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Power side-channel attacks pose a serious threat to cryptographic hardware implementations. To avoid deploying insecure implementations, it is essential to perform side-channel leakage assessments at the pre-silicon stage. Register Transfer Level (RTL)-level or gate-level power traces-generated, for example using SpyGlass, can be produced very efficiently but suffer from limited accuracy. In contrast, post-layout simulations provide a much higher accuracy but are prohibitively time-consuming. In this work, we propose a hybrid approach that extracts layout information, including timing and parasitic effects, and augments the gate-level netlist with this data. This approach enables fast pre-silicon power trace generation that accurately embeds post-layout parasitics. Our results show that power traces generated from gate-level and transistor-level simulations, both augmented with layout information, perform similarly in key-ranking anlysis and have a low Euclidean distance, while the gate-level simulations are 19 x-125 x faster to generate.
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Power side-channel attacks pose a serious threat to cryptographic hardware implementations. To avoid deploying insecure implementations, it is essential to perform side-channel leakage assessments at the pre-silicon stage. Register Transfer Level (RTL)-level or gate-level power traces-generated, for example using SpyGlass, can be produced very efficiently but suffer from limited accuracy. In contrast, post-layout simulations provide a much higher accuracy but are prohibitively time-consuming. In this work, we propose a hybrid approach that extracts layout information, including timing and parasitic effects, and augments the gate-level netlist with this data. This approach enables fast pre-silicon power trace generation that accurately embeds post-layout parasitics. Our results show that power traces generated from gate-level and transistor-level simulations, both augmented with layout information, perform similarly in key-ranking anlysis and have a low Euclidean distance, while the gate-level simulations are 19 x-125 x faster to generate.
Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) extensions, particularly scalar cryptography extensions (Zk), combine the performance advantages of hardware with the adaptability of software, enabling the direct and efficient execution of cryptographic functions within the processor pipeline. This integration eliminates the need to communicate with external cores, substantially reducing latency, power consumption, and hardware overhead, making it especially suitable for embedded systems with constrained resources. However, current scalar cryptography extension implementations remain vulnerable to physical threats, notably power side-channel attacks (PSCAs). These attacks allow adversaries to extract confidential information, such as secret keys, by analyzing the power consumption patterns of the hardware during operation. This paper presents an optimized and secure implementation of the RISC-V scalar Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) extension (Zkne/Zknd) using Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) to mitigate first-order PSCAs. Our approach features optimized assembly implementations for partial rounds and key scheduling alongside pipeline-aware microarchitecture optimizations. We evaluated the security and performance of the proposed design using the Xilinx Artix7 FPGA platform. The results indicate that our design is side-channel-resistant while adding a very low area overhead of 0.39% to the full 32-bit CV32E40S RISC-V processor. Moreover, the performance overhead is zero when the extension-related instructions are properly scheduled.
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Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) extensions, particularly scalar cryptography extensions (Zk), combine the performance advantages of hardware with the adaptability of software, enabling the direct and efficient execution of cryptographic functions within the processor pipeline. This integration eliminates the need to communicate with external cores, substantially reducing latency, power consumption, and hardware overhead, making it especially suitable for embedded systems with constrained resources. However, current scalar cryptography extension implementations remain vulnerable to physical threats, notably power side-channel attacks (PSCAs). These attacks allow adversaries to extract confidential information, such as secret keys, by analyzing the power consumption patterns of the hardware during operation. This paper presents an optimized and secure implementation of the RISC-V scalar Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) extension (Zkne/Zknd) using Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) to mitigate first-order PSCAs. Our approach features optimized assembly implementations for partial rounds and key scheduling alongside pipeline-aware microarchitecture optimizations. We evaluated the security and performance of the proposed design using the Xilinx Artix7 FPGA platform. The results indicate that our design is side-channel-resistant while adding a very low area overhead of 0.39% to the full 32-bit CV32E40S RISC-V processor. Moreover, the performance overhead is zero when the extension-related instructions are properly scheduled.
