Modern DRAMs are vulnerable to Rowhammer attacks, demanding robust protection methods to mitigate these attacks. Existing solutions aim at increased resilience by improving design and/or adjusting operation parameters, limit row access count by throttling and prevent bit flips by timely row refreshing. However, scaling these methods for future DRAM technologies may incur significant costs in terms of area, power and/or latency. This study analyses the impact of the values of the neighbouring cells on victim cells and introduces a row alternation protection method, which is a novel approach that alternates the data of attacker rows on each access to lower the chance of bit flips in victim rows. Our analysis show that the minimum Rowhammer count to cause a bitflip in a particular cell does not only depend on vertical neighbours from the attacker row, but also on the value of the horizontal neighbours from the victim row as well as diagonal cells from the attacker row. Row alternation is able to protect the majority of the vulnerable cells (i.e., with 65%) for the DRAM used in our case study and in cases where unsuccessful it significantly increases the average minimum required Rowhammer account by 18%.