Process safety and process security share the common goal of protecting people, assets, and the environment, yet they remain largely fragmented in regulation and practice. This separation obscures the coupled nature of accidental and intentional risks in the chemical process industry and creates blind spots in how safety–security interactions are managed. To address this challenge, this study develops the Resilience-oriented Process Safety and Process Security (RoPSS) framework, which integrates both domains through four resilience capabilities (Anticipation, Absorption, Adaptation, and Ascension) embedded within a six-step management cycle. The framework introduces Ascension as an evolutionary capability that consolidates restoration, learning, continuous improvement, and prevention, extending resilience beyond recovery toward longer-term system strengthening. A structured catalogue of 50 performance indicators, organized by disruption type, resilience capability, and indicator category, provides measurable means to assess both operational and governance resilience. These indicators were defined and refined through focused expert elicitation, including an importance-availability assessment used as a formative step for indicator prioritization. An illustrative example in a chlor-alkali plant shows how RoPSS supports integrated disruption mapping, shared objective setting, and resilience-enhancing strategies. Overall, the framework offers an expert-informed conceptual basis for managing coupled safety–security risks and provides a foundation for future empirical evaluation, industrial application, and resilience benchmarking.

This research explores how process safety and process security risk management methods may be integrated into a unified framework, thereby considering the resilience engineering paradigm. Employing a systematic literature review and expert surveys with industrial practitioners alongside representatives from key regulatory bodies to understand the complexities and opportunities of such integration. The interactions that result from a mixed-method study ensure the gaining of insights into the practical challenges and opportunities of integration in diverse operational and regulatory environments. Utilizing Microsoft Forms analytics tools and ATLAS.ti for qualitative analysis, the research identifies patterns and conditions, as well as the context, which is pivotal for constructing a comprehensive, adaptable risk management framework. This paper introduces a novel, holistic risk management perspective, advocating for the amalgamation of process safety and process security within the chemical industry, adopting the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model underscored by resilience principles.

This paper presents a systematic literature review of risk assessment methods in the chemical process industry (CPI), focusing on process safety, process security, and resilience. We analyzed peer-reviewed articles from 2000 to 2022 using the PRISMA methodology and identified twelve predominant methods. Our findings reveal a shift towards dynamic, systemic-based assessments like the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) and System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). These methods are particularly effective at capturing the complexities of sociotechnical systems in the CPI. However, a significant observation from our review is the limited emphasis on the resilience paradigm within many existing methods when addressing both process safety and process security risks, which is crucial for preventing and recovering from disruptions. Given the evolving challenges in system safety and security threats, there is an urgent need for holistic methods that integrate process safety, process security, and resilience. Our review highlights the opportunity for further research to better prepare the industry for future challenges, ensuring safer, more secure, reliable, and resilient operations.