We formulate for the first time the economic dispatch problem among prosumers in an integrated electrical and gas distribution system (IEGDS) as a game equilibrium problem. Specifically, by approximating the nonlinear gas-flow equations either with a mixed-integer second-order cone (MISOC) or a piecewise affine (PWA) model and by assuming that electricity and gas prices depend linearly on the total consumption, we obtain a potential mixed-integer game. To compute an approximate generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE), we propose an iterative two-stage method that exploits a problem convexification and the gas-flow models. We quantify the quality of the computed solution and perform a numerical study to evaluate the performance of our method.

We consider a large population of decision makers that choose their evolutionary strategies based on simple pairwise imitation rules. We describe such a dynamic process by the replicator dynamics. Differently from the available literature, where the payoffs signals are assumed to be updated continuously, we consider a more realistic scenario where they are updated occasionally. Our main technical contribution is to devise two event-triggered communication schemes with asymptotic convergence guarantees to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how our proposed approach is applicable as an efficient distributed demand response mechanism.

A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE seeking algorithms have in fact convergence guarantees toward an arbitrary, possibly inefficient, equilibrium. In this paper, we solve this open problem by leveraging results from fixed-point selection theory and in turn derive distributed algorithms for the computation of an optimal GNE in monotone games. We then extend the technical results to the time-varying setting and propose an algorithm that tracks the sequence of optimal equilibria up to an asymptotic error, whose bound depends on the local computational capabilities of the agents.

To optimally select a generalized Nash equilibrium, in this paper, we consider a semi-decentralized algorithm based on a double-layer Tikhonov regularization algorithm. Technically, we extend the Tikhonov method for equilibrium selection to generalized games. Next, we couple such an algorithm with the preconditioned forward-backward splitting, which guarantees linear convergence to a solution of the inner layer problem and allows for a semi-decentralized implementation. We then establish a conceptual connection and draw a comparison between the considered algorithm and the hybrid steepest descent method, the other known distributed approach for solving the equilibrium selection problem.

We present a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking method based on the Bregman forward-backward splitting, which allows us to have a mirror mapping instead of the standard projection as the backward operator. Our main technical contribution is to show convergence to a Nash equilibrium when the game has cocoercive pseudogradient mapping. Furthermore, when the feasible sets of the agents are simplices, a suitable choice of a Legendre function results in an exponentiated pseudogradient method, which, in our numerical experience, performs out the standard projected pseudogradient and dual averaging methods.

In future distribution grids, prosumers (i.e., energy consumers with storage and/or production capabilities) will trade energy with each other and with the main grid. To ensure an efficient and safe operation of energy trading, in this paper, we formulate a peer-to-peer energy market of prosumers as a generalized aggregative game, in which a network operator is responsible to enforce the operational constraints of the system. We design a distributed market-clearing mechanism with convergence guarantee to an economically-efficient, strategically-stable, and operationally-safe configuration (i.e., a variational generalized Nash equilibrium). Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus testcase show the scalability of the proposed approach and suggest that active participation in the market is beneficial for both prosumers and the network operator.

The distributed dual ascent is an established algorithm to solve strongly convex multi-agent optimization problems with separable cost functions, in the presence of coupling constraints. In this letter, we study its asynchronous counterpart. Specifically, we assume that each agent only relies on the outdated information received from some neighbors. Differently from the existing randomized and dual block-coordinate schemes, we show convergence under heterogeneous delays, communication and update frequencies. Consequently, our asynchronous dual ascent algorithm can be implemented without requiring any coordination between the agents.

Monotone aggregative games may admit multiple (variational) generalized Nash equilibria, yet currently there is no algorithm able to provide an a-priori characterization of the equilibrium solution actually computed. In this paper, we formulate for the first time the problem of selecting a specific variational equilibrium that is optimal with respect to a given objective function. We then propose a semi-decentralized algorithm for optimal equilibrium selection in linearly coupled aggregative games and prove its convergence.

A multi-agent optimization problem motivated by the management of energy systems is discussed. The associated cost function is separable and convex although not necessarily strongly convex and there exist edge-based coupling equality constraints. In this regard, we propose a distributed algorithm based on solving the dual of the augmented problem. Furthermore, we consider that the communication network might be time-varying and the algorithm might be carried out asynchronously. The time-varying nature and the asynchronicity are modeled as random processes. Then, we show the convergence and the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm under the aforementioned conditions.

In this paper, we propose a distributed model predictive control (MPC) scheme for economic dispatch of energy systems with a large number of active components. The scheme uses a distributed optimization algorithm that works over random communication networks and asynchronous updates, implying the resiliency of the proposed scheme with respect to communication problems, such as link failures, data packet drops, and delays. The distributed optimization algorithm is based on the augmented Lagrangian approach, where the dual of the considered convex economic dispatch problem is solved. Furthermore, in order to improve the convergence speed of the algorithm, we adapt Nesterov's accelerated gradient method and apply the warm start method to initialize the variables. We show through numerical simulations of a well-known case study the performance of the proposed scheme.

A non-centralized model predictive control (MPC) scheme for solving an economic dispatch problem of electrical networks is proposed in this paper. The scheme consists of two parts. The first part is an event-triggered repartitioning method that splits the network into a fixed number of non-overlapping sub-systems (microgrids). The objective of the repartitioning procedure is to obtain self-sufficient microgrids, i.e., those that can meet their local loads using their own generation units. However, since the algorithm does not guarantee that all the resulting microgrids are self-sufficient, the microgrids that are not self-sufficient must then form a coalition with some of their neighboring microgrids. This process becomes the second part of the scheme. By performing the coalition formation, we can decompose the economic dispatch problem of the network into coalition-based sub-problems such that each subproblem is feasible. Furthermore, we also show that the solution obtained by solving the coalition-based sub-problems is a feasible but sub-optimal solution to the centralized problem. Additionally, some numerical simulations are also carried out to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.

We consider the economic dispatch problem for a day-ahead, peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity market of prosumers (i.e., energy consumers who can also produce electricity) in a distribution network. In our model, each prosumer has the capability of producing power through its dispatchable or non-dispatchable generation units and/or has a storage energy unit. Furthermore, we consider a hybrid main grid & P2P market in which each prosumer can trade power both with the main grid and with (some of) the other prosumers. First, we cast the economic dispatch problem as a noncooperative game with coupling constraints. Then, we design a fully-scalable algorithm to steer the system to a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). Finally, we show through numerical studies that the proposed methodology has the potential to ensure safe and efficient operation of the power grid.

We propose a distributed method to solve a multi-agent optimization problem with strongly convex cost function and equality coupling constraints. The method is based on Nesterov's accelerated gradient approach and works over stochastically time-varying communication networks. We consider the standard assumptions of Nesterov's method and show that the sequence of the expected dual values converge toward the optimal value with the rate of \mathcal{O}(1/{k^2}). Furthermore, we provide a simulation study of solving an optimal power flow problem with a well-known benchmark case.