The goal of this study is to identify, classify, explore, and understand decision-making complexity elements in major infrastructure projects (MIPs). This article puts forward systematic definitions of decision making, decision-making quality, and decision-making complexity. Based on literature reviews and an in-depth case analysis of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB), a comprehensive framework of decision-making complexity is developed, which divides the elements into six dimensions: technical, social, financial, legal, organizational, and time. The links between different dimensions are also illustrated. This article is expected to deepen our current understanding of decision-making complexity and to provide a fundamental point of reference in the front-end phase of MIPs.@en

The frequent occurrence of mega project accidents has created an issue of risk management and has made its solution highly valued. In the case that the owner is at a regulatory disadvantage, insurance institution can provide a new pattern for risk management of mega projects. The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of insurance institution’s participation in mega project risk management on the decision-making of all participants and the promotion of the overall effectiveness of collaborative risk management of all participants. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model between the insurance institution, supervision unit and contractor, the conditions of the behavior evolution process of each participant and the important parameters affecting the change in behavior strategies are analyzed. The results indicate that the participation of insurance institution can promote the risk management investment of the supervision unit and contractor, and punitive measures can make participants pay more attention to the losses caused by the occurrence of risks In order to encourage insurance institution to participate in risk management of mega projects, incentive measures need to be taken to dispel their concerns cost surrounding costs. This study is helpful to reduce the probability of risk occurrence so as to realize the sustainable development of mega projects and provides management suggestions for insurance institution to participate in risk management. @en

In the context of carbon peak and carbon neutral policies, low-carbon construction has been the focus of most countries worldwide. As one of the most effective ways to achieve green construction, many countries have launched low-carbon policies to promote the development of prefabrication. However, the effectiveness and influencing factors of low-carbon policies on prefabrication need to be further verified under the dynamic game between the government and the construction enterprise. Therefore, this study considered subsidy and carbon tax policies and developed an evolutionary game model to promote the development of the prefabricated construction market. The evolutionary stable strategy of the government and construction enterprise under different scenarios was obtained. Subsequently, a numerical analysis was conducted to further investigate the impact of the key factors on the stable strategy. The results showed that an appropriate hybrid policy of subsidies and taxes could positively promote the prefabrication implementation of the construction enterprise. The government should adopt an appropriate policy intensity according to the maturity of the market. This study can provide effective guidance and practical enlightenment for the government to achieve low-carbon, green, and sustainable construction. @en

In mega projects, the stakeholders may be exposed to significant on-site construction risk, especially the owners and insurance companies who take the most responsibility for the risk loss. It is difficult for insurance companies to diversify their risks by undertaking enough similar policies, and participating in on-site risk management has become an important method of active risk control. Based on the principal-agent relationship between the owner, insurance company, and contractor, this paper establishes incentive mechanisms for risk management considering the common agency and exclusive agency models. The results show that an insurance company's involvement in the common agency model creates external effects that can improve the utility of both the owner and the insurance company. The owner is then willing to provide a higher incentive coefficient, and the contractor's nonrisk and risk management efforts increase accordingly. From the owner's perspective, the influence of the participants' characteristics and external uncertainties on the incentive strategy are discussed. The results recommend that it is better for the owners and insurance companies to jointly establish a good cooperative relationship and build the incentive mechanism. The spillover effect has a positive effect on the cooperation between the two parties, while the impact of the uncertainty in risk management output on the cooperative relationship is negative. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge for understanding the on-site risk management considering stakeholders' participation and provides a practical mode for owners and insurance companies to implement active risk management in mega projects, thus achieving better risk governance of mega projects. @en