Population games with replicator dynamics under event-triggered payoff provider and a demand response application

Population games with replicator dynamics under event-triggered payoff provider and a demand response application

Martinez-Piazuelo, Juan (Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya)
Ananduta, W. (TU Delft Team Sergio Grammatico)
Ocampo-Martinez, Carlos (Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya)
Grammatico, S. (TU Delft Team Sergio Grammatico; TU Delft Team Bart De Schutter)
Quijano, Nicanor (Universidad de los Andes)

2023

We consider a large population of decision makers that choose their evolutionary strategies based on simple pairwise imitation rules. We describe such a dynamic process by the replicator dynamics. Differently from the available literature, where the payoffs signals are assumed to be updated continuously, we consider a more realistic scenario where they are updated occasionally. Our main technical contribution is to devise two event-triggered communication schemes with asymptotic convergence guarantees to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how our proposed approach is applicable as an efficient distributed demand response mechanism.

Asymptotic stability
Costs
Demand response
Event-triggered control
game theory
Games
optimization
Protocols
Sociology
Statistics

http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8fe1138a-34aa-4a61-a108-68ead2e1257b

https://doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2023.3285532

2023-12-12

2475-1456

IEEE Control Systems Letters, 7, 3417-3422

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

Institutional Repository

journal article

© 2023 Juan Martinez-Piazuelo, W. Ananduta, Carlos Ocampo-Martinez, S. Grammatico, Nicanor Quijano