Exploiting PUF Variation to Detect Fault Injection Attacks
Troya Köylü (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
L. Garaffa (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
Cezar Reinbrecht (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
M.Z. Zahedi (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
S. Hamdioui (TU Delft - Quantum & Computer Engineering)
M Taouil (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
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Abstract
The massive deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices makes them vulnerable against physical tampering attacks, such as fault injection. These kind of hardware attacks are very popular as they typically do not require complex equipment or high expertise. Hence, it is important that IoT devices are protected against them. In this work, we present a novel fault injection attack detector with high flexibility and low overhead. Our solution is based on the reuse of a security primitive used in many IoT devices, i.e., ring oscillator (RO) physically unclonable function (PUF). Our results show that we obtain a high detection effectiveness and no false alarms against most popular fault injection attacks based on voltage and clock manipulations.