This paper proposes a nonmonetary traffic demand management scheme, named CARMA, as a fair solution to the morning commute congestion. We consider heterogeneous commuters traveling through a single bottleneck that differ in both the desired arrival time and value of time (VOT). We consider a generalized notion of VOT by allowing it to vary dynamically on each day (e.g., according to trip purpose and urgency) rather than being a static characteristic of each individual. In our CARMA scheme, the bottleneck is divided into a fast lane that is kept in free flow and a slow lane that is subject to congestion. We introduce a nontradable mobility credit, named karma, that is used by commuters to bid for access to the fast lane. Commuters who get outbid or do not participate in the CARMA scheme instead use the slow lane. At the end of each day, karma collected from the bidders is redistributed, and the process repeats day by day. We model the collective commuter behaviors under CARMA as a dynamic population game (DPG), in which a stationary Nash equilibrium (SNE) is guaranteed to exist. Unlike existing monetary schemes, CARMA is demonstrated, both analytically and numerically, to achieve (a) an equitable traffic assignment with respect to heterogeneous income classes and (b) a strong Pareto improvement in the long-term average travel disutility with respect to no policy intervention. With extensive numerical analysis, we show that CARMA is able to retain the same congestion reduction as an optimal monetary tolling scheme under uniform karma redistribution and even outperform tolling under a well-designed redistribution scheme. We also highlight the privacy-preserving feature of CARMA, that is, its ability to tailor to the private preferences of commuters without centrally collecting the information.

The morning commute bottleneck congestion problem has classically been modelled as a static game in which commuters act strategically based on their immediate Value of Time (VOT). This has restricted existing congestion mitigation techniques to rely on essentially monetary incentives to affect the static costs of the commuters. In contrast, a dynamic model enables characterizing the strategic tradeoff between immediate and future resource access rights and inspires the design of new classes of fair, non-monetary congestion mitigation schemes. In this paper, we show how the recently proposed Dynamic Population Game (DPG) framework can be leveraged to study a non-monetary economy for bottleneck congestion management based on karma, a non-tradable mobility credit. Our DPG model allows to consider an elastic demand of commuters that only travel if congestion is reduced, and we show that a Stationary Nash Equilibrium (SNE) is guaranteed to exist despite of the dynamic participation of these commuters. Through numerical case studies we illustrate how our tools can assist policy makers in taking informed decisions about complex policy outcomes. In particular, we show how the dynamic karma scheme is robust to a potentially detrimental rebound effect that would manifest in a static monetary scheme.

A popular remedy for the morning commute bottleneck congestion is to split the highway capacity into a managed lane that is kept in free-flow and a general purpose lane that is subject to congestion. A classical theoretical result is that the more capacity is allocated to the managed lane the less the resulting congestion. However, existing approaches to restrict access to the managed lane are primarily monetary, e.g., tolls, which severely limits the public willingness to accept them due to equity concerns. Following up on recent work which introduces karma as a completely non-monetary credit used to control access to a so-called Karma Priority (KP) lane, we first review the strategic problem of the commuters which is modeled as a dynamic population game. We then numerically investigate the effect of varying the KP lane capacity. The karma scheme is equitable with respect to different income classes irrespective of the capacity split, meanwhile achieving near-optimal traffic reduction. Thus, managing a larger fraction of the bottleneck could be more socially feasible under a karma scheme than a monetary scheme.

Vehicle sharing system consists of a fleet of vehicles (usually bikes or cars) that can be rented at one station and returned at another station. We study how to achieve guaranteed service availability in such systems. Specifically, we are interested in determining a) the fleet size and initial allocation of vehicles to stations and b) the minimum capacity of each station needed to guarantee that a) every customer will find an available vehicle at the origin station and b) the customer will find a free parking spot at the destination station. We model the evolution of number of vehicles at each station as a stochastic process and prove that the relevant probabilities in the system can be approximated from above using a computationally-tractable decoupled model. This property can be exploited to efficiently determine the size of fleet, initial distribution of vehicles to stations, and station capacities that are sufficient to achieve the desired service level. The applicability of the method is demonstrated by computing the initial vehicle stock and the capacity of each station that would be needed to avoid service failures in Boston's bike sharing system 'The Hubway'. Our simulation shows that the proposed method is able to find more efficient design parameters than the naive approach and consequently it can achieve the equivalent quality-of-service level with half of the vehicle fleet and half of the parking capacity.

Ride-sharing services are transforming urban mobility by providing timely and convenient transportation to anybody, anywhere, and anytime. These services present enormous potential for positive societal impacts with respect to pollution, energy consumption, congestion, etc. Current mathematical models, however, do not fully address the potential of ride-sharing. Recently, a largescale study highlighted some of the benefits of car pooling but was limited to static routes with two riders per vehicle (optimally) or three (with heuristics).We present a more general mathematical model for real-time high-capacity ride-sharing that (i) scales to large numbers of passengers and trips and (ii) dynamically generates optimal routes with respect to online demand and vehicle locations. The algorithm starts from a greedy assignment and improves it through a constrained optimization, quickly returning solutions of good quality and converging to the optimal assignment over time. We quantify experimentally the tradeoff between fleet size, capacity, waiting time, travel delay, and operational costs for low- to medium-capacity vehicles, such as taxis and van shuttles. The algorithm is validated with ~3 million rides extracted from the New York City taxicab public dataset. Our experimental study considers ride-sharing with rider capacity of up to 10 simultaneous passengers per vehicle. The algorithm applies to fleets of autonomous vehicles and also incorporates rebalancing of idling vehicles to areas of high demand. This framework is general and can be used for many real-time multivehicle, multitask assignment problems.