Print Email Facebook Twitter Proximal dynamics in multi-agent network games Title Proximal dynamics in multi-agent network games Author Grammatico, S. (TU Delft Team Bart De Schutter) Date 2017 Abstract In this paper, we consider dynamics and protocols for agents seeking an equilibrium in a network game with proximal quadratic cost coupling. We adopt an operator theoretic perspective to show global convergence to a network equilibrium, under the assumption of convex cost functions with proximal quadratic couplings, time-invariant and time-varying communication graph along with convex local constraints, and time-invariant communication graph along with convex local constraints and separable convex coupling constraints. We show that proximal dynamics generalize opinion dynamics in social networks and are applicable to distributed tertiary control in power networks. Subject Control systemsConvergenceCost functionCouplingsGamesPower system dynamicsProtocols To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:cbd33c9c-e148-40f5-acac-747b67b811a4 DOI https://doi.org/10.1109/TCNS.2017.2754358 ISSN 2325-5870 Source IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 5 (2018) (4), 1707-1716 Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type journal article Rights © 2017 S. Grammatico Files PDF 08046094.pdf 1.01 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:cbd33c9c-e148-40f5-acac-747b67b811a4/datastream/OBJ/view