The inclusion of PV and heat pumps in residential low-voltage distribution systems is a fundamental component of the energy transition. Nevertheless, adoptions below 40% can already cause voltage conditions incompliant with the standard EN50160 during winter. Aggregated storage systems have been proposed as a solution; however, the literature generally assumes full observability and controllability of the assets, which is unrealistic in many cases. This paper evaluates the potential of aggregated single- and multi-carrier storage systems to maintain voltage stability in low voltage networks, considering separated controllers for the prosumer and the aggregator. We used a real 301-node residential distribution network in the Netherlands as case study. Our results demonstrate that aggregated multi-carrier energy storage can ensure the voltage conditions established in the standard EN50160 for energy transition adoptions up to 80%, while aggregated single-carrier storage can reach 60% and centralized storage only 40%. We concluded that aggregation of storage assets increases the utilization of the existing grid infrastructure, reducing reinforcement costs for the DSOs. However, the energy storage assets’ high investment costs lead to unattractive conditions for single- and multi-carrier storage, compared to a case with only PV and heat pumps. Considering the current market conditions, using storage for voltage support would require economic compensations. These findings provide DSOs valuable insight on alternative solutions to grid reinforcement and centralized storage to address the challenges of the energy transition.

As a part of energy transition, the shift from internal combustion engines (ICEs) to electric vehicles (EVs) has accelerated the development of the EV charging infrastructure (EVCI). EVCI rely heavily on information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet of Things (IoT). As a result, the susceptibility to cyber attacks increases. However, although EVCI are strongly intertwined with cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs), the consequences of such a cyber attack on the power grid are not widely researched. In this paper, we present a comprehensive cyber-physical system architecture of the EV charging infrastructure based on the industry practice in The Netherlands, which is applicable to European distribution systems. We present a survey of work on EVCI cyber security and CPPS resilience. We combine unique industrial insights with the academic state-of-the-art. We show that although cyber security of EVCI is researched, the state-of-the-art inadequately covers the consequences for CPPSs, especially distribution networks. We survey the current work on CPPS resilience and conclude that while cyber attacks are often recognized as high impact low probability (HILP) disturbances of CPPSs, the resilience-related research on cyber attacks on EVCI is lacking. Therefore, we present a novel method to model the stochastic EV charging behaviour based on probability density functions (PDFs). We validate the method using PowerFactory models of distribution networks supplied by a Dutch distribution system operator (DSO). We demonstrate the effects of cyber attacks on EVCI on distribution networks voltages. Under the investigated operational scenario, the impact is not significant. However the results do underline the importance of researching cyber attacks on EVCI from a CPPS resilience perspective. Research into future scenarios of energy transition is essential for future resilient operation of power grids.