Rui Mu
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3 records found
1
Mix and match
Configuring different types of policy instruments to develop successful low carbon cities in China
Local governments in China actively promote low carbon city pilots to respond to the challenges of climate change mentioned in the Sustainable Development Goals, including building sustainable cities and communities, and taking climate action. However, relatively little is known about the actual implementation of programs to achieve sustainable cities, especially how combinations of policy instruments are deployed in the realisation of low carbon cities. First, this study contributes to the literature in policy studies by identifying how four types relevant to carbon city development, hierarchy, market, network and information based ones, can be combined in policy mixes and play out in the effective realisation of low carbon cities in other countries. Second, this framework is used to map the application of policy instruments in China's 35 low carbon pilot cities. This study uses fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to explore which configurations of policy instruments are in use and assesses their effects on low carbon city construction. It thus builds a bridge between theory on policy instruments, their combinations and low carbon city development. The presence of hierarchical policy instruments appears to be a necessary condition for low carbon city development and their use prevails. Market-based and network-based instruments complement hierarchical instruments but do not suffice in themselves. Applying hierarchical instruments and market-based instruments together tends to hamper the effect of network instruments and information instruments, whereas network instruments appear to be interchangeable with information instruments. Network governance in China's low carbon city development is still comparatively underdeveloped.
Co-production is a solution by which the government provides public services. Coproduction theory is built upon Western experience and currently focuses on the types of coproduction in different policy stages, the barriers and governance strategies for co-production. However, little attention is paid to how political background will influence the co-production process. To fill the gap, we analyzed a case of co-production that occurred in China, and we characterized the political background as consisting of three main political features: political mobility, central–local relations, and performance measurement. Based on an in-depth case study of a government project in a medium-sized Chinese city, the impact and the changes of political features affecting governmental projects in different co-production stages are analyzed and assessed. We find that political features play a critical role in the co-production of China’s large government projects and may separately and jointly affect co-production. Government performance measurement affects the co-design and co-implementation of projects. Political mobility and changes in local government and performance measurement also affect the co-implementation continuity of the project. Political focus affects the co-design of projects. Central-local relations influence the support from higher government and the actual practices of lower government in the co-implementation stage.
Assessing and explaining interagency collaboration performance
A comparative case study of local governments in China
This study assesses and explains interagency collaboration performance in the Chinese public sector. Through a comparative case study, it shows that inter-organizational relation is hard to start up; conflicting policies, incompatible procedures, power disparity, low issue salience, and lack of perceived interdependence may separately and jointly affect collaboration performance. The presence of vertical meta-governance plays a critical role in turning the tide; however, its presence is tied up with other factors such as high issue salience or bottom-up appeal. In addition, the highest level of performance not only depends on vertical meta-governance but also on horizontal meta-governance.