Startle and surprise are known to potentially incapacitate professionals who respond to emergency situations. In the aviation domain, self-management methods to prevent such incapacitation have been introduced for pilots. This study aims to explore the relevance of similar self-management methods tailored for cabin crew, using subjective evaluation by cabin crew and cabin crew instructors. First, a method was designed and refined using interviews and a focus group with nine subject-matter experts, consisting of four steps: protect, reset, check and act. Second, relevance of the method was quasi-experimentally tested by letting 15 cabin crew members apply it in a simulated firefighting scenario. After performing the scenario, they rated whether the method had positive or negative effects, was difficult or easy to use, and they retrospectively rated their perceived stress before and after applying the method. Participants positively rated the method’s effectiveness and usability, and reported the method to significantly reduce perceived stress. Participants provided several suggestions for improving the method, and for approaches to integrate the method more effectively into existing protocols. The outcomes of this study provide direction on the design and use of self-management methods that can help manage startle and surprise in teams.

This paper outlines the three-phase construction of the Startle and Surprise Inventories (Startle-I; Surprise-I) and Visual Analogue Scales for Startle and Surprise (Startle-VAS; Surprise-VAS). In Phase 1, seven experts in the field assessed the content validity of 14 items for surprise, 7 items for startle derived from fundamental and applied literature. Elimination of items was based on a 50% agreement of relevance. In Phase 2, 81 participants completed the retained 19 items nine times, each time immediately after watching a video clip. A multilevel exploratory factor analysis was applied to assess the construct validity of items. In Phase 3, concurrent validity of the Startle-VAS and Surprise-VAS was tested by comparing with the Startle-I and Surprise-I scores, respectively. The first two phases yielded a 11-item two-factor solution, corresponding to the constructs of startle and surprise. These results supported Startle-I and Surprise-I as measures of self-report startle and surprise, with Startle-VAS and Surprise-VAS as efficient alternatives.

Previous studies have indicated that the attitude director indicator (ADI) used in commercial aviation is suboptimal in representing the bank angle direction, which can lead to confusion, roll reversal errors and increased workload. Confusion about the bank angle direction has been implied in several cases of loss of control in-flight (LOC-I). In the current study, we therefore tested whether bank angle representation can be improved by adding non-disruptive visual depth cues to the ADI. An enhanced ADI was created, in which three monocular cues were added: atmospheric haze (i.e. a gradient in color towards the horizon), a shadow line under the aircraft symbol, and perspective lines on the ground. Airline pilots (n = 25) were tasked with rolling back to level 96 times from unforeseen (30 or -30 degrees) bank angles after experiencing either matching or mismatching (disorienting) roll motion cues in a motion-base simulator. There was no outside visibility and pilots responded using the ADI only. Roll reversal errors and reaction times were compared within-subject between the enhanced and baseline ADI, which were both based on the B747. Pilots were tasked to respond immediately upon presentation of the display, so that their initial interpretation of bank angle direction could be measured. There was no significant difference in roll reversal errors, and a significant increase in reaction times, when using the enhanced ADI compared to the baseline ADI. This suggests that pilots had slightly more difficulty with reading the bank angle with the enhanced ADI. Of the pilots, 56% preferred the enhanced ADI over the baseline display as it is, 8% had no preference and 36% preferred the baseline ADI. The most valued addition was the perspective lines on the ground, which pilots remarked would also be helpful in recovering extreme attitudes. The most-heard concerns were about potential clutter caused by the added cues, and difficulty with accurate reading of the pitch angle due to the shadow lines. In conclusion, according to the pilots' feedback, the addition of depth cues to the ADI appears promising, but it should be tested using more challenging tasks. Further design changes also appear needed to prevent clutter and facilitate quick reading of the aircraft attitude.

We tested whether pilots would detect low-salient controllability problems more quickly during manual compared to automated flight. Using a moving-base simulator and a Piper Seneca aerodynamic model, airline pilots (n = 20) performed scenarios in which either a gradually ensuing single-engine failure or an icing accumulation occurred. Both scenarios were performed once during manual flight and once during automated flight, and were alternated with distraction scenarios. The icing accumulation was detected marginally significantly more quickly during manual flight, while there was no significant difference for the engine failure. Problems in manual flight were, as expected, most likely discovered from aircraft motions or control forces. Interestingly, there were several late detections during manual flight which appeared to be caused by subconscious manual corrections. In automated flight, the engine failure was discovered most often from the engine manifold pressure indication, while the icing accumulation was most often discovered from control column movement. The results therefore underline the importance of using back-driven controls, and further indicate that manual flight does not necessarily improve detection of problems that occur without display indications.

Previous research indicated a need to improve pilot training with regard to understanding of autopilot logic and behavior, especially in non-routine situations. Therefore, we tested the effect of problem-based exploratory training on pilots’ understanding of autopilot functions. Using a moving-base flight simulator, general aviation pilots (n = 45) were trained to diagnose failures either without foreknowledge and guidance (exploratory group), without foreknowledge but with some guidance (exploratory-guidance group) or with foreknowledge and full guidance (control group). They subsequently performed six test scenarios in which their understanding of the effects of failures was tested by requiring them to deduce the failures and select autopilot modes that were still functioning. Those who received exploratory training with guidance were significantly more likely than the other groups to diagnose failures correctly. The exploratory training group also selected the most appropriate functioning autopilot modes significantly faster than the control group. The results suggest that exploratory training with an appropriate level of guidance is useful for gaining a practical understanding of autopilot logic and behavior. Exploratory training may help to improve transfer of training to operational practice, and prevent automation surprises and accidents.