Voltage Control in Distributed Generation under Measurement Falsification Attacks
M. Ma (TU Delft - Intelligent Electrical Power Grids)
Andre Teixeira (TU Delft - Information and Communication Technology)
Jan van den Berg (TU Delft - Cyber Security, TU Delft - Cyber Security)
Peter Palensky (TU Delft - Intelligent Electrical Power Grids)
More Info
expand_more
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.
Abstract
Low-voltage distribution grids experience a rising penetration of inverter-based, distributed generation. In order to not only contribute to but also solve voltage problems, these inverters are increasingly asked to participate in intelligent grid controls. Communicating inverters implement distributed voltage droop controls. The impact of cyber-attacks to the stability of such distributed grid controls is poorly researched and therefore addressed in this article. We characterize the potential impact of several attack scenarios by employing the positivity and diagonal dominance properties. In particular, we discuss measurement falsification scenarios where the attacker corrupts voltage measurement data received by the voltage droop controllers. Analytical, control-theoretic methods for assessing the impact on system stability and voltage magnitude are presented and validated via simulation.
help_outline