Multiplayer boycotts in convex games
Journal Article
(2024)
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606
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Publication Year
2024
Language
English
Volume number
236
Article number
111606
Downloads counter
225
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Abstract
We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.
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