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Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

Journal Article (2024)
Author(s)

Robbert Fokkink (TU Delft - Applied Probability)

Hans de Munnik (Student TU Delft)

Research Group
Applied Probability
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606
More Info
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Publication Year
2024
Language
English
Research Group
Applied Probability
Volume number
236
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Abstract

We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.