Zero-Power Defense Done Right

Shielding IMDs from Battery-Depletion Attacks

Journal Article (2020)
Author(s)

M.A. Siddiqi (Erasmus MC, TU Delft - Electronics)

WA Serdijn (TU Delft - Bio-Electronics)

C. Strydis (Erasmus MC, TU Delft - Bio-Electronics)

Research Group
Electronics
Copyright
© 2020 M.A. Siddiqi, W.A. Serdijn, C. Strydis
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11265-020-01530-5
More Info
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Publication Year
2020
Language
English
Copyright
© 2020 M.A. Siddiqi, W.A. Serdijn, C. Strydis
Research Group
Electronics
Issue number
4
Volume number
93 (2021)
Pages (from-to)
421–437
Reuse Rights

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Abstract

The wireless capabilities of modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) make them vulnerable to security attacks. One prominent attack, which has disastrous consequences for the patient’s wellbeing, is the battery Denial-of-Service attack whereby the IMD is occupied with continuous authentication requests from an adversary with the aim of depleting its battery. Zero-Power Defense (ZPD), based on energy harvesting, is known to be an excellent protection against these attacks. This paper raises essential design considerations for employing ZPD techniques in commercial IMDs, offers a critical review of ZPD techniques found in literature and, subsequently, gives crucial recommendations for developing comprehensive ZPD solutions.