Game-Theoretical Modeling of Sequential Topology Attacks in Radially Operated Distribution Networks

Abstract

While the digitalization of the power system has its merit, it also introduced emerging cyber attack threats. Once the attacker has access to the control of the system, they can cause significant damage to infrastructure and society as a whole. Game-theoretical models that allow the decision-making of multiple actors have been previously studied to assess the impact of such attacks and potential responses. In this study, we present a novel and generalized incident response game against topology attacks in radially operated distribution networks. The introduced model allows for sequential interactions between the attacker and defender over multiple waves of attacks. Within this new framework, we propose a simplified model called the associated single-round game to efficiently compute the lower-bound load loss attainable by the adversary. Finally, a case study on the IEEE 33-bus system showed that the multi-round game framework can be used to determine and compare optimal sequences of actions. Moreover, the single-round game required less computation while achieving the same maximum loss by the attacker against an optimal defender, indicating a tight bound.