Reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks

Analysis and synthesis tools

Conference paper (2017)

Authors

Carlos Murguia Singapore University of Technology and Design
N. van de Wouw University of Minnesota, Team Bart De Schutter - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering , Eindhoven University of Technology
Justin Ruths University of Texas at Dallas
Research Group
Team Bart De Schutter (Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2017 Carlos Murguia, N. van de Wouw, Justin Ruths
DOI
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.528
Security Stochastic systems Cyber physical systems Model-based fault detectors Reachable sets
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Published Date

2017

Language

English

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Faculty

Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering

Department

Delft Center for Systems and Control

Research Group

Team Bart De Schutter

Abstract

For given system dynamics, control structure, and fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools–in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)–for characterizing and minimizing the set of states that sensor attacks can induce in the system while keeping the alarm rate of the fault detector sufficiently close to its false alarm rate in the attack-free case. This quantifies the attack's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.