Operationally-Safe Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading in Distribution Grids

A Game-Theoretic Market-Clearing Mechanism

Journal article (2022)

Authors

Giuseppe Belgioioso ETH Zürich
W. Ananduta Team Sergio Grammatico - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
S. Grammatico Team Sergio Grammatico - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering , Team Bart De Schutter - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
C.A. Ocampo Martinez Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Team Bart De Schutter - Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering
Research Group
Team Sergio Grammatico (Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2022 Giuseppe Belgioioso, W. Ananduta, S. Grammatico, C.A. Ocampo Martinez
DOI
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https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2022.3158442
Energy management Reliability Production Costs Distribution networks Prosumers Distributed algorithm Couplings Peer-to-peer computing Automatic voltage control Generalized Nash equilibrium.
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Published Date

2022

Language

English

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Faculty

Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering

Department

Delft Center for Systems and Control

Research Group

Team Sergio Grammatico

Abstract

In future distribution grids, prosumers (i.e., energy consumers with storage and/or production capabilities) will trade energy with each other and with the main grid. To ensure an efficient and safe operation of energy trading, in this paper, we formulate a peer-to-peer energy market of prosumers as a generalized aggregative game, in which a network operator is responsible to enforce the operational constraints of the system. We design a distributed market-clearing mechanism with convergence guarantee to an economically-efficient, strategically-stable, and operationally-safe configuration (i.e., a variational generalized Nash equilibrium). Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus testcase show the scalability of the proposed approach and suggest that active participation in the market is beneficial for both prosumers and the network operator.