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20 records found
ANAC 2018
Repeated Multilateral Negotiation League
This is an extension from a selected paper from JSAI2019. There are a number of research challenges in the field of Automated Negotiation. The Ninth International Automated Negotiating Agent Competition encourages participants to develop effective negotiating agents, which can ne
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A Baseline for Nonlinear Bilateral Negotiations
The full results of the agents competing in ANAC 2014
In the past few years, there is a growing interest in automated negotiationin which software agents facilitate negotiation on behalf of their users and try to reach joint agreements. The potential value of developing such mechanisms becomes enormous when negotiation domain is too
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A Baseline for Nonlinear Bilateral Negotiations
The full results of the agents competing in ANAC 2014
In the past few years, there is a growing interest in automated negotiationin which software agents facilitate negotiation on behalf of their users and try to reach joint agreements. The potential value of developing such mechanisms becomes enormous when negotiation domain is too
...
ANAC 2017
Repeated Multilateral Negotiation League
The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) is annually organized competition to facilitate the research on automated negotiation. This paper presents the ANAC 2017 Repeated Multilateral Negotiation League. As human negotiators do, agents are supposed to learn from their
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In May 2015, we organized the Sixth International Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2015) in conjunction with AAMAS 2015. ANAC is an international competition that challenges researchers to develop a successful automated negotiator for scenarios where there is incomp
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The game of Diplomacy has been used as a test case for complex automated negotiations for a long time, but to date very few successful negotiation algorithms have been implemented for this game. We have therefore decided to include a Diplomacy tournament within the annual Automat
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We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by oth
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