Zonder dat we het beseffen speelt geo-informatie een belangrijke rol in de samenleving. Vragen als waar ga ik heen, hoe kom ik daar, hoeveel tijd kost het me en wat zijn de alternatieven zijn vragen waar vrijwel iedereen iedere dag mee te maken heeft. De behoefte aan actuele en juiste geo-informatie is hierbij evident. Het correct gebruik van de geoinformatie is net zo belangrijk als de beschikbaarheid. Een geologische kaart is niet geschikt voor navigatiedoeleinden, net zoals een vaarwegennetwerk niets zegt over de kwaliteit van het water. Er zijn mensen die voor het eerst op GoogleEarth kijken en spontaan naar buiten gaan om te zwaaien naar de buren met de illusie dat deze dit live kunnen zien op hun computer. Geo-informatie kan lang niet altijd zomaar gebruikt worden. Geo-informatie mag ook lang niet altijd zomaar gebruikt worden. Met dit laatste komen we bij het onderwerp van dit boek: het informatierecht. Openbaarheid, gebruiksvoorwaarden, intellectuele eigendom, en privacy zijn factoren waar op zijn minst rekening mee moet worden gehouden bij het gebruik van de geo-informatie.@en

The availability of information in information societies is a key issue that affects the entire society’s well-being. The possibilities for discovering new insights about the natural world, which have both commercial and public interest value, are extraordinary (NRC 1999a, p. 34). Developments in information technology have improved significantly the level of detail, currency of the data, but above all their interoperability. It is currently possible to link a wide variety of data sets at any time, and independent from their and your geographic location. Interoperable geographic data sets are at the core of SDI concepts. However, for the highest level of geographic detail, when the data can be linked to individuals, the ever-increasing level of interoperability poses serious threats to privacy rights. At these detailed levels the interest of a society for the concept of SDI may conflict with privacy interests of that same society. SDIs in advanced stages of development are expected to be driven by value added services (see Van Loenen 2006). Among the most promising value added services are location based services. However, especially for these services, privacy concerns may be a serious threat to the success and further development of LBS. This chapter explores the SDI (development) with respect to privacy considerations.@en

The issue of privacy protection is raising discussion in society, every time certain ICT developments allow for or simplify the collection, combination or application of new sets of person related data. Location based services (LBS) are amongst these new ICT developments that potentially put the privacy of individuals at risk. LBS technology allows for tracking and tracing the location of mobile phones or other terminal equipment, for example car navigation systems. These are widely available and becoming increasingly precise in defining a location, opening new possibilities for commercial and government use of location information. The increased possibility to know people’s whereabouts, both in a geographical and temporal sense, is posing the question of possibility versus desirability with regard to location privacy. The EU-Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC, OJ L 201) has anticipated this new ICT development. In addition to ‘traffic data’, necessary for the transmission of a communication, the directive uses the term ‘location data’, being the geographic position of the terminal equipment. Processing of any data for LBS is only allowed if the supplier has got prior, informed consent from the user. The user should have the possibility to block the processing of his location data (him being tracked) in an easy manner when he prefers so. Through the directive the EU has chosen for a strict OPT-IN regime including on-the-fly OPT-OUT. However, the directive allows national legislation to override the EU provisions for a number of cases. For example, national laws can restrict the privacy protection when this is “a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security, defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system” (article 15). This poses the question to what extent government may collect and use tracking information to prevent terrorist attacks, or to satisfy other national security purposes, and consequently limit location privacy. This research centralised around the question: “How should the right to location privacy of users of mobile phones and other terminal equipment be balanced with the tracing and tracking interests of the (national) security sector?”@en

The issue of privacy protection is raising discussion in society, every time certain ICT developments allow for or simplify the collection, combination or application of new sets of person related data. Location based services (LBS) are amongst these new ICT developments that potentially put the privacy of individuals at risk. LBS technology allows for tracking and tracing the location of mobile phones or other terminal equipment, for example car navigation systems. These are widely available and becoming increasingly precise in defining a location, opening new possibilities for commercial and government use of location information. The increased possibility to know people’s whereabouts, both in a geographical and temporal sense, is posing the question of possibility versus desirability with regard to location privacy. The EU-Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC, OJ L 201) has anticipated this new ICT development. In addition to ‘traffic data’, necessary for the transmission of a communication, the directive uses the term ‘location data’, being the geographic position of the terminal equipment. Processing of any data for LBS is only allowed if the supplier has got prior, informed consent from the user. The user should have the possibility to block the processing of his location data (him being tracked) in an easy manner when he prefers so. Through the directive the EU has chosen for a strict OPT-IN regime including on-the-fly OPT-OUT. However, the directive allows national legislation to override the EU provisions for a number of cases. For example, national laws can restrict the privacy protection when this is “a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security, defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system” (article 15). This poses the question to what extent government may collect and use tracking information to prevent terrorist attacks, or to satisfy other national security purposes, and consequently limit location privacy. This research centralised around the question: “How should the right to location privacy of users of mobile phones and other terminal equipment be balanced with the tracing and tracking interests of the (national) security sector?”@en

The issue of privacy protection is raising discussion in society, every time certain ICT developments allow for or simplify the collection, combination or application of new sets of person related data. Location based services (LBS) are amongst these new ICT developments that potentially put the privacy of individuals at risk. LBS technology allows for tracking and tracing the location of mobile phones or other terminal equipment, for example car navigation systems. These are widely available and becoming increasingly precise in defining a location, opening new possibilities for commercial and government use of location information. The increased possibility to know people’s whereabouts, both in a geographical and temporal sense, is posing the question of possibility versus desirability with regard to location privacy. The EU-Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC, OJ L 201) has anticipated this new ICT development. In addition to ‘traffic data’, necessary for the transmission of a communication, the directive uses the term ‘location data’, being the geographic position of the terminal equipment. Processing of any data for LBS is only allowed if the supplier has got prior, informed consent from the user. The user should have the possibility to block the processing of his location data (him being tracked) in an easy manner when he prefers so. Through the directive the EU has chosen for a strict OPT-IN regime including on-the-fly OPT-OUT. However, the directive allows national legislation to override the EU provisions for a number of cases. For example, national laws can restrict the privacy protection when this is “a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security, defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system” (article 15). This poses the question to what extent government may collect and use tracking information to prevent terrorist attacks, or to satisfy other national security purposes, and consequently limit location privacy. This research centralised around the question: “How should the right to location privacy of users of mobile phones and other terminal equipment be balanced with the tracing and tracking interests of the (national) security sector?”@en

Value added use of geographic information is important in the development of geographic information infrastructures. In spite of the European directive 'Reuse of public sector information', the market for value-added geographic information products and services based on government information hardly develops in Europe under current circumstances. The value-added business community uses the information to a limited extent because of the high price and the restrictive use conditions. As a consequence the use of these public datasets remains limited to a stable group of professional users; the mass is not reached. However, this paper argues that the barriers can be levelled through an alternative to current access policies. The alternative access policy may be a first step towards the widespread availability of value added geographic information services satisfying the needs of the public data providers, the value-added businesses, and the citizen.@en

Value added use of geographic information is important in the development of geographic information infrastructures. In spite of the European directive 'Reuse of public sector information', the market for value-added geographic information products and services based on government information hardly develops in Europe under current circumstances. The value-added business community uses the information to a limited extent because of the high price and the restrictive use conditions. As a consequence the use of these public datasets remains limited to a stable group of professional users; the mass is not reached. However, this paper argues that the barriers can be levelled through an alternative to current access policies. The alternative access policy may be a first step towards the widespread availability of value added geographic information services satisfying the needs of the public data providers, the value-added businesses, and the citizen.@en

Value added use of geographic information is important in the development of geographic information infrastructures. In spite of the European directive 'Reuse of public sector information', the market for value-added geographic information products and services based on government information hardly develops in Europe under current circumstances. The value-added business community uses the information to a limited extent because of the high price and the restrictive use conditions. As a consequence the use of these public datasets remains limited to a stable group of professional users; the mass is not reached. However, this paper argues that the barriers can be levelled through an alternative to current access policies. The alternative access policy may be a first step towards the widespread availability of value added geographic information services satisfying the needs of the public data providers, the value-added businesses, and the citizen.@en