BR
B. Riemersma
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1
This article studies safety management in future gas systems. It is structured around the compatibility of its technological and institutional coordination. We identify how the current mode of safety management is not in harmony with increasingly complex technological and institutional arrangements, and combine safety science with institutional analysis to improve safety management. For our case study of biogas quality monitoring in the Netherlands, we offer structured recommendations for the reallocation of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms based on Safety-II. This article provides insights for users of gas systems and other infrastructures alike, and it offers safety scholars an approach to safety management that incorporates a novel focus on institutions.
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This article studies safety management in future gas systems. It is structured around the compatibility of its technological and institutional coordination. We identify how the current mode of safety management is not in harmony with increasingly complex technological and institutional arrangements, and combine safety science with institutional analysis to improve safety management. For our case study of biogas quality monitoring in the Netherlands, we offer structured recommendations for the reallocation of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms based on Safety-II. This article provides insights for users of gas systems and other infrastructures alike, and it offers safety scholars an approach to safety management that incorporates a novel focus on institutions.
Upholding safety in future energy systems
The need for systemic risk assessment
This paper argues that energy systems are becoming increasingly complex, and illustrates how new types of hazards emerge from an ongoing transition towards renewable energy sources. It shows that the energy sector relies heavily on risk assessment methods that are analytic, and that systemic methods provide important additional insights.Acase study of the Dutch gas sector illustrates this by comparing the hazard and operability study (HAZOP, analytic) with the system-theoretic process analysis (STPA, systemic). The contribution is twofold. This paper illustrates how system hazards will remain underestimated by sustained use of only analytic methods, and it highlights the need to study the organization of safety in energy transitions. We conclude that appropriate risk assessment for future energy systems involves both analytic and systemic risk assessments.
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This paper argues that energy systems are becoming increasingly complex, and illustrates how new types of hazards emerge from an ongoing transition towards renewable energy sources. It shows that the energy sector relies heavily on risk assessment methods that are analytic, and that systemic methods provide important additional insights.Acase study of the Dutch gas sector illustrates this by comparing the hazard and operability study (HAZOP, analytic) with the system-theoretic process analysis (STPA, systemic). The contribution is twofold. This paper illustrates how system hazards will remain underestimated by sustained use of only analytic methods, and it highlights the need to study the organization of safety in energy transitions. We conclude that appropriate risk assessment for future energy systems involves both analytic and systemic risk assessments.
This paper identifies safety concerns that arise from ongoing technical and institutional changes in the Dutch gas sector. The Netherlands has a well-developed gas infrastructure that primarily transports natural gas, although its constituting features are undergoing major changes. We identify three historical developments, and show how (1) ongoing effects of liberalization; (2) earthquakes in the Groningen-area; and (3) commitment to climate goals affect safety. Between trends of ongoing decentralization and a growing variety of gas producers, the most urgent concerns relate to the operation of low- and medium pressure distribution grids. Natural gas is losing its prominent role, leaving system operators faced with trade-offs induced by a declining share of customers. At the same time, responsibilities for new gas technologies are allocated over a growing number of actors. In illustrating how safety practices have evolved in line with incremental technological and institutional developments over the last half century, this article elaborates how sudden changes in constitutional features of infrastructural systems might jeopardize system safety.
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This paper identifies safety concerns that arise from ongoing technical and institutional changes in the Dutch gas sector. The Netherlands has a well-developed gas infrastructure that primarily transports natural gas, although its constituting features are undergoing major changes. We identify three historical developments, and show how (1) ongoing effects of liberalization; (2) earthquakes in the Groningen-area; and (3) commitment to climate goals affect safety. Between trends of ongoing decentralization and a growing variety of gas producers, the most urgent concerns relate to the operation of low- and medium pressure distribution grids. Natural gas is losing its prominent role, leaving system operators faced with trade-offs induced by a declining share of customers. At the same time, responsibilities for new gas technologies are allocated over a growing number of actors. In illustrating how safety practices have evolved in line with incremental technological and institutional developments over the last half century, this article elaborates how sudden changes in constitutional features of infrastructural systems might jeopardize system safety.
Changing risks in existing gas infrastructure in the Netherlands
Are traditional hazard analysis methods equipped for an energy transition?
Countries with extensive gas infrastructures are increasingly turning towards gasses that are produced from renewable energy sources, such as biomass, solar and wind. While these renewable gasses such as biogas/green gas and possibly hydrogen are compatible with existing infrastructure, they exhibit different combustion and explosion behavior. Current safety practices designed for natural gas are not sufficient to ensure a similar level of safety, and must be updated to mitigate changing risks. Additionally, new actors are emerging who are involved with the production and distribution process. The current paper analyzes the extent to which the gas sector in the Netherlands is equipped to deal with a changing risk profile by elaborating on two risk analysis methods. These methods are applied to a segment of the green gas. We find that the Bowtie method that is currently used in the sector provides an understanding of the physical and technical aspects of risks related to green gas provision and is instrumental in communicating them to a general audience. It is also, however, largely static and does nog accommodate changing technical and institutional features of gas provision. The System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model, conversely, provides better tools to understand the interaction between incumbent and new actors and technology in the gas sector and provides comprehensive design recommendations for renewable gas systems to a specific audience.
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Countries with extensive gas infrastructures are increasingly turning towards gasses that are produced from renewable energy sources, such as biomass, solar and wind. While these renewable gasses such as biogas/green gas and possibly hydrogen are compatible with existing infrastructure, they exhibit different combustion and explosion behavior. Current safety practices designed for natural gas are not sufficient to ensure a similar level of safety, and must be updated to mitigate changing risks. Additionally, new actors are emerging who are involved with the production and distribution process. The current paper analyzes the extent to which the gas sector in the Netherlands is equipped to deal with a changing risk profile by elaborating on two risk analysis methods. These methods are applied to a segment of the green gas. We find that the Bowtie method that is currently used in the sector provides an understanding of the physical and technical aspects of risks related to green gas provision and is instrumental in communicating them to a general audience. It is also, however, largely static and does nog accommodate changing technical and institutional features of gas provision. The System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model, conversely, provides better tools to understand the interaction between incumbent and new actors and technology in the gas sector and provides comprehensive design recommendations for renewable gas systems to a specific audience.