JS

J.C.D. Scharpff

Authored

15 records found

Can multiple contractors self-regulate their joint service delivery?

A serious gaming experiment on road maintenance planning

The next step in the use of innovative, dynamic and performance-based contracts for service delivery by contractors could be use of monetary incentives to stimulate self-regulation of the network. Because it is currently unclear how performance-based payments in network tenders c ...

Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation

Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning

This thesis explores the potential of self-regulation in collective decision making to align interests and optimise joint performance. Demonstrated in the domain of road maintenance planning, this research contributes novel incentive mechanisms and algorithmic techniques to incit ...

The Road Maintenance Planning Game

Game design and first results

This white paper describes the Road Maintenance Planning game, a game that simulates planning, coordination and execution of maintenance projects in the domain of infrastructural maintenance. In particular, the game models the dynamic contracting procedure of Volker et al. (2014) ...
In cooperative multi-agent sequential decision making under uncertainty, agents must coordinate to find an optimal joint policy that maximises joint value. Typical algorithms exploit additive structure in the value function, but in the fully-observable multi-agent MDP (MMDP) sett ...
Planning under uncertainty poses a complex problem in which multiple objectives often need to be balanced. When dealing with multiple objectives, it is often assumed that the relative importance of the objectives is known a priori. However, in practice human decision makers often ...
Planning under uncertainty poses a complex problem in which multiple objectives often need to be balanced. When dealing with multiple objectives, it is often assumed that the relative importance of the objectives is known a priori. However, in practice human decision makers often ...
Scheduling of infrastructural maintenance poses a complex multi-agent problem. Commonly a central authority is responsible for the quality and throughput of the infrastructure, while the actual maintenance is performed by multiple self-interested contractors. Not only does the ce ...
Scheduling of infrastructural maintenance poses a complex multi-agent problem. Commonly a central authority is responsible for the quality and throughput of the infrastructure, while the actual maintenance is performed by multiple self-interested contractors. Not only does the ce ...