A Security Verification Template to Assess Cache Architecture Vulnerabilities
Tara Ghasempouri (Tallinn University of Technology)
J. Raik (Tallinn University of Technology)
Kolin Paul (Tallinn University of Technology)
Cezar Rodolfo Wedig Reinbrecht (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
S. Hamdioui (TU Delft - Quantum & Computer Engineering)
M. Taouil (TU Delft - Computer Engineering)
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Abstract
In the recent years, cache based side-channel attacks have become a serious threat for computers. To face this issue, researches have been looking at verifying the security policies. However, these approaches are limited to manual security verification and they typically work for a small subset of the attacks. Hence, an effective verification environment to automatically verify the cache security for all side-channel attacks is still missing. To address this shortcoming, we propose a security verification methodology that formally verifies cache designs against cache side-channel vulnerabilities. Results show that this verification template is a straightforward, automated method in verifying cache invulnerability.