Abstract: Pilots, in both civil and military aviation, must possess a unique combination of cognitive and psychomotor skills to manage the complexities of flight. Moreover, they need to be able to perform these skills under high pressure when things go wrong, when fatigued, after long periods of low cognitive demand, and in collaboration with others. In this sense, there are parallels between the domain of aviation and sports. Professional athletes receive targeted training to instill self-regulatory techniques which ensure optimal performance under different stressors. Because of the parallels between the two domains, a review of the sports psychology literature was performed to identify evidence-based self-regulatory techniques, and training practices for development of these techniques, that could be relevant for pilots. Identified techniques were goal setting, visualization, self-talk, pre-performance rituals, and mindfulness-based techniques. More general performance-enhancing techniques were the development of a growth mindset and grit. Technologies to support the training and application of these techniques that were identified were the use of virtual reality (VR) and physiological monitoring. In conclusion, several self-regulation techniques used by professional athletes could enhance the performance of military and civil pilots. Factors such as integration into existing operational routines, organizational culture, and psychological safety must be carefully considered to ensure successful adaptation and implementation in the aviation context.

Introduction: Maintaining cognitive performance during sleep deprivation is of vital importance in many professions, especially in high-risk professions like the military. It has long been known that sleep deprivation diminishes cognitive performance. To mitigate the negative effects on cognitive performance during crucial military tasks, new interventions are necessary. Non-invasive cervical transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation (ctVNS) has gained traction as a method to boost alertness and cognitive functioning. Methods: We investigated the effects of a 2 × 2 minute ctVNS stimulation protocol on three cognitive tasks applied during conditions of sleep-deprivation: a psychomotor vigilance task (PVT), a multitasking task (SynWin), and an inhibitory control task (stop-signal task; SST). In addition, participants also performed a close-quarter-battle (CQB) test in virtual reality (VR) to examine if potential effects of ctVNS translate to operational military contexts. A total of 35 military operators from Special Operations Forces (SOF) and SOF support units participated. They were randomly assigned to an active stimulation group or sham group. Before stimulation at 19:00 h, participants performed baseline tests. Participants stayed awake through the night and performed the cognitive tasks every 3 h. The last round of cognitive tasks was followed by the VR test. Results: Though sleep deprivation was successfully induced, as evident from a decline in performance on all three cognitive tasks (effect of session: p < 0.001 SynWin; p < 0.001 PVT; p < 0.001 SST; Linear Mixed Model), no significant effects of ctVNS were found on cognitive task performance, as well as on the military operational VR task. However, the influence of stimulation intensity on SynWin performance showed a trend, indicating that higher stimulation intensities could have a negative impact on cognitive performance. Discussion: A 2 × 2 minute stimulation protocol may not be sufficient to elicit beneficial effects on cognitive-and operational military performance. Moreover, correct stimulation intensity may be critical to induce effects on cognitive performance, as stimulation effects may follow an inverted-u dose-response curve. Stimulation intensities in the current study are higher compared to a similar study that reported beneficial effects of ctVNS, which may explain this null finding. Further research is recommended to optimize stimulation protocols and investigate robustness of effects.

This paper outlines the three-phase construction of the Startle and Surprise Inventories (Startle-I; Surprise-I) and Visual Analogue Scales for Startle and Surprise (Startle-VAS; Surprise-VAS). In Phase 1, seven experts in the field assessed the content validity of 14 items for surprise, 7 items for startle derived from fundamental and applied literature. Elimination of items was based on a 50% agreement of relevance. In Phase 2, 81 participants completed the retained 19 items nine times, each time immediately after watching a video clip. A multilevel exploratory factor analysis was applied to assess the construct validity of items. In Phase 3, concurrent validity of the Startle-VAS and Surprise-VAS was tested by comparing with the Startle-I and Surprise-I scores, respectively. The first two phases yielded a 11-item two-factor solution, corresponding to the constructs of startle and surprise. These results supported Startle-I and Surprise-I as measures of self-report startle and surprise, with Startle-VAS and Surprise-VAS as efficient alternatives.

Previous studies have indicated that the attitude director indicator (ADI) used in commercial aviation is suboptimal in representing the bank angle direction, which can lead to confusion, roll reversal errors and increased workload. Confusion about the bank angle direction has been implied in several cases of loss of control in-flight (LOC-I). In the current study, we therefore tested whether bank angle representation can be improved by adding non-disruptive visual depth cues to the ADI. An enhanced ADI was created, in which three monocular cues were added: atmospheric haze (i.e. a gradient in color towards the horizon), a shadow line under the aircraft symbol, and perspective lines on the ground. Airline pilots (n = 25) were tasked with rolling back to level 96 times from unforeseen (30 or -30 degrees) bank angles after experiencing either matching or mismatching (disorienting) roll motion cues in a motion-base simulator. There was no outside visibility and pilots responded using the ADI only. Roll reversal errors and reaction times were compared within-subject between the enhanced and baseline ADI, which were both based on the B747. Pilots were tasked to respond immediately upon presentation of the display, so that their initial interpretation of bank angle direction could be measured. There was no significant difference in roll reversal errors, and a significant increase in reaction times, when using the enhanced ADI compared to the baseline ADI. This suggests that pilots had slightly more difficulty with reading the bank angle with the enhanced ADI. Of the pilots, 56% preferred the enhanced ADI over the baseline display as it is, 8% had no preference and 36% preferred the baseline ADI. The most valued addition was the perspective lines on the ground, which pilots remarked would also be helpful in recovering extreme attitudes. The most-heard concerns were about potential clutter caused by the added cues, and difficulty with accurate reading of the pitch angle due to the shadow lines. In conclusion, according to the pilots' feedback, the addition of depth cues to the ADI appears promising, but it should be tested using more challenging tasks. Further design changes also appear needed to prevent clutter and facilitate quick reading of the aircraft attitude.

Literature on transfer of training largely deals with positive transfer. Only few studies exist on negative transfer, and these were often performed in (laboratory) environments with low ecological validity. This study's objective is to identify factors that contribute to negative transfer in safety-critical professions. The primary focus of the study is on aviation, but investigated principles also apply to other domains with high-performing professionals. Semi-structured interviews were performed with training experts from commercial and military aviation (n = 8), as well as the medical (n = 1) and maritime (n = 1) domain. The experts were asked to list examples of negative transfer that they have observed or experienced themselves. Follow-up questions addressed training approaches and solutions regarding these examples. Answers were categorized using a transfer framework. The experts' most salient concerns involved: Time pressure, which leads to rushed training; Instructors with insufficient understanding of the limitations of the (simulator) training; and the way in which trainees should be placed into hazardous situations in a realistic manner. The experts provided several factors and recalls of experiences which may lead to negative transfer. These results may be relevant for instructors and can provide input for further experimental research regarding negative transfer.

We tested whether pilots would detect low-salient controllability problems more quickly during manual compared to automated flight. Using a moving-base simulator and a Piper Seneca aerodynamic model, airline pilots (n = 20) performed scenarios in which either a gradually ensuing single-engine failure or an icing accumulation occurred. Both scenarios were performed once during manual flight and once during automated flight, and were alternated with distraction scenarios. The icing accumulation was detected marginally significantly more quickly during manual flight, while there was no significant difference for the engine failure. Problems in manual flight were, as expected, most likely discovered from aircraft motions or control forces. Interestingly, there were several late detections during manual flight which appeared to be caused by subconscious manual corrections. In automated flight, the engine failure was discovered most often from the engine manifold pressure indication, while the icing accumulation was most often discovered from control column movement. The results therefore underline the importance of using back-driven controls, and further indicate that manual flight does not necessarily improve detection of problems that occur without display indications.

Previous research indicated a need to improve pilot training with regard to understanding of autopilot logic and behavior, especially in non-routine situations. Therefore, we tested the effect of problem-based exploratory training on pilots’ understanding of autopilot functions. Using a moving-base flight simulator, general aviation pilots (n = 45) were trained to diagnose failures either without foreknowledge and guidance (exploratory group), without foreknowledge but with some guidance (exploratory-guidance group) or with foreknowledge and full guidance (control group). They subsequently performed six test scenarios in which their understanding of the effects of failures was tested by requiring them to deduce the failures and select autopilot modes that were still functioning. Those who received exploratory training with guidance were significantly more likely than the other groups to diagnose failures correctly. The exploratory training group also selected the most appropriate functioning autopilot modes significantly faster than the control group. The results suggest that exploratory training with an appropriate level of guidance is useful for gaining a practical understanding of autopilot logic and behavior. Exploratory training may help to improve transfer of training to operational practice, and prevent automation surprises and accidents.