Population games with replicator dynamics under event-triggered payoff provider and a demand response application
Juan Martinez-Piazuelo (Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya)
W. Ananduta (TU Delft - Team Sergio Grammatico)
Carlos Ocampo-Martinez (Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya)
Sergio Grammatico (TU Delft - Team Bart De Schutter, TU Delft - Team Sergio Grammatico)
Nicanor Quijano (Universidad de los Andes)
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Abstract
We consider a large population of decision makers that choose their evolutionary strategies based on simple pairwise imitation rules. We describe such a dynamic process by the replicator dynamics. Differently from the available literature, where the payoffs signals are assumed to be updated continuously, we consider a more realistic scenario where they are updated occasionally. Our main technical contribution is to devise two event-triggered communication schemes with asymptotic convergence guarantees to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how our proposed approach is applicable as an efficient distributed demand response mechanism.