ones, recreation, and relaxation. Although this line of reasoning helps explain why domestic robots are in high demand, this article will contest its validity throughout. By drawing from historical accounts of older, ostensibly labour-saving domestic technologies, it will argue that we should expect domestic robots to alter the nature of housework rather than reduce the need for it. Overall, it will argue that domestic robots change what needs to be done for their owners to enjoy their private lives.
Construction robots are becoming more common in the Netherlands, but remain rarities in contexts aside from state-of-the-art factories owned by wealthy or technologically-orientated companies. In its current state, the construction industry would have to change significantly to make room for robots. To understand whether these changes are welcome or not, this paper presents qualitative, exploratory research concerning 10 stakeholders’ perspectives of robotisation and construction robots in the Dutch construction industry.
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Construction robots are becoming more common in the Netherlands, but remain rarities in contexts aside from state-of-the-art factories owned by wealthy or technologically-orientated companies. In its current state, the construction industry would have to change significantly to make room for robots. To understand whether these changes are welcome or not, this paper presents qualitative, exploratory research concerning 10 stakeholders’ perspectives of robotisation and construction robots in the Dutch construction industry.