The increased digitalization of the power grid and transition to cyber-physical power systems raise serious concerns about cyber security and secure operation of the power system. It is now well recognized that information and communication technologies are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Thereby, electrical power grids as critical infrastructures are susceptible to cyber attacks as well. Malicious cyber attacks on power grid infrastructure can detrimentally affect power system operation and stability. In the worst-case, it can trigger cascading failures across the system, leading to a blackout. A coordinated cyber attack across multiple locations can collapse the entire interconnected power grids of nations, or even continents. This is a real modern-day threat, as seen during the cyber attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015, 2016, and 2022. Therefore, power grid resilience and cyber security are now recognized challenges for power system operation and security of electricity supply. The gist of this entire thesis can be summarized as follows.
“Analyze and demonstrate how cyber attacks on power grids may cause and accelerate cascading failures. Based on this analysis, develop suitable proactive defense measures to contain the spread of cascading failures.” Consequently, the core research focus of the thesis with a threefold objective is as follows:
Cyber security of digital substations
This thesis investigated the impact of cyber threats targeting digital substations. Experiments demonstrate the catastrophic impact of spoofing and replay attacks targeting OT protocols and standards used in digital substations, leading to relay denial-of-service and malfunction. Subsequently, it is experimentally shown how these events may snowball resulting in cascading failures and blackouts. Based on this analysis, this thesis developed mitigation measures based on IEC 62351-6 using HMAC to secure critical control communications in digital substations, adherent to latency requirements of 4ms. The aforementioned studies are conducted using a hardware-in-the-loop cyber-physical experimental framework that closely resembles real-world conditions within a digital substation, including intelligent electronic devices and protection schemes. Thus, the outcomes of this research are of particular importance to both, vendors and utilities.
Dynamical analysis of power system cascading failures caused by cyber attacks
This thesis proposed a data-driven method for dynamical analysis of power system cascading failures caused by cyberattacks. It provides experimental proof on how cyber attacks may accelerate the cascading failure mechanism, in comparison to historically observed blackouts. Using a dynamic power grid model, consisting of multiple, coordinated protection schemes, the point of no return is defined and analysed in a cascading failure sequence by applying the Hilbert–Huang transform for time-frequency analysis. Numerical results indicate, cyber attacks may accelerate cascading failures at least by a factor of 3x. This is due to the excitation and non-damping of multiple frequency modes greater than 1 Hz in a short time span. This thesis demonstrates semi-analytically how cyber attacks can cause and accelerate power system cascading failures, thereby leading to a quicker point of no return.
Defense against cyber attack induced cascading failures
Cyber-physical power systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks that may lead to cascading failures and power outages. A promising solution to tackle this emerging issue is the concept of preventive/proactive controlled islanding before the cyber event occurs based on early detection of cyber attacks. Hence, this thesis developed a novel physics-informed graph convolution network to perform preventive controlled islanding. By incorporating power system physics into the neural network loss function formulations, the resulting islands were made self-sufficient and voltage and frequency stable. Experimental simulations using a modified version of the IEEE 39-bus test system with coordinated protection schemes prove that the islands formed using the proposed method can contain the spread of cascading failures. This results in minimization of loss of load by up to 90\% and 62% when single and multiple substations are compromised, respectively. Hence, this work paves the way towards automated cyber-resilience for power systems and provides system operators with decision making recommendations to curtail the spread of cascading failures.
This thesis addressed the increasingly crucial topic of cyber security for power systems. It provides a comprehensive analysis of how cyber attacks may trigger and accelerate cascading failures in power grids, potentially leading to large-scale power outages. Furthermore, this research enhances our understanding of power grid cyber resilience by experimentally demonstrating the vulnerabilities of digital substations, proposing a novel data-driven method for analysing cyber-induced cascading failures, and developing an advanced physics-informed graph convolutional network for preventive controlled islanding. The findings of this thesis are highly relevant to utilities and vendors, as they offer practical insights into the pitfalls associated with power system digitalization and possible adverse consequences. Thereby, the proposed cascading failure analysis technique and preventive islanding defense strategy directly contribute towards enhancing the cyber security of power systems and ensuring better preparedness in the face of the ever-growing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, this research contributes to a more cyber secure and resilient power system.