MT
M. Tealane
info
Please Note
<p>This page displays the records of the person named above and is not linked to a unique person identifier. This record may need to be merged to a profile.</p>
5 records found
1
Journal article
(2022)
-
Marko Tealane, Jako Kilter, Oleg Bagleybter, Birkir Heimisson, Marjan Popov
This paper presents an out-of-step protection algorithm based on angle derivatives, which makes use of wide-area measurements and can be applied on arbitrary tie-lines in electrical power systems. The developed algorithm uses PMU measurements that are taken at both ends of a transmission line. Based on the changes of the electrical quantities in the power system, the algorithm detects unstable system conditions. Thus, the developed solution is settingless and can be easily applied where an out-of-step condition is expected. The concept is deployed by using an industrial controller and tested by conducting numerous hardware-in-the-loop simulations. Additionally, recorded data from actual out-of-step events in the Icelandic power system are used to validate the developed algorithm. The performance of the implemented method is compared against the traditional impedance-based out-of-step protection methods. The results confirm that the proposed algorithm detects out-of-step conditions more reliably and faster than the traditional impedance-based solutions.
...
This paper presents an out-of-step protection algorithm based on angle derivatives, which makes use of wide-area measurements and can be applied on arbitrary tie-lines in electrical power systems. The developed algorithm uses PMU measurements that are taken at both ends of a transmission line. Based on the changes of the electrical quantities in the power system, the algorithm detects unstable system conditions. Thus, the developed solution is settingless and can be easily applied where an out-of-step condition is expected. The concept is deployed by using an industrial controller and tested by conducting numerous hardware-in-the-loop simulations. Additionally, recorded data from actual out-of-step events in the Icelandic power system are used to validate the developed algorithm. The performance of the implemented method is compared against the traditional impedance-based out-of-step protection methods. The results confirm that the proposed algorithm detects out-of-step conditions more reliably and faster than the traditional impedance-based solutions.
This paper presents a robust and adaptive out-of-step (OOS) protection algorithm, using wide-area information, that can be applied on tie-lines in observable power systems. The developed algorithm is based upon real-time computation of the system impedance and makes use of the well-known power-angle characteristic. In this way, a setting-less OOS concept in real-time environment is developed, which is applicable for tie-lines in an arbitrary power system. Furthermore, the developed protection algorithm is installed on hardware and is verified by numerous tests. The performance of the new hardware implementation is compared to the traditional impedance-based OOS protection methods. The results confirm that the proposed algorithm detects OOS conditions faster and more reliably than the traditional impedance-based solutions.
...
This paper presents a robust and adaptive out-of-step (OOS) protection algorithm, using wide-area information, that can be applied on tie-lines in observable power systems. The developed algorithm is based upon real-time computation of the system impedance and makes use of the well-known power-angle characteristic. In this way, a setting-less OOS concept in real-time environment is developed, which is applicable for tie-lines in an arbitrary power system. Furthermore, the developed protection algorithm is installed on hardware and is verified by numerous tests. The performance of the new hardware implementation is compared to the traditional impedance-based OOS protection methods. The results confirm that the proposed algorithm detects OOS conditions faster and more reliably than the traditional impedance-based solutions.
Conference paper
(2022)
-
M. Popov, A. Boricic, Nidarshan Veerakumar, Matija Naglic, I. Tyuryukanov, M. Tealane, José L. Rueda, M.A.M.M. van der Meijden, P. Palensky, More Authors...
This paper deals with the essentials of synchrophasor applications for future power systems aimed at increasing system reliability and resilience. In this work, several applications are presented, covering real-time disturbance detection and blackout prevention. Firstly, an advanced big-data management platform built in real-time digital simulation (RTDS) environment to support measurement data collection, processing and sharing among stakeholders is described. With this platform, a network splitting methodology to avoid cascading failures is presented and demonstrated, which upon the occurrence of a disturbance successfully isolates the affected part to avoid catastrophic cascade system outage. Online generator coherency identification is another synchrophasor application implemented on the platform, whose use is demonstrated in the context of controlled network splitting. By using synchrophasors, data-analytics techniques can also be used for identifying and classifying different disturbances in real-time with the least human intervention. Therefore, a novel centralized artificial intelligence (AI) based expert system to detect and classify critical events is outlined. Finally, the paper elaborates on the development of advanced system resilience metrics for real-time vulnerability assessment, with a focus on increasingly relevant dynamic interactions between distribution and transmission systems.
...
This paper deals with the essentials of synchrophasor applications for future power systems aimed at increasing system reliability and resilience. In this work, several applications are presented, covering real-time disturbance detection and blackout prevention. Firstly, an advanced big-data management platform built in real-time digital simulation (RTDS) environment to support measurement data collection, processing and sharing among stakeholders is described. With this platform, a network splitting methodology to avoid cascading failures is presented and demonstrated, which upon the occurrence of a disturbance successfully isolates the affected part to avoid catastrophic cascade system outage. Online generator coherency identification is another synchrophasor application implemented on the platform, whose use is demonstrated in the context of controlled network splitting. By using synchrophasors, data-analytics techniques can also be used for identifying and classifying different disturbances in real-time with the least human intervention. Therefore, a novel centralized artificial intelligence (AI) based expert system to detect and classify critical events is outlined. Finally, the paper elaborates on the development of advanced system resilience metrics for real-time vulnerability assessment, with a focus on increasingly relevant dynamic interactions between distribution and transmission systems.
Conference paper
(2020)
-
Vetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar, Marko Tealane, Alexandru Stefanov, Peter Palensky
Power systems automation and communication standards are crucial for the transition of the conventional power system towards a smart grid. The IEC 61850 standard is widely used for substation automation and protection. It enables real-time communication and data exchange between critical substation automation devices. IEC 61850 serves as the foundation for open communication and data exchange for digital substations of the smart grid. However, IEC 61850 has cyber security vulnerabilities that can be exploited with a man-in-the-middle attack. Such coordinated cyber attacks against the protection system in digital substations can disconnect generation and transmission lines, causing cascading failures. In this paper, we demonstrate a cyber attack involving the Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol of IEC 61850. This is achieved by exploiting the cyber security vulnerabilities in the protocol and injecting spoofed GOOSE data frames into the substation communication network at the bay level. The cyber attack leads to tripping of multiple protective relays in the power grid, eventually resulting in a blackout. The attack model and impact on system dynamics are verified experimentally through hardware-in-the-loop simulations using commercial relays and Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS).
...
Power systems automation and communication standards are crucial for the transition of the conventional power system towards a smart grid. The IEC 61850 standard is widely used for substation automation and protection. It enables real-time communication and data exchange between critical substation automation devices. IEC 61850 serves as the foundation for open communication and data exchange for digital substations of the smart grid. However, IEC 61850 has cyber security vulnerabilities that can be exploited with a man-in-the-middle attack. Such coordinated cyber attacks against the protection system in digital substations can disconnect generation and transmission lines, causing cascading failures. In this paper, we demonstrate a cyber attack involving the Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol of IEC 61850. This is achieved by exploiting the cyber security vulnerabilities in the protocol and injecting spoofed GOOSE data frames into the substation communication network at the bay level. The cyber attack leads to tripping of multiple protective relays in the power grid, eventually resulting in a blackout. The attack model and impact on system dynamics are verified experimentally through hardware-in-the-loop simulations using commercial relays and Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS).
Conference paper
(2020)
-
Vetrivel Subramaniam Rajkumar, Marko Tealane, Alexandru Stefanov, Alfan Presekal, Peter Palensky
Power system automation and communication standards are spearheading the power system transition towards a smart grid. IEC 61850 is one such standard, which is widely used for substation automation and protection. It enables real-time communication and data exchange between critical substation automation and protection devices within digital substations. However, IEC 61850 is not cyber secure. In this paper, we demonstrate the dangerous implications of not securing IEC 61850 standard. Cyber attacks may exploit the vulnerabilities of the Sampled Values (SV) and Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocols of IEC 61850. The cyber attacks may be realised by injecting spoofed SV and GOOSE data frames into the substation communication network at the bay level. We demonstrate that such cyber attacks may lead to obstruction or tripping of multiple protective relays. Coordinated cyber attacks against the protection system in digital substations may cause generation and line disconnections, triggering cascading failures in the power grid. This may eventually result in a partial or complete blackout. The attack model, impact on system dynamics and cascading failures are veri ed experimentally through a proposed cyber-physical experimental framework that closely resembles real-world conditions within a digital substation, including Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and protection schemes. It is implemented through Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulations of commercial relays with a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS).
...
Power system automation and communication standards are spearheading the power system transition towards a smart grid. IEC 61850 is one such standard, which is widely used for substation automation and protection. It enables real-time communication and data exchange between critical substation automation and protection devices within digital substations. However, IEC 61850 is not cyber secure. In this paper, we demonstrate the dangerous implications of not securing IEC 61850 standard. Cyber attacks may exploit the vulnerabilities of the Sampled Values (SV) and Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocols of IEC 61850. The cyber attacks may be realised by injecting spoofed SV and GOOSE data frames into the substation communication network at the bay level. We demonstrate that such cyber attacks may lead to obstruction or tripping of multiple protective relays. Coordinated cyber attacks against the protection system in digital substations may cause generation and line disconnections, triggering cascading failures in the power grid. This may eventually result in a partial or complete blackout. The attack model, impact on system dynamics and cascading failures are veri ed experimentally through a proposed cyber-physical experimental framework that closely resembles real-world conditions within a digital substation, including Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and protection schemes. It is implemented through Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulations of commercial relays with a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS).