I. Bouwmans
Please Note
25 records found
1
Adding Heat to a Planned Energy Hub
Socio-Technical Lessons from the Boekelermeer Energy Hub
A qualitative single-case study was combined with scenario analysis, EMS simulations, financial assessment and stakeholder interviews. Four configurations were assessed: a gas boiler reference, CHP, a heat pump (HP), and an e-boiler with thermal storage and gas backup.
The results identify four main lessons. First, electrified heat feasibility depends on the interaction between temperature requirements, individual and shared electricity capacity, and timing; in the BEH, the HP could supply about 150°C compared with a required 180°C, while the e-boiler still required 144.7 MWhth/year of gas backup. Second, individually owned heat technologies can create shared effects for the wider hub, for example through additional capacity use or local electricity and heat production. Third, financial feasibility depends on the robustness of the complete configuration, with the HP showing the strongest and most robust annual savings and the e-boiler operating close to annual-cost break-even. Fourth, feasible configurations perform differently across financial, environmental, grid and organisational outcomes, meaning that no technology is preferable across all criteria.
The main conclusion is that heat integration should be treated as a two-stage decision at the level of the complete heat configuration. First, configurations should be assessed against the technical, financial, institutional and operational requirements needed for implementation. Only then should feasible options be compared based on their performance and the stakeholder priorities and trade-offs they create. ...
A qualitative single-case study was combined with scenario analysis, EMS simulations, financial assessment and stakeholder interviews. Four configurations were assessed: a gas boiler reference, CHP, a heat pump (HP), and an e-boiler with thermal storage and gas backup.
The results identify four main lessons. First, electrified heat feasibility depends on the interaction between temperature requirements, individual and shared electricity capacity, and timing; in the BEH, the HP could supply about 150°C compared with a required 180°C, while the e-boiler still required 144.7 MWhth/year of gas backup. Second, individually owned heat technologies can create shared effects for the wider hub, for example through additional capacity use or local electricity and heat production. Third, financial feasibility depends on the robustness of the complete configuration, with the HP showing the strongest and most robust annual savings and the e-boiler operating close to annual-cost break-even. Fourth, feasible configurations perform differently across financial, environmental, grid and organisational outcomes, meaning that no technology is preferable across all criteria.
The main conclusion is that heat integration should be treated as a two-stage decision at the level of the complete heat configuration. First, configurations should be assessed against the technical, financial, institutional and operational requirements needed for implementation. Only then should feasible options be compared based on their performance and the stakeholder priorities and trade-offs they create.
Energy hubs versus grid reinforcement in congested industrial areas
A techno-economic comparison using agent-based modelling
Exploring Transition Barriers in the Development of a Brazil-Netherlands Green Hydrogen Corridor
The Case of Pecém-Rotterdam
This thesis examines how transition barriers shape the early-stage development of the Pecém–Rotterdam green hydrogen corridor. It addresses a gap in existing research, which often focuses on national hydrogen systems, regional value chains or isolated value-chain segments, while the interaction between exporting and importing regions remains underexplored. The study uses an exploratory embedded qualitative single-case design, combining Industry Life Cycle theory with the transition-failure framework to locate the corridor in an early market phase and diagnose the barriers preventing a first operational chain. The empirical basis consists of academic and grey literature, complemented by thirteen semi-structured interviews across seven stakeholder groups.
The findings show that the corridor is largely technically feasible, as ammonia, methanol and hydrogen are already produced, transported and traded globally. However, large-scale reconversion technologies such as ammonia cracking and methanol reforming remain immature, costly and energy-intensive, making direct carrier use more attractive in the short term. Sixteen barriers were identified and grouped into four clusters: market formation, the institutional and regulatory environment, infrastructure and production capability, and coordination and shared directional vision. The most binding barriers are the cost gap with fossil alternatives, weak and uncertain demand, regulatory uncertainty, limited subsidy budgets, and coordination complexities. Together, these barriers form a self-reinforcing bankability loop in which producers, offtakers, infrastructure developers and governments each wait for other actors to move first.
The study further finds that barriers differ across the corridor. Pecém mainly faces physical and operational constraints, including grid congestion and shared-infrastructure development, while Rotterdam faces more institutional and strategic barriers, including permitting complexity, public concerns around ammonia handling and tensions between climate ambition and industrial competitiveness. The main bottleneck lies on the European demand side, as Pecém’s development depends on credible long-term offtake from Europe.
The thesis contributes by analysing Pecém–Rotterdam as one integrated end-to-end socio-technical system and by adapting the transition-failure framework to an early-stage corridor context. It concludes that the corridor is not blocked by individual problems, but by mutually reinforcing uncertainties. Breaking this deadlock requires a predictable green premium, long-term regulatory certainty, bankable offtake, import-compatible public financing and coordinated chain commitment. A public-private corridor consortium focused on a small-scale demonstration chain could help reduce uncertainty, generate learning and build confidence for gradual scale-up.
...
This thesis examines how transition barriers shape the early-stage development of the Pecém–Rotterdam green hydrogen corridor. It addresses a gap in existing research, which often focuses on national hydrogen systems, regional value chains or isolated value-chain segments, while the interaction between exporting and importing regions remains underexplored. The study uses an exploratory embedded qualitative single-case design, combining Industry Life Cycle theory with the transition-failure framework to locate the corridor in an early market phase and diagnose the barriers preventing a first operational chain. The empirical basis consists of academic and grey literature, complemented by thirteen semi-structured interviews across seven stakeholder groups.
The findings show that the corridor is largely technically feasible, as ammonia, methanol and hydrogen are already produced, transported and traded globally. However, large-scale reconversion technologies such as ammonia cracking and methanol reforming remain immature, costly and energy-intensive, making direct carrier use more attractive in the short term. Sixteen barriers were identified and grouped into four clusters: market formation, the institutional and regulatory environment, infrastructure and production capability, and coordination and shared directional vision. The most binding barriers are the cost gap with fossil alternatives, weak and uncertain demand, regulatory uncertainty, limited subsidy budgets, and coordination complexities. Together, these barriers form a self-reinforcing bankability loop in which producers, offtakers, infrastructure developers and governments each wait for other actors to move first.
The study further finds that barriers differ across the corridor. Pecém mainly faces physical and operational constraints, including grid congestion and shared-infrastructure development, while Rotterdam faces more institutional and strategic barriers, including permitting complexity, public concerns around ammonia handling and tensions between climate ambition and industrial competitiveness. The main bottleneck lies on the European demand side, as Pecém’s development depends on credible long-term offtake from Europe.
The thesis contributes by analysing Pecém–Rotterdam as one integrated end-to-end socio-technical system and by adapting the transition-failure framework to an early-stage corridor context. It concludes that the corridor is not blocked by individual problems, but by mutually reinforcing uncertainties. Breaking this deadlock requires a predictable green premium, long-term regulatory certainty, bankable offtake, import-compatible public financing and coordinated chain commitment. A public-private corridor consortium focused on a small-scale demonstration chain could help reduce uncertainty, generate learning and build confidence for gradual scale-up.
Creating System and Societal Value with Power-to-Methane
Technical, infrastructural and socio-technical conditions in Dutch regional energy systems
Power-to-hydrogen (P2H), the closest comparable pathway, serves as the benchmark for P2M's distinctive value throughout. The analysis runs through four sub-questions, from reactor performance to societal value. A mass-energy balance model characterises two operational modes: an electricity-driven mode, intermittent around surplus periods, and a CO2-driven mode, continuous on stable point-source streams. The infrastructural analysis places deployment at cluster-adjacent and biogenic sites where electricity, CO2 and gas align in both location and timing, with industrial CO2 access narrowing toward 2030. A multi-criteria comparison shows P2M's constraints differ in kind from P2H's: its most prominent, recognition, can be addressed on shorter timelines, where P2H's depend on system change over decades.
P2M's distinctive societal value comes from two structural drivers. Driver 1 is the climate value of integrating CO2 that would otherwise be emitted and replacing fossil methane downstream: about EUR 49k/MW/y in the electricity-driven mode and EUR 168k/MW/y in the CO2-driven mode at central ETS pricing. Driver 2 is the system-wide cost of building a new hydrogen network instead of reusing the existing gas system: tens of billions nationally and tens to hundreds of millions per cluster regionally, against P2M's own cost of a single 10 MW methanation-and-injection installation of EUR 7–11 million. The flexibility P2M is often credited with is valuable, but does not set it apart: P2H and batteries do the same.
To realise the full value, both drivers must deliver at the same site, and the two are never aggregated. The reason is the distribution of that value: Driver 1 reaches the public and the state, and in part the CO2-supplying industry; Driver 2 reaches network users, the state and industry. Only when both deliver does the value reach across society; where only one does, P2M loses its edge. The case holds across most of the four II3050 scenarios, weakest in the hydrogen-dominant one.
What stands between P2M and that value is neither the technology nor the infrastructure. It is whether e-methane is recognised as a gas-grid option in the national decisions now shaping the 2030 to 2040 system, where it does not yet appear. The risk for P2M is omission, not rejection. Each year it stays outside the frame, more CO2 goes to storage and more of the system to hydrogen, leaving less room for it. P2M is technically workable and its value identifiable, but it is unbuilt and, in policy, unrecognised. What remains is to act on it while the system is still being decided, before a means that fits is left unused.
...
Power-to-hydrogen (P2H), the closest comparable pathway, serves as the benchmark for P2M's distinctive value throughout. The analysis runs through four sub-questions, from reactor performance to societal value. A mass-energy balance model characterises two operational modes: an electricity-driven mode, intermittent around surplus periods, and a CO2-driven mode, continuous on stable point-source streams. The infrastructural analysis places deployment at cluster-adjacent and biogenic sites where electricity, CO2 and gas align in both location and timing, with industrial CO2 access narrowing toward 2030. A multi-criteria comparison shows P2M's constraints differ in kind from P2H's: its most prominent, recognition, can be addressed on shorter timelines, where P2H's depend on system change over decades.
P2M's distinctive societal value comes from two structural drivers. Driver 1 is the climate value of integrating CO2 that would otherwise be emitted and replacing fossil methane downstream: about EUR 49k/MW/y in the electricity-driven mode and EUR 168k/MW/y in the CO2-driven mode at central ETS pricing. Driver 2 is the system-wide cost of building a new hydrogen network instead of reusing the existing gas system: tens of billions nationally and tens to hundreds of millions per cluster regionally, against P2M's own cost of a single 10 MW methanation-and-injection installation of EUR 7–11 million. The flexibility P2M is often credited with is valuable, but does not set it apart: P2H and batteries do the same.
To realise the full value, both drivers must deliver at the same site, and the two are never aggregated. The reason is the distribution of that value: Driver 1 reaches the public and the state, and in part the CO2-supplying industry; Driver 2 reaches network users, the state and industry. Only when both deliver does the value reach across society; where only one does, P2M loses its edge. The case holds across most of the four II3050 scenarios, weakest in the hydrogen-dominant one.
What stands between P2M and that value is neither the technology nor the infrastructure. It is whether e-methane is recognised as a gas-grid option in the national decisions now shaping the 2030 to 2040 system, where it does not yet appear. The risk for P2M is omission, not rejection. Each year it stays outside the frame, more CO2 goes to storage and more of the system to hydrogen, leaving less room for it. P2M is technically workable and its value identifiable, but it is unbuilt and, in policy, unrecognised. What remains is to act on it while the system is still being decided, before a means that fits is left unused.
This research has investigated whether green growth or degrowth is a more feasible strategy regarding economic costs and efficacy in reaching net zero emissions. This was done through the main research question: ‘What is the influence of green growth and degrowth on the Dutch economy and energy transition in the Netherlands?’. This question assessed the influence of both strategies on the Dutch economy and energy transition and looked at their impact on the quality of life of Dutch citizens. The main research question was answered through the following sub-questions:
1. What is the current state of the Dutch economy and Dutch energy transition?
2. How are the external factors innovation and geopolitics impacting the energy transition?
3. What is the influence of a green growth and degrowth approach on the Dutch economy?
4. What is the influence of a green growth and degrowth approach on the Dutch energy transition?
5. What strategies are the most effective in tackling the energy transition while maintaining the quality of life of Dutch citizens?
The methods used in this research include a mixture of literature research and macroeconomic modelling. This information was synthesised in a multi-criteria analysis to find the most effective strategies among green growth and degrowth alternatives. Five scenarios explored different combinations of high and low innovation, as well as high and low geopolitical cooperation. These five scenarios were: ‘long-lasting trade war’, ‘Chinese invasion of Taiwan’, ‘Business as usual’, ‘Fourth industrial revolution’ and ‘Extended war in Europe’.
The economic situation of the Netherlands should offer the necessary space for investments in the energy transition. This can be seen in the low debt to GDP, which is between 40% and 45%. It can also be seen in the relatively stable level of inflation and low unemployment rate. Currently only 15% of total energy consumption is provided through green energy sources. This shows a lot of investments into the transition are still needed, which are expected to be about 750 billion euros total until 2050.
It is unlikely that all sectors within the Dutch economy can become climate neutral through innovation and technological progress, as for example sustainable aviation is still nowhere near possible. Either carbon capture storage or degrowth of these specific sectors would be required to make them sustainable by 2050. However, innovation would speed up climate neutrality in several other sectors. For example, innovative battery technologies such as solid-state, as well as improvements in current lithium-ion batteries will likely help the transition to renewables, causing less net congestion. Small Modular Reactors could also help with more stable energy production, although these might be more expensive than renewable alternatives. Technologies such as nuclear fusion are unlikely to make an impact before 2050.
The other external factor, geopolitics, also heavily influences the energy transition and the efficacy of green growth and degrowth policy. Low geopolitical cooperation could cause more trade wars and more wars in general, disrupting global supply chains. A degrowth policy could lead the Netherlands to become more dependent on other countries, while a green growth policy could allow the country to export more green energy and increase geopolitical leverage. This could allow the Netherlands to get other countries on board with the energy transition as well.
The macroeconomic model used in this research found climate neutrality to be achievable with both degrowth and green growth policy. The costs for the transition would be the lowest in the most optimistic scenario ‘Fourth industrial revolution’ and the highest in the ‘Chinese invasion of Taiwan’ scenario. Four alternatives were researched, which the government could use in a green growth and degrowth path respectively. Degrowth policies such as increasing luxury consumption taxes or making taxes more progressive would not result in sufficient consumption reduction to reach climate neutrality before 2050 without additional investments. The green growth policies of higher infrastructure investments and household energy transition subsidies would result in net zero emissions in 2050 in most of the scenarios, through their additional government and private investments. Total real investments needed with green growth policy would come down to an increase of 5-15 billion euros extra per year, or about 0.5% to 1.5% of GDP. Real consumption reductions with degrowth policy would have to be about 50% compared to 2024, higher than what can be achieved through these alternatives alone.
Future research could focus on more accurately determining the costs of the energy transition through a degrowth or green growth approach, as the economic model used in this study can only give more general conclusions. More research can also help ascertain whether there is enough public support for degrowth and green growth strategies and what can be done to improve the willingness to accept such a strategy or a mixture of both strategies. Finally, further research could look at how geopolitics influences the energy transition and vice versa. This could show how degrowth and green growth can be paired with energy independence and geopolitical leverage.
In conclusion, this research finds green growth has a more positive impact on the Dutch energy transition and economy than degrowth has. However, a combination policy where energy consumption decreases while green investments are considerably higher, is still very helpful to reach the energy transition goals even more smoothly. Whichever strategy is chosen; it is clear the Dutch government will have to take much more action to reach climate neutrality in 2050.
...
This research has investigated whether green growth or degrowth is a more feasible strategy regarding economic costs and efficacy in reaching net zero emissions. This was done through the main research question: ‘What is the influence of green growth and degrowth on the Dutch economy and energy transition in the Netherlands?’. This question assessed the influence of both strategies on the Dutch economy and energy transition and looked at their impact on the quality of life of Dutch citizens. The main research question was answered through the following sub-questions:
1. What is the current state of the Dutch economy and Dutch energy transition?
2. How are the external factors innovation and geopolitics impacting the energy transition?
3. What is the influence of a green growth and degrowth approach on the Dutch economy?
4. What is the influence of a green growth and degrowth approach on the Dutch energy transition?
5. What strategies are the most effective in tackling the energy transition while maintaining the quality of life of Dutch citizens?
The methods used in this research include a mixture of literature research and macroeconomic modelling. This information was synthesised in a multi-criteria analysis to find the most effective strategies among green growth and degrowth alternatives. Five scenarios explored different combinations of high and low innovation, as well as high and low geopolitical cooperation. These five scenarios were: ‘long-lasting trade war’, ‘Chinese invasion of Taiwan’, ‘Business as usual’, ‘Fourth industrial revolution’ and ‘Extended war in Europe’.
The economic situation of the Netherlands should offer the necessary space for investments in the energy transition. This can be seen in the low debt to GDP, which is between 40% and 45%. It can also be seen in the relatively stable level of inflation and low unemployment rate. Currently only 15% of total energy consumption is provided through green energy sources. This shows a lot of investments into the transition are still needed, which are expected to be about 750 billion euros total until 2050.
It is unlikely that all sectors within the Dutch economy can become climate neutral through innovation and technological progress, as for example sustainable aviation is still nowhere near possible. Either carbon capture storage or degrowth of these specific sectors would be required to make them sustainable by 2050. However, innovation would speed up climate neutrality in several other sectors. For example, innovative battery technologies such as solid-state, as well as improvements in current lithium-ion batteries will likely help the transition to renewables, causing less net congestion. Small Modular Reactors could also help with more stable energy production, although these might be more expensive than renewable alternatives. Technologies such as nuclear fusion are unlikely to make an impact before 2050.
The other external factor, geopolitics, also heavily influences the energy transition and the efficacy of green growth and degrowth policy. Low geopolitical cooperation could cause more trade wars and more wars in general, disrupting global supply chains. A degrowth policy could lead the Netherlands to become more dependent on other countries, while a green growth policy could allow the country to export more green energy and increase geopolitical leverage. This could allow the Netherlands to get other countries on board with the energy transition as well.
The macroeconomic model used in this research found climate neutrality to be achievable with both degrowth and green growth policy. The costs for the transition would be the lowest in the most optimistic scenario ‘Fourth industrial revolution’ and the highest in the ‘Chinese invasion of Taiwan’ scenario. Four alternatives were researched, which the government could use in a green growth and degrowth path respectively. Degrowth policies such as increasing luxury consumption taxes or making taxes more progressive would not result in sufficient consumption reduction to reach climate neutrality before 2050 without additional investments. The green growth policies of higher infrastructure investments and household energy transition subsidies would result in net zero emissions in 2050 in most of the scenarios, through their additional government and private investments. Total real investments needed with green growth policy would come down to an increase of 5-15 billion euros extra per year, or about 0.5% to 1.5% of GDP. Real consumption reductions with degrowth policy would have to be about 50% compared to 2024, higher than what can be achieved through these alternatives alone.
Future research could focus on more accurately determining the costs of the energy transition through a degrowth or green growth approach, as the economic model used in this study can only give more general conclusions. More research can also help ascertain whether there is enough public support for degrowth and green growth strategies and what can be done to improve the willingness to accept such a strategy or a mixture of both strategies. Finally, further research could look at how geopolitics influences the energy transition and vice versa. This could show how degrowth and green growth can be paired with energy independence and geopolitical leverage.
In conclusion, this research finds green growth has a more positive impact on the Dutch energy transition and economy than degrowth has. However, a combination policy where energy consumption decreases while green investments are considerably higher, is still very helpful to reach the energy transition goals even more smoothly. Whichever strategy is chosen; it is clear the Dutch government will have to take much more action to reach climate neutrality in 2050.
Balancing Data Centre Growth and Sustainability
Mapping the Future of Dutch Data Centres Integrating in the Energy Sector
The outlined complex pattern model provided a basis to develop desired future scenarios, and seven different roles data centres can obtain to contribute to this pathway. However, in realising these roles, obstacles are faced. To tackle these barriers, to provide acceptable intermediate roles for data centres in the energy system, eight policy incentives are determined and prioritized based on their technical, institutional or economic domain.
This research has contributed to uncovering further opportunities for the Netherlands, which lies in boosting cooperation to realise higher energy efficiency for data centres, energy flexibility to tackle grid congestion, setting up an infrastructure for heat utilization and distribution, and exploring decentralisation.
Even though, some limitations on research constraints like time and access to stakeholders influenced outcomes. The research clearly indicates what areas require attention to further develop a sustainable energy sector within the Netherlands, which is a crucial step, even if a detailed plan for how these policy incentives should be implemented requires further research.
...
The outlined complex pattern model provided a basis to develop desired future scenarios, and seven different roles data centres can obtain to contribute to this pathway. However, in realising these roles, obstacles are faced. To tackle these barriers, to provide acceptable intermediate roles for data centres in the energy system, eight policy incentives are determined and prioritized based on their technical, institutional or economic domain.
This research has contributed to uncovering further opportunities for the Netherlands, which lies in boosting cooperation to realise higher energy efficiency for data centres, energy flexibility to tackle grid congestion, setting up an infrastructure for heat utilization and distribution, and exploring decentralisation.
Even though, some limitations on research constraints like time and access to stakeholders influenced outcomes. The research clearly indicates what areas require attention to further develop a sustainable energy sector within the Netherlands, which is a crucial step, even if a detailed plan for how these policy incentives should be implemented requires further research.
Strategic Carbon Flow Assessment for a Dutch Defossilisation Pathway
Using Origin-Labelled Carbon Flow Mapping and Creating the Essential Carbon Assessment Framework to Support Strategic Prioritisation of Scarce Sustainable Carbon
emissions, but also deciding which uses of carbon can remain and how scarce sustainable carbon should be allocated. This highlights the necessity of understanding how carbon flows through the economy. This thesis addresses the question: How can scarce sustainable carbon best be allocated by prioritising carbon flows across energy, material and food uses in the Netherlands, given the current carbon supply, use, and trade patterns?
To answer this, the thesis first maps how carbon currently flows through the Netherlands and then assesses which of these flows are truly essential in a fossil-free future. In 2020, about 156 Megatonnes Carbon entered the Dutch economy via domestic extraction, imports and recycled inputs. Roughly 78% of this supply was fossil, 17% was biogenic and at most 6% was recycled. Around 83% of total carbon supply was imported, confirming the Netherlands as a carbon transit and processing hub that relies on international supply chains for both fossil and non-fossil carbon. This already indicates a key tension for the transition: sustainable carbon is scarce and largely imported, yet current use of carbon is dominated by fossil use.
Methodologically, the thesis develops and applies two complementary instruments:
1. An Origin-Labelled Carbon Flow Map of the Dutch economy, which traces carbon from supply (extraction, imports, stocks) through main purposes (energy, materials, food/feed) to final destinations (domestic use, export, emissions, waste, stocks). The map distinguishes fossil, biogenic, and recycled carbon.
2. An Essential Carbon Assessment Framework inspired by the essential use doctrine of the Montreal Protocol. Each Carbon Flow of Concern is scored on (i) societal essentiality of the function, (ii) technical substitutability based on the maturity of low-carbon alternatives, and (iii) circularity constraints. These criteria are combined into an Essentiality Index under different weighting scenarios, which provides a transparent ranking of flows for policy prioritisation.
Overall, the Carbon Flow Mapping highlights three structural insights that are critical for prioritisation: (i) fossil carbon still supports the majority of Dutch energy and material use; (ii) most domestically available biogenic carbon is already structurally allocated to food/feed and long-lived materials rather than energy; and (iii) recycling compensates for only a small fraction of primary carbon demand.
On top of this mapping, the Essential Carbon Assessment Framework offers a structured approach to determining which uses should retain access to scarce sustainable carbon. The framework is
applied to five representative carbon flows: (A) fossil refinery products exported as fuels; (B) domestically consumed biogenic food; (C) fossil-based chemicals for export; (D) fossil refinery
products combusted domestically for transport and other energy services; and (E) fossil natural gas for household energy. Together, these cases encompass high-volume exports, domestic energy services and essential food provision.
Across the different weighting scenarios, the ranking of flows remains consistent in its overarching message. When volume is weighted more heavily, large export flows dominate the ranking; when
essentiality is prioritised, food and minimum domestic energy services rank higher. In both cases, the framework indicates that Dutch carbon governance must pursue two parallel objectives: (i) phase out high-volume, non-essential fossil flows that currently dominate the carbon system; and (ii) safeguard a much smaller set of essential carbon flows, principally nutrition and a minimum level of domestic energy and material services, with scarce sustainable carbon.
The thesis therefore concludes that prioritisation is not an optional refinement but a prerequisite for a feasible carbon transition. Scarce sustainable carbon cannot replace all current fossil uses one-to-one. By combining an origin-labelled carbon flow map with an essentiality assessment, this work provides a concrete basis for deciding where limited biogenic, recycled and captured carbon should be allocated, and which fossil uses should be reduced first. Effective carbon governance in the Netherlands requires a threefold strategy: reduce total carbon demand, prioritise essential uses, and strategically secure non-fossil carbon supply. Implementing such a strategy can enable the Netherlands to move from a fossil-dependent carbon hub towards a climate-resilient, circular carbon economy. ...
emissions, but also deciding which uses of carbon can remain and how scarce sustainable carbon should be allocated. This highlights the necessity of understanding how carbon flows through the economy. This thesis addresses the question: How can scarce sustainable carbon best be allocated by prioritising carbon flows across energy, material and food uses in the Netherlands, given the current carbon supply, use, and trade patterns?
To answer this, the thesis first maps how carbon currently flows through the Netherlands and then assesses which of these flows are truly essential in a fossil-free future. In 2020, about 156 Megatonnes Carbon entered the Dutch economy via domestic extraction, imports and recycled inputs. Roughly 78% of this supply was fossil, 17% was biogenic and at most 6% was recycled. Around 83% of total carbon supply was imported, confirming the Netherlands as a carbon transit and processing hub that relies on international supply chains for both fossil and non-fossil carbon. This already indicates a key tension for the transition: sustainable carbon is scarce and largely imported, yet current use of carbon is dominated by fossil use.
Methodologically, the thesis develops and applies two complementary instruments:
1. An Origin-Labelled Carbon Flow Map of the Dutch economy, which traces carbon from supply (extraction, imports, stocks) through main purposes (energy, materials, food/feed) to final destinations (domestic use, export, emissions, waste, stocks). The map distinguishes fossil, biogenic, and recycled carbon.
2. An Essential Carbon Assessment Framework inspired by the essential use doctrine of the Montreal Protocol. Each Carbon Flow of Concern is scored on (i) societal essentiality of the function, (ii) technical substitutability based on the maturity of low-carbon alternatives, and (iii) circularity constraints. These criteria are combined into an Essentiality Index under different weighting scenarios, which provides a transparent ranking of flows for policy prioritisation.
Overall, the Carbon Flow Mapping highlights three structural insights that are critical for prioritisation: (i) fossil carbon still supports the majority of Dutch energy and material use; (ii) most domestically available biogenic carbon is already structurally allocated to food/feed and long-lived materials rather than energy; and (iii) recycling compensates for only a small fraction of primary carbon demand.
On top of this mapping, the Essential Carbon Assessment Framework offers a structured approach to determining which uses should retain access to scarce sustainable carbon. The framework is
applied to five representative carbon flows: (A) fossil refinery products exported as fuels; (B) domestically consumed biogenic food; (C) fossil-based chemicals for export; (D) fossil refinery
products combusted domestically for transport and other energy services; and (E) fossil natural gas for household energy. Together, these cases encompass high-volume exports, domestic energy services and essential food provision.
Across the different weighting scenarios, the ranking of flows remains consistent in its overarching message. When volume is weighted more heavily, large export flows dominate the ranking; when
essentiality is prioritised, food and minimum domestic energy services rank higher. In both cases, the framework indicates that Dutch carbon governance must pursue two parallel objectives: (i) phase out high-volume, non-essential fossil flows that currently dominate the carbon system; and (ii) safeguard a much smaller set of essential carbon flows, principally nutrition and a minimum level of domestic energy and material services, with scarce sustainable carbon.
The thesis therefore concludes that prioritisation is not an optional refinement but a prerequisite for a feasible carbon transition. Scarce sustainable carbon cannot replace all current fossil uses one-to-one. By combining an origin-labelled carbon flow map with an essentiality assessment, this work provides a concrete basis for deciding where limited biogenic, recycled and captured carbon should be allocated, and which fossil uses should be reduced first. Effective carbon governance in the Netherlands requires a threefold strategy: reduce total carbon demand, prioritise essential uses, and strategically secure non-fossil carbon supply. Implementing such a strategy can enable the Netherlands to move from a fossil-dependent carbon hub towards a climate-resilient, circular carbon economy.
Assessing the Effect of Battery Storage on European Electricity Balancing Markets
An Empirical Approach
This study empirically investigates the impact of increasing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) capacity on European balancing market prices. Using time-series data from five European countries between 2016 and 2019, multivariate regression models are applied to analyze the effects on three types of balancing services: Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR), Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR), and Manual Frequency Restoration Reserves (mFRR).
The results indicate that increased BESS capacity significantly reduces balancing prices, particularly in the FCR and aFRR markets. This research extends the findings from previous studies in Australia to the European context, highlighting the potential of BESS to offer cost-effective, CO2-neutral solutions for grid stability.
These findings have important implications for Transmission System Operators (TSOs), policymakers, and stakeholders in the energy market, suggesting that specific policy and strategic investments in BESS could enhance the cost-efficiency and sustainability of future electricity systems. ...
This study empirically investigates the impact of increasing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) capacity on European balancing market prices. Using time-series data from five European countries between 2016 and 2019, multivariate regression models are applied to analyze the effects on three types of balancing services: Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR), Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR), and Manual Frequency Restoration Reserves (mFRR).
The results indicate that increased BESS capacity significantly reduces balancing prices, particularly in the FCR and aFRR markets. This research extends the findings from previous studies in Australia to the European context, highlighting the potential of BESS to offer cost-effective, CO2-neutral solutions for grid stability.
These findings have important implications for Transmission System Operators (TSOs), policymakers, and stakeholders in the energy market, suggesting that specific policy and strategic investments in BESS could enhance the cost-efficiency and sustainability of future electricity systems.
Determining Stakeholders’ Preferences towards Sustainable Aviation Technologies
A Bayesian Best-Worst Method in Assessing Sustainable Aviation Technologies Preferences
The study addresses the research question: "What are stakeholder preferences towards sustainable aviation technologies for the transition to net zero CO2 aviation in 2050?" The Best-Worst Method (BWM), a Multi-Criteria Analysis approach, was chosen to explore these preferences. The research is divided into four sections: identifying promising SATs, establishing relevant evaluation criteria, obtaining weights for these criteria based on stakeholder preferences, and determining SAT performance scores.
Initially, the study identified promising SATs, categorizing them into hydrogen, electric, electrofuels, and biofuels. Electric technologies were excluded for medium- and long-haul flights due to their unsuitability. The specific SATs identified for potential adoption included Liquid Hydrogen with PEM fuel cell aircraft (LH2), HEFA-produced biofuel with used cooking oils (HEFA), and n-octane electrofuel.
The second section established evaluation criteria based on an extensive literature review and frameworks like Feitelson & Salomon’s political economy of transport innovations and the Triple Bottom Line theory. Three main criteria were established: Environmental, Economic, and Technological performance, each encompassing three sub-criteria. These sub-criteria include greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, land use impact (Environmental); minimum jet fuel selling price, investment costs, operational costs (Economic); and technological readiness level, scalability, efficiency (Technological).
The third section utilized the Bayesian BWM to determine optimal weights for these criteria from stakeholder perspectives. Data from semi-structured interviews with eleven stakeholders from the aviation industry, categorized into airline, expert/advisor, and producer/manufacturer groups, provided the necessary input. The analysis revealed that "Greenhouse gas emissions" were the most critical sub-criterion, followed by "Operational costs" and "Land use impact". Variations in weightings among stakeholder groups were noted, with airlines prioritizing Economic performance and experts/advisors emphasizing Technological performance.
Finally, the study applied the Weighted Sum Method (WSM) to combine SAT performance scores with the obtained weights, determining the final scores for the years 2024, 2030, and 2050. HEFA consistently emerged as the top SAT across all stakeholder groups for all years, except for the expert/advisor group in 2050, where n-octane ranked highest. The preference for HEFA was due to its consistently high scores across most sub-criteria, though the gap between SATs decreased by 2050 due to improvements in LH2 and n-octane’s greenhouse gas emissions performance.
In conclusion, HEFA is generally the most preferred SAT for transitioning to net-zero CO2 aviation by 2050. However, these findings are indicative, given the limited number of interviews, suggesting further research with more extensive stakeholder engagement to ensure representativeness and mitigate potential biases. ...
The study addresses the research question: "What are stakeholder preferences towards sustainable aviation technologies for the transition to net zero CO2 aviation in 2050?" The Best-Worst Method (BWM), a Multi-Criteria Analysis approach, was chosen to explore these preferences. The research is divided into four sections: identifying promising SATs, establishing relevant evaluation criteria, obtaining weights for these criteria based on stakeholder preferences, and determining SAT performance scores.
Initially, the study identified promising SATs, categorizing them into hydrogen, electric, electrofuels, and biofuels. Electric technologies were excluded for medium- and long-haul flights due to their unsuitability. The specific SATs identified for potential adoption included Liquid Hydrogen with PEM fuel cell aircraft (LH2), HEFA-produced biofuel with used cooking oils (HEFA), and n-octane electrofuel.
The second section established evaluation criteria based on an extensive literature review and frameworks like Feitelson & Salomon’s political economy of transport innovations and the Triple Bottom Line theory. Three main criteria were established: Environmental, Economic, and Technological performance, each encompassing three sub-criteria. These sub-criteria include greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, land use impact (Environmental); minimum jet fuel selling price, investment costs, operational costs (Economic); and technological readiness level, scalability, efficiency (Technological).
The third section utilized the Bayesian BWM to determine optimal weights for these criteria from stakeholder perspectives. Data from semi-structured interviews with eleven stakeholders from the aviation industry, categorized into airline, expert/advisor, and producer/manufacturer groups, provided the necessary input. The analysis revealed that "Greenhouse gas emissions" were the most critical sub-criterion, followed by "Operational costs" and "Land use impact". Variations in weightings among stakeholder groups were noted, with airlines prioritizing Economic performance and experts/advisors emphasizing Technological performance.
Finally, the study applied the Weighted Sum Method (WSM) to combine SAT performance scores with the obtained weights, determining the final scores for the years 2024, 2030, and 2050. HEFA consistently emerged as the top SAT across all stakeholder groups for all years, except for the expert/advisor group in 2050, where n-octane ranked highest. The preference for HEFA was due to its consistently high scores across most sub-criteria, though the gap between SATs decreased by 2050 due to improvements in LH2 and n-octane’s greenhouse gas emissions performance.
In conclusion, HEFA is generally the most preferred SAT for transitioning to net-zero CO2 aviation by 2050. However, these findings are indicative, given the limited number of interviews, suggesting further research with more extensive stakeholder engagement to ensure representativeness and mitigate potential biases.
Barriers and Strategies Analysis on Mass Adoption of Solar Electric Vehicle in Indonesia
A Technological Innovation System Study
“From the technical innovation system perspective, how could solar electric vehicles reach mass adoption in Indonesia?”
This research is conducted in collaboration with Lightyear – a SEV producer. As Lightyear is aiming to mass produce its SEV, therefore, this research is conducted to explore and evaluate the Indonesian market, so that the best strategy recommendation could be provided to Lightyear so it could commercialize its SEV in a large scale in Indonesia. The qualitative research approach is implemented in this research by reviewing diverse online literature, including both scientific and grey literature.
The TIS Framework (Ortt & Kamp, 2022) and the Ten Niche Strategies framework (Ortt et al., 2013) are used as the starting point of the research. TIS is defined as innovation systems around a specific technology that consists of four main elements: the technology, a network of actors, the institutions, and the demand. Ortt & Kamp’s TIS framework is a tool to examine the TIS of an innovation that is in its adaptation phase to judge whether the innovation is ready for its mass uptake or whether a small-scale niche introduction strategy is needed prior to the large-scale diffusion. The framework consists of three major elements: TIS building blocks (most important aspects needed for large-scale diffusion), influencing factors, and strategies. When certain influencing factors negatively affect the completeness of the TIS building blocks, they pose as barriers to the mass adoption of the innovation. Certain strategies could be implemented to circumvent these barriers, such as the generic Ten Niche Strategies proposed by Ortt et al.
The research is conducted in four major steps. First, basic information about SEV technology is explored. Second, a new framework called “the Best Strategy Framework” is developed to extend and complete the original TIS Framework and Ten Niche Strategies Framework so that the users/readers could select the best strategy based on the combination of barriers that hinder mass adoption of the innovations. Third, the newly developed framework is used to evaluate the Indonesian market and to identify the barriers that might hamper Lightyear’s SEV mass adoption in Indonesia. Finally, by using the newly developed framework, the best strategy that could circumvent the identified barriers is selected and proposed to Lightyear. ...
“From the technical innovation system perspective, how could solar electric vehicles reach mass adoption in Indonesia?”
This research is conducted in collaboration with Lightyear – a SEV producer. As Lightyear is aiming to mass produce its SEV, therefore, this research is conducted to explore and evaluate the Indonesian market, so that the best strategy recommendation could be provided to Lightyear so it could commercialize its SEV in a large scale in Indonesia. The qualitative research approach is implemented in this research by reviewing diverse online literature, including both scientific and grey literature.
The TIS Framework (Ortt & Kamp, 2022) and the Ten Niche Strategies framework (Ortt et al., 2013) are used as the starting point of the research. TIS is defined as innovation systems around a specific technology that consists of four main elements: the technology, a network of actors, the institutions, and the demand. Ortt & Kamp’s TIS framework is a tool to examine the TIS of an innovation that is in its adaptation phase to judge whether the innovation is ready for its mass uptake or whether a small-scale niche introduction strategy is needed prior to the large-scale diffusion. The framework consists of three major elements: TIS building blocks (most important aspects needed for large-scale diffusion), influencing factors, and strategies. When certain influencing factors negatively affect the completeness of the TIS building blocks, they pose as barriers to the mass adoption of the innovation. Certain strategies could be implemented to circumvent these barriers, such as the generic Ten Niche Strategies proposed by Ortt et al.
The research is conducted in four major steps. First, basic information about SEV technology is explored. Second, a new framework called “the Best Strategy Framework” is developed to extend and complete the original TIS Framework and Ten Niche Strategies Framework so that the users/readers could select the best strategy based on the combination of barriers that hinder mass adoption of the innovations. Third, the newly developed framework is used to evaluate the Indonesian market and to identify the barriers that might hamper Lightyear’s SEV mass adoption in Indonesia. Finally, by using the newly developed framework, the best strategy that could circumvent the identified barriers is selected and proposed to Lightyear.
An exploratory evaluation of business perspectives on sustainable aviation fuels
Research on business perspective factors influencing the adoption of innovative sustainable alternatives in the aviation industry
Based on scientific literature, a conceptual framework is constructed from innovation and business theories on why motivations, commitments, and beliefs are relevant for adoption and whether there are examples in literature. The conceptual framework visualizes the coherence of the theories and presents potential adoption factors but the combination of theories lacked specification, degree of importance, and a concise list of all relevant adoption factors reflected by the industry. Therefore will this research as a relevant scientific contribution, with the use of the conceptual framework, explore and specify relevant motivations, commitments, and beliefs in the industry toward adopting sustainable aviation innovations into the current technological regime.
The interviews that have been held with stakeholders have resulted in multiple specified types of adoption factors regarding motivations, commitment, and beliefs. Within these types are factors determined on their importance as well as factors that can be stated as new interesting knowledge. Based on these factors, the research concludes that over the last couple of years sustainable awareness is increasing a lot and therefore it is one of the most important motivations to start adopting SAF. SAF is becoming more widely known and it is seen that momentum for sustainable transition is being built in the industry. Nevertheless, the research can conclude the implementation of regulations is strongly demanded to create motivation for adoption in the industry. The industry explicitly claims that they require the implementation of blending mandates that cause pressure which is needed to motivate businesses to already start adopting SAF.
The main recommendations to put on the scientific agenda are to do additional similar research including more European countries or on other continents. For policymakers, they need to lay focus on the development of regulations that stimulate the adoption of SAF. For the industry, this research recommends using the specifications of the adoption factors at the negotiation table or as advice for firms as a supportive base to start adopting SAF
...
Based on scientific literature, a conceptual framework is constructed from innovation and business theories on why motivations, commitments, and beliefs are relevant for adoption and whether there are examples in literature. The conceptual framework visualizes the coherence of the theories and presents potential adoption factors but the combination of theories lacked specification, degree of importance, and a concise list of all relevant adoption factors reflected by the industry. Therefore will this research as a relevant scientific contribution, with the use of the conceptual framework, explore and specify relevant motivations, commitments, and beliefs in the industry toward adopting sustainable aviation innovations into the current technological regime.
The interviews that have been held with stakeholders have resulted in multiple specified types of adoption factors regarding motivations, commitment, and beliefs. Within these types are factors determined on their importance as well as factors that can be stated as new interesting knowledge. Based on these factors, the research concludes that over the last couple of years sustainable awareness is increasing a lot and therefore it is one of the most important motivations to start adopting SAF. SAF is becoming more widely known and it is seen that momentum for sustainable transition is being built in the industry. Nevertheless, the research can conclude the implementation of regulations is strongly demanded to create motivation for adoption in the industry. The industry explicitly claims that they require the implementation of blending mandates that cause pressure which is needed to motivate businesses to already start adopting SAF.
The main recommendations to put on the scientific agenda are to do additional similar research including more European countries or on other continents. For policymakers, they need to lay focus on the development of regulations that stimulate the adoption of SAF. For the industry, this research recommends using the specifications of the adoption factors at the negotiation table or as advice for firms as a supportive base to start adopting SAF
Politics in frugal innovations
Assessing the relationship between political risks and the market diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems
However, the span of this relationship, specifically in the combination with frugal solar-PV systems, is unknown. To analyse this, the following main research question has been posed in this research: ‘To what extent is there a relationship between political risks and the market diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems?’. The answer to this research question has been researched with a mixed-methods research approach. First, a quantitative analysis is performed with a correlation analysis. The second phase includes qualitative research. Based on the results of the quantitative results, the factors which could influence the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems in Uganda and Namibia are analysed with means of case studies and interviews.
The correlation analysis showed that there is no relationship between political risks and the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems. There are too little significant results to convince that there is a relationship between the political risks and the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems worldwide and per continent. Given the fact that this is a research area where little operationalising has been done so far, it is also important to find possible explanations for this result. Based on the case studies and interviews, it can be stated that that there are more factors playing a role in the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems than the included political risks. For example, the need for frugal innovations, (renewable) energy technologies which are already invested in, the varying degree of involvement of foreign investors and non-governmental organisations, the history of relationships with other countries and current trading agreements.
To conclude, this research has contributed to the knowledge gaps and scientific debates in the frugal innovation field by looking at the market diffusion of these systems and the possible role political risks can play in this process. Valuable knowledge has been gathered, which has contributed in filling in gaps in academic research: political risks have been operationalised, a contribution has been made in the field of diffusion theories, specifically for frugal innovations, and the scope of the extent of a relationship between political risks and the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems has been determined. The results of this research can hopefully on the long term contribute to increasing the percentage of people having access to affordable and renewable generated electricity and reducing the energy poverty worldwide. ...
However, the span of this relationship, specifically in the combination with frugal solar-PV systems, is unknown. To analyse this, the following main research question has been posed in this research: ‘To what extent is there a relationship between political risks and the market diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems?’. The answer to this research question has been researched with a mixed-methods research approach. First, a quantitative analysis is performed with a correlation analysis. The second phase includes qualitative research. Based on the results of the quantitative results, the factors which could influence the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems in Uganda and Namibia are analysed with means of case studies and interviews.
The correlation analysis showed that there is no relationship between political risks and the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems. There are too little significant results to convince that there is a relationship between the political risks and the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems worldwide and per continent. Given the fact that this is a research area where little operationalising has been done so far, it is also important to find possible explanations for this result. Based on the case studies and interviews, it can be stated that that there are more factors playing a role in the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems than the included political risks. For example, the need for frugal innovations, (renewable) energy technologies which are already invested in, the varying degree of involvement of foreign investors and non-governmental organisations, the history of relationships with other countries and current trading agreements.
To conclude, this research has contributed to the knowledge gaps and scientific debates in the frugal innovation field by looking at the market diffusion of these systems and the possible role political risks can play in this process. Valuable knowledge has been gathered, which has contributed in filling in gaps in academic research: political risks have been operationalised, a contribution has been made in the field of diffusion theories, specifically for frugal innovations, and the scope of the extent of a relationship between political risks and the diffusion of frugal solar-PV systems has been determined. The results of this research can hopefully on the long term contribute to increasing the percentage of people having access to affordable and renewable generated electricity and reducing the energy poverty worldwide.
source. Within solar technologies, crystalline-silicon (c-Si) based account for a market share of 95%. Nevertheless, large-scale production of solar PVs encounters many challenges, due to the current solar industry design. Countries that aim at developing solar technology on a significant
scale, have to face China’s current market dominance. China is the largest producer, exporter, and installer of solar panels, on a worldwide scale. The final goal of the research is to evaluate if and how could China impede the competitiveness
or market expansion of Member States in the c-Si solar-tech industry. The main research question therefore is: What is China’s market dominance when compared to the European Union in the solar panels
global industry?
The analysis is structured by following the application of a novel Analytical Framework that takes into account all the significant factors that are able to influence the solar market dynamics. From the application of Analytical Framework to the EU-China case-study emerges the Market Dominance
Assessment, that analyses the actual market dominance of China, with respect to the European Union, in the commercialization of c-Si technologies.
Three are the main takeaways that can be drawn from the Market Dominance Assessment. Firstly, China, technically, controls over 80% of the worldwide c-Si solar market; each variable of the Analytical
Framework confirms the predominance of Chinese companies along the global solar supply chain, creating a situation where European parties cannot have access to those resources that allowed China to reach its current status. Secondly, the European Union is dependent on imports of Chinese c-Si panels, at the point that 90% of the current PV installations in the European territory come from China and few other Asian countries; at the same time, the EU is China’s number one trading partner. C-si panels trading, therefore, over years, created a situation of mutual dependency
among the two market parties, where the EU is dependent of Chinese export rates, while
China, to avoid over-supply, is dependent on European import rates. Thirdly, the best market strategy that Member States can apply is to accept and recognize the market dominance of China, and work to strengthen the domestic solar industry by tackling local weaknesses. As outlined in the policy options, the European Union, on my advice, should work, in the first place, towards the
implementation of a European electricity market. In conclusion, the European Union, therefore, remains highly dependent on Chinese c-Si panels, and this dependency is expected to rise in the coming years, due to future European plans to foster
solar energy. Anyhow, with the right policies and an adequate degree of investments in the solar industry, European countries will easily be able to reach the goals set in the European Green Deal. ...
source. Within solar technologies, crystalline-silicon (c-Si) based account for a market share of 95%. Nevertheless, large-scale production of solar PVs encounters many challenges, due to the current solar industry design. Countries that aim at developing solar technology on a significant
scale, have to face China’s current market dominance. China is the largest producer, exporter, and installer of solar panels, on a worldwide scale. The final goal of the research is to evaluate if and how could China impede the competitiveness
or market expansion of Member States in the c-Si solar-tech industry. The main research question therefore is: What is China’s market dominance when compared to the European Union in the solar panels
global industry?
The analysis is structured by following the application of a novel Analytical Framework that takes into account all the significant factors that are able to influence the solar market dynamics. From the application of Analytical Framework to the EU-China case-study emerges the Market Dominance
Assessment, that analyses the actual market dominance of China, with respect to the European Union, in the commercialization of c-Si technologies.
Three are the main takeaways that can be drawn from the Market Dominance Assessment. Firstly, China, technically, controls over 80% of the worldwide c-Si solar market; each variable of the Analytical
Framework confirms the predominance of Chinese companies along the global solar supply chain, creating a situation where European parties cannot have access to those resources that allowed China to reach its current status. Secondly, the European Union is dependent on imports of Chinese c-Si panels, at the point that 90% of the current PV installations in the European territory come from China and few other Asian countries; at the same time, the EU is China’s number one trading partner. C-si panels trading, therefore, over years, created a situation of mutual dependency
among the two market parties, where the EU is dependent of Chinese export rates, while
China, to avoid over-supply, is dependent on European import rates. Thirdly, the best market strategy that Member States can apply is to accept and recognize the market dominance of China, and work to strengthen the domestic solar industry by tackling local weaknesses. As outlined in the policy options, the European Union, on my advice, should work, in the first place, towards the
implementation of a European electricity market. In conclusion, the European Union, therefore, remains highly dependent on Chinese c-Si panels, and this dependency is expected to rise in the coming years, due to future European plans to foster
solar energy. Anyhow, with the right policies and an adequate degree of investments in the solar industry, European countries will easily be able to reach the goals set in the European Green Deal.
“Just” Energy Transition
Learnings from a Solar Park case study in India
The Uncertain Future of Oil Refineries
A Roadmap for Relevance and Integration of Oil Refineries into Future Energy Systems