YZ
Y. Zhang
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9 records found
1
Real-Time Data-Driven Maintenance Logistics
A Public-Private Collaboration
Conference paper
(2024)
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Willem van Jaarsveld, Laurens Bliek, Mathijs de Weerdt, Stella Kapodistria, Verus Pronk, Peter Verleijsdonk, Simon Voorberg, Sicco Verwer, Yingqian Zhang, More authors...
The project “Real-time data-driven maintenance logistics” was initiated with the purpose of bringing innovations in data-driven decision making to maintenance logistics, by bringing problem owners in the form of three innovative companies together with researchers at two leading knowledge institutions. This paper reviews innovations in three related areas: How the innovations were inspired by practice, how they materialized, and how the results impact practice.
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The project “Real-time data-driven maintenance logistics” was initiated with the purpose of bringing innovations in data-driven decision making to maintenance logistics, by bringing problem owners in the form of three innovative companies together with researchers at two leading knowledge institutions. This paper reviews innovations in three related areas: How the innovations were inspired by practice, how they materialized, and how the results impact practice.
Creating incentives to prevent execution failures
An extension of VCG mechanisms
When information or control in a multiagent system is private to the agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed outcome, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit. In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents can become negative when using VCG payments (i.e., VCG is not strongly individually rational). To deal with this problem, we introduce an extended payment structure which takes into account the actual execution of the promised outcome. We show that this extended mechanism can guarantee a nonnegative utility and is (i) incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) incentive compatible in dominant strategies if and only if all agents can be verified during execution.
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When information or control in a multiagent system is private to the agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed outcome, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit. In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents can become negative when using VCG payments (i.e., VCG is not strongly individually rational). To deal with this problem, we introduce an extended payment structure which takes into account the actual execution of the promised outcome. We show that this extended mechanism can guarantee a nonnegative utility and is (i) incentive compatible in a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) incentive compatible in dominant strategies if and only if all agents can be verified during execution.