In this article, firstly, cooperative interaction between robots and humans is discussed; specifically, the possibility of human/robot joint action and (relatedly) the possibility of robots occupying institutional roles alongside humans. The discussion makes use of concepts developed in social ontology. Secondly, certain key moral (or ethical—these terms are used interchangeably here) issues arising from this cooperative action are discussed, specifically issues that arise from robots performing (including qua role occupants) morally significant actions jointly with humans. Such morally significant human/robot joint actions, supposing they exist, could potentially range from humans and robots jointly caring for the infirm through to jointly killing enemy combatants.

This is an open access title. It is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International licence. It is available to read and download as a PDF version on the Oxford Academic platform. The advent of the Internet, exponential growth in computing power, and rapid developments in artificial intelligence have raised numerous cybersecurity-related ethical questions in various domains. The dual use character of cybertechnology-that it can be used to provide great benefits to humankind but can also do great harm-means that business (data security, data ownership and privacy), public communication (disinformation and computational propaganda), health (privacy, ransomware attacks), law enforcement (data security, predictive policing) and interstate conflict (cyberwar, autonomous weapons) are of vital interest to cybersecurity ethics. This work analyses the key ethical concepts in the field, such as privacy, freedom of communication, security, and the right to self-defence, and develops sets of ethical guidelines for the regulation of cyberspace in these various domains. From a liberal democratic perspective, Seumas Miller and Terry Bossomaier seek to protect individual rights while ensuring the collective good of cybersecurity. They also pay close attention to institutionally embedded collective moral responsibilities that function as 'webs of prevention' against cyberattacks. These webs, they argue, need new regulation and the redesign of institutional roles, as well as technical countermeasures to cyberattacks, such as passwords, encryption, firewalls, and 'patching.' At times, webs of prevention also involve offensive and defensive measures. In their expert analysis and guidance, Miller and Bossomaier reinforce just how much is at stake in the field of cybersecurity ethics.

This article’s primary concern is with characterizing and distinguishing institutional corruption and institutional corrosion. While the concept of institutional corruption entails some degree of culpability on the part of institutional role occupants, this does not seem to be the case with institutional corrosion. The article outlines and motivates a prior definition of institutional corruption developed elsewhere to develop an account of the contrasting notion of institutional corrosion. Since both institutional corruption and institutional corrosion are typically the product of some form of collective action or omission on the part of multiple institutional role occupants, there is also a need to provide a serviceable notion of collective responsibility.

In the original publication of the article, the author Prof. Seumas Miller was missed to be added as the co-corresponding author in the author group. This has been now corrected with this erratum.

The original article has been corrected.

In this paper the role of robots in institutional settings is considered and, in particular, the possibility of robots occupying institutional roles. It is argued that robots are not rational agents and, therefore, cannot choose their ultimate ends, including the ultimate collective ends of institutions. Moreover, robots are not moral agents and cannot exercise the moral judgments, including discretionary moral judgments, required of institutional role occupants. Rather robots can only be organisational role occupants performing a restricted range of specialised tasks that do not require moral judgments and doing so in circumscribed domains under the tight control of human beings. Robots in institutional roles are, or ought to be, technological instruments under the control of human agents in the service of the collective goods definitive of the institutions in question.

In this article I address differences between myself and Uwe Steinhoff in relation to the moral principle of reciprocity and its implications for the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants. Whereas I agree with Steinhoff that there is a principle of reciprocity in play in war, contra Steinhoff, I suggest that this principle and, indeed, moral principles of reciprocity more generally, are particularist principles, although if conventionalised or given legal status they can assume a generalised form. Moreover, I also hold that there is a moral difference between those fighting a just war and those fighting an unjust war and this difference, taken in conjunction with the moral equality of combatants doctrine, generates a degree of moral complexity that seems to have gone unrecognised by Steinhoff (and, for that matter, by the two dominant schools of thought in this area, revisionists and Walzerians).

This article characterises the nature of cognitive warfare and its use of disinformation and computational propaganda and its political and military purposes in war and in conflict short of war. It discusses both defensive and offensive measures to counter cognitive warfare and, in particular, measures that comply with relevant moral principles.

This article provides philosophical analyses of some of the key notions involved in national security intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. In Section 1, and relying on the intelligence studies literature, the notion of intelligence is characterized by means of an outline its main features or, at least, those features typically ascribed to it. In Section 2, an analysis of the notion, or rather inter-related set of notions, of knowledge (broadly understood) that lies at the heart of intelligence activity is provided. In Section 3, the focus shifts to the activity, or rather inter-related activities, of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination and, in particular, the notion of joint epistemic action.

This article considers individual rights and fundamental tenets of the criminal justice system in the context of DNA evidence, in particular recent advancements in genomics that have significantly advanced law enforcement investigative capabilities in this area. It discusses a technique known as Investigative Genetic Genealogy (IGG) which utilizes genomic data held by commercial direct-to-consumer ancestry and health companies to investigate the identity of suspects linked to serious crimes. Using this technique, even if only a small proportion of the population (e.g. 5%) has submitted genomic data to these companies, almost anyone in the population can be identified. We discuss this phenomenon in the context of the existing literature and arguments in relation to universal forensic DNA databases, as well as relevant recent developments in both liberal democracies and authoritarian states. We introduce the concept of a quasi-universal forensic DNA database and consider associated implications for the criminal justice system and society from the perspectives of privacy, the right not to self-incriminate, joint rights, and collective responsibility.

In this article, I undertake three main tasks. First, I argue that, contrary to the standard view, moral injury is not a species of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) but rather, on the most coherent conception of moral injury, PTSD is (in effect) a species of moral injury. In doing so, I make use of the notion of caring deeply about something or someone worthy of being cared deeply about. Second, I consider so-called "dirty hands" actions in police work and in war, and distinguish these from the morally legitimate, but harmful, actions of police officers and of war fighters, such as the morally legitimate use of coercive force and lethal force (respectively). While the morally legitimate use of harmful methods is constitutive of these occupational roles, "dirty hands" methods are not. Roughly speaking, a "dirty hands" action is one that is morally wrong and (typically) unlawful but done for the sake of a good outcome. Both categories of action are conducive to moral injury, but "dirty hands" actions much more so, especially given the slippery moral slope from "dirty hands" actions to egregious moral wrongdoing. Third, I offer some recommendations for reducing moral injury among police officers and war fighters.

The aim is to provide a synoptic view of the epistemic landscape in respect of epistemic actions, abilities and knowing how. The resulting view consists of the following propositions: (1) knowledge-by-acquaintance cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge or to knowing-how or some combination of these; the same point holds for propositional knowledge in relation to knowledge-by-acquaintance and knowing-how, and to knowing-how in relation to knowledge-by-acquaintance and propositional knowledge; (2) These categories of knowledge are, nevertheless, interdependent in a number of senses; (3) Abilities are not the same thing as know-how; (4) Epistemic actions need to be distinguished from behavioral actions; (5) Judgements are epistemic actions which, if successful, result in knowledge and, therefore, the sharp contrast drawn between, on the one hand, comings to believe and, in particular, judgments and, on the other hand, actions – with respect to being freely chosen – is not sustainable; (6) Judgements manifest both abilities and know-how.

In this article, it is argued that the constitutive principles of Just War Theory and the jus ad bellum/jus in bello duality do not transfer all that well to national security intelligence activity. Accordingly, while Just Intelligence Theory–comprising jus ad intelligentiam and jus in intelligentia–provides a useful starting point in the construction of a normative framework for national security intelligence activities, ultimately it is found to be wanting in a number of important respects. For instance, while war ought to be a last resort, intelligence collection and analysis ought to be a first resort. In addition, analyses are offered of the key principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality, and it is shown in general terms how they apply, or ought to apply, to national security intelligence activity. Importantly, the principle of necessity has been given a novel analysis according to which it is in reality a set of different principles, depending on the institutional setting in which it is being used. Moreover, the analysis reveals that as typically used it consists (in part) of a means/end principle of rationality and one or other versions of a principle of harm minimisation. Finally, it is argued that there is a normative principle governing espionage, in particular, that is not a constitutive principle of Just War Theory; this is a principle of reciprocity.

This chapter argues for the following definition of terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy that: 1. Consists in state or non-state actors deliberately performing acts of violence aimed at (directly or indirectly) seriously harming persons who are not military combatants, human rights violators or violent revolutionaries; 2. Consists of violent actions that ought to be criminalized; 3. Is an intended means of terrorizing the members of some social, economic, ethnic, political, etc., group in order to achieve a political purpose; 4. Relies on the violence receiving a degree of publicity, at least to the extent necessary to engender widespread fear in the target group.

This chapter provides an ethical analysis of the use of stings or traps in police counter-terrorism operations in liberal democracies and, more specifically, in the USA. The conclusion reached is that such operations are morally justified under certain conditions, such as that they are effective, there are no less intrusive methods available, and the inducements offered are ones that the targets of the sting could reasonably be expected to resist. An important novel condition that is proposed is that the suspect has a standing intention (and/or an immediate intention), to commit a serious terrorist offence, for example, he or she occupies a role in a terrorist organization as a bomb-maker, recruiter or trainer, or has otherwise expressed the standing and/or immediate intention to commit a serious terrorist offence, for example, the suspect has drawn up a plan of the terrorist attack and is actively seeking the means to execute it.

This book undertakes a multifaceted and integrated examination of biometric identification, including the current state of the technology, how it is being used, the key ethical issues, and the implications for law and regulation. The five chapters examine the main forms of contemporary biometrics–fingerprint recognition, facial recognition and DNA identification– as well the integration of biometric data with other forms of personal data, analyses key ethical concepts in play, including privacy, individual autonomy, collective responsibility, and joint ownership rights, and proposes a raft of principles to guide the regulation of biometrics in liberal democracies.
Biometric identification technology is developing rapidly and being implemented more widely, along with other forms of information technology. As products, services and communication moves online, digital identity and security is becoming more important. Biometric identification facilitates this transition. Citizens now use biometrics to access a smartphone or obtain a passport; law enforcement agencies use biometrics in association with CCTV to identify a terrorist in a crowd, or identify a suspect via their fingerprints or DNA; and companies use biometrics to identify their customers and employees. In some cases the use of biometrics is governed by law, in others the technology has developed and been implemented so quickly that, perhaps because it has been viewed as a valuable security enhancement, laws regulating its use have often not been updated to reflect new applications. However, the technology associated with biometrics raises significant ethical problems, including in relation to individual privacy, ownership of biometric data, dual use and, more generally, as is illustrated by the increasing use of biometrics in authoritarian states such as China, the potential for unregulated biometrics to undermine fundamental principles of liberal democracy. Resolving these ethical problems is a vital step towards more effective regulation.

Biometric facial recognition is an artificial intelligence technology involving the automated comparison of facial features, used by law enforcement to identify unknown suspects from photographs and closed circuit television. Its capability is expanding rapidly in association with artificial intelligence and has great potential to solve crime. However, it also carries significant privacy and other ethical implications that require law and regulation. This article examines the rise of biometric facial recognition, current applications and legal developments, and conducts an ethical analysis of the issues that arise. Ethical principles are applied to mediate the potential conflicts in relation to this information technology that arise between security, on the one hand, and individual privacy and autonomy, and democratic accountability, on the other. These can be used to support appropriate law and regulation for the technology as it continues to develop.

National security intelligence is information or other data collected, analyzed and disseminated by intelligence agencies (in particular) and done so in the service of these agencies’ primary institutional purpose (Miller 2010), at least in liberal democracies. Here it is understood that this institutional purpose and these actions are to be understood normatively, that is in terms of what ought to be done, as opposed to what is in fact being done. Here, the term “normative” has a moral or ethical loading, for example what ought to be done is typically what morally ought to be done all things considered (including consideration of the empirical facts). 1 Moreover, these essentially epistemic (from the Greek word, “episteme”, meaning knowledge) or evidence-based truth-seeking activities of collection, analysis and dissemination are the main ones performed by national security agencies. That said, many of these agencies also perform kinetic tasks, for example the covert operations conducted by the United States CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), and on occasion tasks that might be referred to as quasi-epistemic, for example psychological “warfare”.