Literature on transfer of training largely deals with positive transfer. Only few studies exist on negative transfer, and these were often performed in (laboratory) environments with low ecological validity. This study's objective is to identify factors that contribute to negative transfer in safety-critical professions. The primary focus of the study is on aviation, but investigated principles also apply to other domains with high-performing professionals. Semi-structured interviews were performed with training experts from commercial and military aviation (n = 8), as well as the medical (n = 1) and maritime (n = 1) domain. The experts were asked to list examples of negative transfer that they have observed or experienced themselves. Follow-up questions addressed training approaches and solutions regarding these examples. Answers were categorized using a transfer framework. The experts' most salient concerns involved: Time pressure, which leads to rushed training; Instructors with insufficient understanding of the limitations of the (simulator) training; and the way in which trainees should be placed into hazardous situations in a realistic manner. The experts provided several factors and recalls of experiences which may lead to negative transfer. These results may be relevant for instructors and can provide input for further experimental research regarding negative transfer.

Previous research indicated a need to improve pilot training with regard to understanding of autopilot logic and behavior, especially in non-routine situations. Therefore, we tested the effect of problem-based exploratory training on pilots’ understanding of autopilot functions. Using a moving-base flight simulator, general aviation pilots (n = 45) were trained to diagnose failures either without foreknowledge and guidance (exploratory group), without foreknowledge but with some guidance (exploratory-guidance group) or with foreknowledge and full guidance (control group). They subsequently performed six test scenarios in which their understanding of the effects of failures was tested by requiring them to deduce the failures and select autopilot modes that were still functioning. Those who received exploratory training with guidance were significantly more likely than the other groups to diagnose failures correctly. The exploratory training group also selected the most appropriate functioning autopilot modes significantly faster than the control group. The results suggest that exploratory training with an appropriate level of guidance is useful for gaining a practical understanding of autopilot logic and behavior. Exploratory training may help to improve transfer of training to operational practice, and prevent automation surprises and accidents.

We investigated whether deliberately going beyond alarms during aerodynamic stall recovery exercises may result in negative training. Two groups of 20 airline pilots received stall recovery training in a moving-base simulator. The “delayed-response” group induced the stall themselves. The “immediate-response” group was presented with paused situations and had to recover immediately after unpausing. In a surprising transfer test, the pilots in the delayed-response group showed less aggressive unloading, and experienced significantly more time pressure compared to the pilots in the immediate-response group. In a stall cue recognition test, the delayed-response group performed nearly significantly better. We conclude that experiencing the progression of an aerodynamic stall during training has positive effects on pilot performance, even if this requires unprocedural behavior.

Background: Previous research has shown that experiencing motion stimuli negatively impacts cognitive performance. Objective: In the current study, we investigate whether this impact relates to Type-II spatial disorientation (SD), to motion stimulus magnitude, or to an interaction of these factors. Method: Stimuli for participants (n = 23) consisted of Earth-vertical yaw rotations on a rotating chair in a completely darkened room. In the surprise condition, the stimulus started with subthreshold acceleration, followed by suprathreshold deceleration to a non-zero velocity, inducing a sensation of rotation that is opposite to the actual rotation revealed when the lights were switched on. In the no-surprise condition, the same changes in velocity were used, but starting from (almost) zero velocity, which induced a sensation of rotation in the same direction as the actual rotation. Participants performed a self-paced arithmetic task and measurement of their cognitive performance started after the environment was revealed. Stimulus magnitude was operationalized through higher or lower peak suprathreshold deceleration. Results: The results revealed that counting speed decreased significantly when participants were surprised, constituting a large effect size. The proportion of counting errors likewise increased significantly when participants were surprised, but only in the high-magnitude condition. Application: The findings suggest that surprise caused by the recognition of SD has an involuntary disruptive effect on cognition, which may impact performance of piloting tasks. These results are relevant when modeling motion stimuli effects on performance, and when developing SD awareness training for pilots.

Previous studies show that pilots sometimes make roll reversal errors (RREs) when responding to the aircraft bank angle shown on the attitude indicator (AI). This is suggestive of a perceptual ambiguity in the AI. In the current study, we investigated whether expectation contributes to such misperception. Twenty nonpilots performed tasks in a fixed-base flight simulator. Their expectation about the bank angle was manipulated with a flying task using outside view only. When flying at a bank angle, the outside view disappeared, a moving-horizon type AI was shown, and participants had to roll the wings level, trusting the AI. The AI often matched the previously flown turn. However, in some runs, it showed an opposite bank direction (Opposite condition), which was hypothesized to facilitate a misperception. In some other runs, it showed level flight (Level condition), which should not facilitate this. In a second session, participants rolled wings level without preceding flying task (Baseline condition). Participants made 11.2 times more RREs in the Opposite condition (75% error rate) compared to Baseline condition (6.7%), and 2.5 times more compared to the Level condition (30%). This indicates that RREs were in many cases caused by expectation-induced misperception of the AI bank angle.

Background: Mnemonic-type startle and surprise procedures were previously proposed to help pilots cope with startle and surprise in-flight, but effects on performance after procedure execution have not yet been investigated. Objective: Thus, we tested the effectiveness a new mnemonic-type procedure in a moving-base simulator with a non-linear model of a small twin-propeller aircraft flown single-pilot. Method: An experimental group of twelve line pilots was trained to use a four-item procedure: 1. Calm down: take a deep breath, sit up straight and relax shoulders and hands. 2. Observe: call out the basic flight parameters. 3. Outline: formulate a hypothesis about the problem. 4. Lead: formulate and execute a plan of action. A control group of twelve line pilots received a control training. Next, all pilots performed four scenarios with startling and surprising events. Data were obtained on pilot performance, stress, procedure application and evaluation. Results: Application of the procedure in the test scenarios was high (90.0% full, 100.0% partly), and pilots evaluated the procedure positively (median: 4 on a 1–5 point scale). There was significantly superior decision-making in the experimental group, but immediate responses were significantly less optimal. Pilots sometimes applied the procedure at inappropriate moments. Conclusion: The results of the tested mnemonic-type procedure were promising. The procedure may benefit, however, from modifications to reduce complexity and to stimulate application at the appropriate moment.

Objective: We tested whether a procedure in a hexapod simulator can cause incorrect assumptions of the bank angle (i.e., the “leans”) in airline pilots as well as incorrect interpretations of the attitude indicator (AI). Background: The effect of the leans on interpretation errors has previously been demonstrated in nonpilots. In-flight, incorrect assumptions can arise due to misleading roll cues (spatial disorientation). Method: Pilots (n = 18) performed 36 runs, in which they were asked to roll to wings level using only the AI. They received roll cues before the AI was shown, which matched with the AI bank angle direction in most runs, but which were toward the opposite direction in a leans-opposite condition (four runs). In a baseline condition (four runs), they received no roll cues. To test whether pilots responded to the AI, the AI sometimes showed wings level following roll cues in a leans-level condition (four runs). Results: Overall, pilots made significantly more errors in the leans-opposite (19.4%) compared to the baseline (6.9%) or leans-level condition (0.0%). There was a pronounced learning effect in the leans-opposite condition, as 38.9% of pilots made an error in the first exposure to this condition. Experience (i.e., flight hours) had no significant effects. Conclusion: The leans procedure was effective in inducing AI misinterpretations and control input errors in pilots. Application: The procedure can be used in spatial disorientation demonstrations. The results underline the importance of unambiguous displays that should be able to quickly correct incorrect assumptions due to spatial disorientation.

Objective: This study tested whether simulator-based training of pilot responses to unexpected or novel events can be improved by including unpredictability and variability in training scenarios. Background: Current regulations allow for highly predictable and invariable training, which may not be sufficient to prepare pilots for unexpected or novel situations in-flight. Training for surprise will become mandatory in the near future. Method: Using an aircraft model largely unfamiliar to the participants, one group of 10 pilots (the unpredictable and variable [U/V] group) practiced responses to controllability issues in a relatively U/V manner. A control group of another 10 pilots practiced the same failures in a highly predictable and invariable manner. After the practice, performance of all pilots was tested in a surprise scenario, in which the pilots had to apply the learned knowledge. To control for surprise habituation and familiarization with the controls, two control tests were included. Results: Whereas the U/V group required more time than the control group to identify failures during the practice, the results indicated superior understanding and performance in the U/V group as compared to the control group in the surprise test. There were no significant differences between the groups in surprise or performance in the control tests. Conclusion: Given the results, we conclude that organizing pilot training in a more U/V way improves transfer of training to unexpected situations in-flight. Application: The outcomes suggest that the inclusion of U/V simulator training scenarios is important when training pilots for unexpected situations.

Objective: A conceptual model is proposed in order to explain pilot performance in surprising and startling situations. Background: Today’s debate around loss of control following in-flight events and the implementation of upset prevention and recovery training has highlighted the importance of pilots’ ability to deal with unexpected events. Unexpected events, such as technical malfunctions or automation surprises, potentially induce a “startle factor” that may significantly impair performance. Method: Literature on surprise, startle, resilience, and decision making is reviewed, and findings are combined into a conceptual model. A number of recent flight incident and accident cases are then used to illustrate elements of the model. Results: Pilot perception and actions are conceptualized as being guided by “frames,” or mental knowledge structures that were previously learned. Performance issues in unexpected situations can often be traced back to insufficient adaptation of one’s frame to the situation. It is argued that such sensemaking or reframing processes are especially vulnerable to issues caused by startle or acute stress. Conclusion: Interventions should focus on (a) increasing the supply and quality of pilot frames (e.g., though practicing a variety of situations), (b) increasing pilot reframing skills (e.g., through the use of unpredictability in training scenarios), and (c) improving pilot metacognitive skills, so that inappropriate automatic responses to startle and surprise can be avoided. Application: The model can be used to explain pilot behavior in accident cases, to design experiments and training simulations, to teach pilots metacognitive skills, and to identify intervention methods.