A.G. Muntendam-Bos
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38 records found
1
This study explores two approaches to assess stress changes: a semi-analytical geomechanical proxy and a fully-coupled Thermo-Hydro-Mechanical (THM) model using open-DARTS. The THM model simulates coupled thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical processes in complex rock formations, while the proxy method approximates displacements and stress changes using reservoir simulation outputs and homogeneous geomechanical rock properties assumptions.
The proxy model has been applied to matrix- and fault-dominated systems, including the Brugge dataset. Results include pressure, temperature, displacements, stress changes predictions over 30 years. Fault stability is evaluated using Mohr-Coulomb criteria with a constant friction coefficient.
In fracture-dominated systems, faults often control flow but. Discrete Fracture Model (DFM) has been used for flow modelling.
Combining proxy and THM models can optimize the balance between accuracy and computational cost. The study emphasizes the differing impacts of pressure and temperature on fault stability during geothermal operations. ...
This study explores two approaches to assess stress changes: a semi-analytical geomechanical proxy and a fully-coupled Thermo-Hydro-Mechanical (THM) model using open-DARTS. The THM model simulates coupled thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical processes in complex rock formations, while the proxy method approximates displacements and stress changes using reservoir simulation outputs and homogeneous geomechanical rock properties assumptions.
The proxy model has been applied to matrix- and fault-dominated systems, including the Brugge dataset. Results include pressure, temperature, displacements, stress changes predictions over 30 years. Fault stability is evaluated using Mohr-Coulomb criteria with a constant friction coefficient.
In fracture-dominated systems, faults often control flow but. Discrete Fracture Model (DFM) has been used for flow modelling.
Combining proxy and THM models can optimize the balance between accuracy and computational cost. The study emphasizes the differing impacts of pressure and temperature on fault stability during geothermal operations.
Managing Induced Seismicity Risks From Enhanced Geothermal Systems
A Good Practice Guideline
Geothermal energy is a green source of power that could play an important role in climate-conscious energy portfolios; enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) have the potential to scale up exploitation of thermal resources. During hydraulic fracturing, fluids injected under high-pressure cause the rock mass to fail, stimulating fractures that improve fluid connectivity. However, this increase of pore fluid pressure can also reactivate pre-existing fault systems, potentially inducing earthquakes of significant size. Induced earthquakes are a significant concern for EGS operations. In some cases, ground shaking nuisance, building damages, or injuries have spurred the early termination of projects (e.g., Basel, Pohang). On the other hand, EGS operations at Soultz-sous-Forêts (France), Helsinki (Finland), Blue Mountain (Nevada, USA), and Utah FORGE (USA) have adequately managed induced earthquake risks. The success of an EGS operation depends on economical reservoir enhancements, while maintaining acceptable seismic risk levels. This requires state-of-the-art seismic risk management. This article reviews domains of seismology, earthquake engineering, risk management, and communication. We then synthesize “good practice” recommendations for evaluating, mitigating, and communicating the risk of induced seismicity. We advocate for a modular approach. Recommendations are provided for key technical aspects including (a) a seismic risk management framework, (b) seismic risk pre-screening, (c) comprehensive seismic hazard and risk evaluation, (d) traffic light protocol designs, (e) seismic monitoring implementation, and (f) step-by-step communication plans. Our recommendations adhere to regulatory best practices, to ensure their general applicability. Our guidelines provide a template for effective earthquake risk management and future research directions.
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For induced seismicity, the non-stationary, heterogeneous character of subsurface stress perturbations can be a source of spatiotemporal variations in the scaling of event sizes; one of the critical parameters controlling seismic hazard and risk. We demonstrate and test a systematic, statistical, penalized-likelihood approach to analysing both spatial and temporal variations in event size distributions. The methodology used is transferable to the risk analysis of any subsurface operation, especially for small earthquake catalogues. We explore the whole solution space and circumvent conventional, arbitrary choices that require a priori knowledge of these variations. We assess the effect of possible bias in the derivation, e.g., due to tapering of the earthquake-size distribution, correlation between the b-value and the magnitude of completeness and correlation between the b-value and the largest magnitude observed. We analyse the spatiotemporal variations in the earthquake-size distribution of the Groningen induced seismicity catalogue (December 1991–November 16, 2021). We find statistically significant spatial variations without any compelling, statistical evidence of a temporal variation. Furthermore, we find that the largest magnitudes observed are inconsistent with the sampling statistics of an unconstrained earthquake-size distribution. Current risk assessment models likely overestimate the probability of larger magnitude events (M ≥ 3.0) and thus the risk posed.
Prospects for geothermal energy in the Netherlands have renewed concerns around induced earthquakes. Risks from induced earthquakes are managed by traffic light protocols (TLPs), where the red-light is chosen as the stop-point before exceeding a tolerance to risk. Here, we simulate post-shut-in earthquake scenarios based on realistic information for the Netherlands. We focus on three risk metrics: aggregates like nuisance and damage impacts and also local personal risk (LPR) – a likelihood of building collapse fatality for an individual. Our results show that the severity of these risks varies spatially by orders of magnitude. Prior induced seismicity (e.g., the 2012 Huizinge event) provides a reference baseline to calibrate the Dutch earthquake risk tolerances. We find that these calibrated risk tolerances are similar to those observed in North America, suggesting an underlying sociological ‘license to operate.’ Furthermore, the use of calibrated risk tolerances results in nuisance concerns completely eclipsing the other two metrics. We compare our results to a hypothetical Groningen geothermal operation and find that our approach sets red-light thresholds approximately one magnitude unit below the ML 3.6 Huizinge event. Overall, our results provide a first-order recommendation for red-light thresholds and proactive management of Dutch enhanced geothermal induced seismicity.
The induced seismicity in the Groningen gas field, The Netherlands, presents contrasted spatio-temporal patterns between the central area and the south west area. Understanding the origin of this contrast requires a thorough assessment of two factors: (1) the stress development on the Groningen faults and (2) the frictional response of the faults to induced stresses. Both factors have large uncertainties that must be honoured and then reduced with the observational constraints. Ensembles of induced stress realizations are built by varying the Poisson's ratio in a poro-elastic model incorporating the 3-D complexities of the geometries of the Groningen gas reservoir and its faults, and the historical pore pressure distribution. The a priori uncertainties in the frictional response are mapped by varying the parameters of a seismicity model based on rate-and-state friction. The uncertainties of each component of this complex physics-based model are honoured through an efficient data assimilation algorithm. By assimilating the seismicity data with an Ensemble-Smoother, the prior uncertainties of each model parameter are effectively reduced, and the posterior seismicity rate predictions are consistent with the observations. Our integrated workflow allows us to disentangle the contributions of the main two factors controlling the induced seismicity at Groningen, induced stress development and fault frictional response. Posterior distributions of the model parameters of each modelling component are contrasted between the central and south west area at Groningen. We find that, even after honouring the spatial heterogeneity in stress development across the Groningen gas field, the spatial variability of the observed induced seismicity rate still requires spatial heterogeneity in the fault frictional response. This work is enabled by the unprecedented deployment of an Ensemble-Smoother combined with physics-based modelling over a complex case of reservoir induced seismicity.
We present an overview of induced seismicity due to subsurface engineering in the Netherlands. Our overview includes events induced by gas extraction, underground gas storage, geothermal heat extraction, salt solution mining and post-mining water ingress. Compared to natural seismicity, induced events are usually small (magnitudes ≤ 4.0). However, due to the soft topsoils in combination with shallow hypocentres, in the Netherlands events exceeding magnitude 1.5–2.0 may be felt by the public. These events can potentially damage houses and infrastructure, and undermine public acceptance. Felt events were induced by gas production in the north of the Netherlands and by post-mining water ingress in the south-east. Notorious examples are the earthquakes induced by gas production from the large Groningen gas field with magnitudes up to 3.6. Here, extensive non-structural damage incurred and public support was revoked. As a consequence, production will be terminated in 2022 leaving approximately 800 billion cubic metres of gas unexploited. The magnitudes of the events observed at underground gas storage, geothermal heat production and salt solution mining projects have so far been very limited (magnitudes ≤ 1.7). However, in the future larger events cannot be excluded. Project- or industry-specific risk governance protocols, extensive gathering of subsurface data and adequate seismic monitoring are therefore essential to allow sustainable use of the Dutch subsurface now and over the decades to come.
Over 190 gas fields have been exploited in The Netherlands and only 15-20% have been associated with induced seismicity. We assess the geomechanical characteristics of stress changes on faults due to gas depletion for 180 producing gas fields in the Netherlands. We confirm findings from earlier generic studies that inter-reservoir offset faults require less reservoir depletion to reach failure compared to bounding and small offset faults. However, the stress changes on the offset faults alone are not sufficient to explain the observed seismicity. We find that the presence of the visco-elastic Zechstein formation probably has a crucial influence on the in-situ stress field in the Dutch subsurface and significantly impacts the fault stability of the gas reservoirs in the Netherlands. By accounting for this influence, our results show remarkable consistency with the observed (non)occurrence of induced seismicity in the Dutch gas fields. A more detailed study taking into account the detailed geological information of reservoir and fault geometry available at the operators and the slip weakening behavior of the frictional strength is required to further refine the predictive power of our analysis.
Another objective of this paper is to discuss how these risks are managed and mitigated by the sector and the supervisor, State Supervision of Mines (SodM). Portfolio operators developing multiple projects, using skilled employees and embracing continuous improvement are seen as the way forward for the sector to grow safely and sustainably.
This paper concludes that positive developments have started, but a lot of work still needs to be done to ensure safe growth of the geothermal energy sector. ...
Another objective of this paper is to discuss how these risks are managed and mitigated by the sector and the supervisor, State Supervision of Mines (SodM). Portfolio operators developing multiple projects, using skilled employees and embracing continuous improvement are seen as the way forward for the sector to grow safely and sustainably.
This paper concludes that positive developments have started, but a lot of work still needs to be done to ensure safe growth of the geothermal energy sector.
The Groningen gas field in the north of the Netherlands is one of the largest gas fields in the world. Since the early 1990s induced seismicity has been recorded. The largest magnitude event observed so far was a Mw = 3.6 event at the town of Huizinge in 2012. The risk posed by the induced events urged the necessity to build comprehensive seismological models capable of explaining the spatial-temporal distribution of the recorded seismicity and evaluating the regional seismic hazard and risk. The link between the occurrence of the seismicity and pressure depletion due to the production of the gas has been firmly established. However, the construction of comprehensive seismological models as well as hazard assessment is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between induced and clustered events (events triggered by stress transfer of preceding, neighbouring events). This paper explores the contribution of clustered populations (i.e. aftershocks) to the Groningen induced seismic catalogue based on a statistical methodology in the time-space-magnitude domain. Specifically, the distributions of space-time distances between pairs of nearest-neighbour earthquakes, referred to as cluster style, is analysed. The cluster style of the Groningen induced seismicity is found to be very diffuse and characterized by a very low proportion of fore-/aftershock sequences and swarms (∼5 per cent) and a large proportion of repeater events (∼10 per cent). In contrast to human-induced seismicity in other regions, the background seismicity rate of Groningen is very low. Temporal variations in background seismicity rates can be related to changes in fault loading rates induced by gas production. Furthermore, a significant amount of independent, coincidental events (events occurring very close in time, but long distances apart) are observed. As the large gas field is fully connected, loading of the faults occurs roughly simultaneously throughout the field. Hence, the statistical probability of events occurring very close in time, but spatially far apart is significantly larger than in areas of fluid-injection induced seismicity The significant amount of repeaters and coincidental events cause an overabundance of events at intermediate time- and space-distances. This is further enhanced by the larger location errors in the catalogue increasing the estimated space-distance for non-relocated events. The diffusivity due to this overabundance of events at intermediate time- and space-distances, and the low-proportion of true fore-/aftershocks renders the statistical method used incapable of deriving a proper mode-separation value. However, this is not unique to this method. Any statistical method aimed at resolving two populations will break down if one of the populations analysed is too small. Hence, it is advisable to use caution when distinguishing fore-/aftershocks sequences or swarms for induced seismicity where the relative proportion of clustered events may be significantly lower than for tectonic events. In addition, given the small proportion of clustering and the general uncertainty in earthquake statistics, the results of this paper indicate that a distinction for earthquake risk modelling in Groningen is unnecessary.
Depletion-induced seismicity at the Groningen gas field
Coulomb rate-and-state models including differential compaction effect
Traffic light systems
To what extent can induced seismicity be controlled?
Most existing TLSs are based on a critical earthquake magnitude or vibration level that should be prevented to occur. Operational measures are defined to be taken after an induced earthquake exceeds predefined threshold values. This concept rests on the tacit assumptions that induced earthquakes of a critical strength announce themselves by precursory events of smaller strength and that future earthquakes of a critical strength can be prevented by modifying or stopping subsurface operations. We investigate to what extent these assumptions can be justified by studying observation data from a dozen fluid‐injection operations in geothermal reservoirs as well as from gas production in 26 gas fields in The Netherlands.
In our case studies, whereas fluid injection–induced seismicity generally starts at a low‐magnitude level and exhibits a gradual temporal increase of the maximum earthquake magnitude with the duration of the injection, the largest magnitude event frequently occurs postinjection. The temporal evolution of the seismicity induced by gas production in The Netherlands is less systematic. In some gas fields, seismicity started at a comparatively large‐magnitude level (ML ≥ 2.7) without detectable precursors. A correlation between seismic activity and the gas production rate is only observed in the largest gas field.
Our findings indicate that the precision to what an earthquake of a given strength can be prevented by a TLS has more limitations than typically assumed. ...
Most existing TLSs are based on a critical earthquake magnitude or vibration level that should be prevented to occur. Operational measures are defined to be taken after an induced earthquake exceeds predefined threshold values. This concept rests on the tacit assumptions that induced earthquakes of a critical strength announce themselves by precursory events of smaller strength and that future earthquakes of a critical strength can be prevented by modifying or stopping subsurface operations. We investigate to what extent these assumptions can be justified by studying observation data from a dozen fluid‐injection operations in geothermal reservoirs as well as from gas production in 26 gas fields in The Netherlands.
In our case studies, whereas fluid injection–induced seismicity generally starts at a low‐magnitude level and exhibits a gradual temporal increase of the maximum earthquake magnitude with the duration of the injection, the largest magnitude event frequently occurs postinjection. The temporal evolution of the seismicity induced by gas production in The Netherlands is less systematic. In some gas fields, seismicity started at a comparatively large‐magnitude level (ML ≥ 2.7) without detectable precursors. A correlation between seismic activity and the gas production rate is only observed in the largest gas field.
Our findings indicate that the precision to what an earthquake of a given strength can be prevented by a TLS has more limitations than typically assumed.
In 2016 State Supervision of Mines (SSM), with input from the geological survey of the Netherlands (TNO) and the onshore operators, proposed a guideline for a qualitative seismic risk analysis for depletion induced seismicity arising from gas production in the small fields in the Netherlands. The guideline follows international practices for risk assessment using a risk matrix approach. This paper elaborates the seismic risk guideline and reports on the application of the guideline to the gas fields in the Netherlands.
Risk is a combination of hazard and consequences. The result of the seismic risk analysis is qualitative and gives a relative scoring of the producing gas fields in the Netherlands in terms of risk. In order to obtain more information on the quantitative assessment of the risk, more detailed studies are needed. The Groningen gas field clearly poses a much larger seismic risk than that obtained for the other, smaller gas fields, most of which fall into the lowest risk category. Because of the large difference in risk between the Groningen field and the other smaller gas fields, the guideline of SodM deems it sufficient to carry out a qualitative risk analysis for the other gas fields in the Netherlands, as performed in this paper. Based on the combination of the hazards and consequences, the risk can be further interpreted and, if necessary, appropriate measures can be implemented. ...
In 2016 State Supervision of Mines (SSM), with input from the geological survey of the Netherlands (TNO) and the onshore operators, proposed a guideline for a qualitative seismic risk analysis for depletion induced seismicity arising from gas production in the small fields in the Netherlands. The guideline follows international practices for risk assessment using a risk matrix approach. This paper elaborates the seismic risk guideline and reports on the application of the guideline to the gas fields in the Netherlands.
Risk is a combination of hazard and consequences. The result of the seismic risk analysis is qualitative and gives a relative scoring of the producing gas fields in the Netherlands in terms of risk. In order to obtain more information on the quantitative assessment of the risk, more detailed studies are needed. The Groningen gas field clearly poses a much larger seismic risk than that obtained for the other, smaller gas fields, most of which fall into the lowest risk category. Because of the large difference in risk between the Groningen field and the other smaller gas fields, the guideline of SodM deems it sufficient to carry out a qualitative risk analysis for the other gas fields in the Netherlands, as performed in this paper. Based on the combination of the hazards and consequences, the risk can be further interpreted and, if necessary, appropriate measures can be implemented.